ESSAY ON THE SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT: SHOWING ITS NATURE, ITS NECESSITY, AND ITS EXTENT.

By

CALEB BURGE, A.M.

APPENDIX.

REMARKS ON THE DOCTRINE OF UNIVERSAL SALVATION.

 

HAVING exhibited in the foregoing work a view of atonement which, if correct, sets aside one of the principal arguments on which reliance has been had for the vindication of the doctrine of universal salvation, I propose to add here a few observations on what I apprehend must be the principal remaining arguments in favor of that system.

I certainly shall not err by assuming that the above-mentioned sentiment ought never to be embraced without the most conclusive evidence of its truth. For, certainly, nothing short of the most enlightened assurance that the scheme cannot possibly prove false, can justify any one in risking the salvation of his immortal soul upon its correctness.

But where shall we find this clear evidence, this infallible proof on which a man may safely venture his eternal all?

I know of but two sources from which evidence can be derived, namely: The analogy of nature, and the doctrines of revelation. If the sentiment cannot be proved from one or the other of these, it may safely be affirmed that it is without support.

By the analogy of nature, I mean the correspondence of one thing with another in the natural world. The laws of nature are supposed to be steady and uniform in their operation. Events, which have uniformly occurred in time past, we believe will continue to occur uniformly in time to come. Our evidence in favor of the continued occurrence of these events, is from the analogy of nature. And this is the only principle (except immediate revelation from God), upon which we never calculate any future event with any degree of certainty or even probability. We believe that day and night, seedtime and harvest, summer and winter, will continue to succeed each other. These events have succeeded each other so long and so uniformly as to prove that they occur according to the uniform laws of nature. So long, therefore, as the laws of nature remain what they now are, these events will regularly occur. Our belief in their future occurrence, therefore, is reasonable, because it is according to the analogy of nature.

Since the earth always has yielded productions necessary to supply the wants of man and beast, it is reasonable to believe it always will until it is destroyed. But the evidence on which this belief is founded, and which, indeed, renders it reasonable, is the analogy of nature.

But is there any thing in the analogy of nature which affords evidence that mankind will all be happy in the world to come? What are the facts in nature from which their future salvation can be certainly inferred? Are they all happy now? Have they always been perfectly happy? If so, the analogy of nature certainly does afford an argument in favor of their future happiness. But if not, if pain and misery always have prevailed among them, why is it unreasonable to conclude (judging from the analogy of nature merely), that pain and misery probably always will prevail among them? The fact that pain and misery prevail among God's creatures now, proves irresistibly that they are not incompatible with his government. Why, then, is it unreasonable to conclude that they always will prevail, at least in as great a degree, as they always have done?

Will you tell me, that although mankind suffer pain and misery, in their present existence, yet there are certain principles of improvement in their condition which constantly tend to a better state; that the longer they live, the more knowledge they acquire and the more happy they become; and that in this way the operation of these principles will prepare them for complete and perfect happiness in the next period of their existence?

I answer. If this were a fact, and, the evidence of it clear, if the supposed principles of improvement in the present condition of human existence have a manifest and constant operation as has been supposed; if the longer men live the happier they become, and this were the case with them universally; it certainly would be reasonable to conclude that they will probably be happier in the next period of their existence. From the analogy of nature, we should conclude that their miseries probably will come to an end. The same mode of reasoning from the past to future, which would lead to the conclusion that they will suffer pain and misery in the world to come, would also, from this supposed fact, justify the belief that probably this pain and misery will eventually become extinct. We should expect they would suffer pain and misery in the future world, because they always had, in a greater or less degree, suffered them in this world. But according to the supposed fact, their pain and misery in this world had constantly diminished; so that if they could have stayed long enough here, their suffering continuing to diminish in its accustomed ratio, would eventually have become extinct. I see not but this would be a fair argument.

But the argument fails because the supposed fact, on which it is founded does not exist. It is not true that mankind do grow happier, the longer they live. It is not true that their sufferings do universally and constantly diminish with the multiplication of their years. It is not true that extreme old age is the period of human life which approximates nearest to a state of perfection in happiness. No, this is not the period of earthly existence universally desired on account of its perfection of health, its freedom from perplexing care, and its exquisite relish for the pleasures of life. In these respects, the period of youth is evidently far preferable. The supposed fact, therefore, instead of being true, is actually the reverse, of truth. The conclusion must therefore be reversed.

How often do we hear persons say, that their childhood and youth have been far the most happy periods of their life! But, if there is a just foundation in human experience for the remark, it certainly furnishes an argument from the analogy of nature, very unfavorable to future happiness. If mankind are afflicted with pain and misery during all that part of their existence with which we are acquainted; and not only so, but this infelicity actually increases, and their situation in relation to happiness becomes more and more unfavorable the longer they live; if their capacity for happiness actually decreases, as they approach a future state, until their present life is terminated in the agonies of death; certainly, no argument from analogy can be hence drawn in favor of their future happiness.

Moreover, in the present state of existence, it is an obvious fact that the happiness and misery of mankind very much result from their own character and conduct. This is strikingly the case with the miseries of poverty, disease, and disgrace, which so uniformly overtake the idle, the intemperate, and the dissipated. And, indeed, almost every case of human misery on earth may be traced to some impropriety of conduct in the sufferer. But if improper conduct subjects to suffering in this life, it is certainly reasonable to suppose it will subject to the same calamity in the life to come. If a man who possesses an unholy, revengeful, and malicious disposition cannot be happy in this life, what reason have we to suppose that he can be happy in the life to come? Since mankind manifest very different dispositions and characters, and are evidently happy or miserable, very much according to this difference in the present world, we have reason to expect that this will continue to he the case in the world to come.

But perhaps you will say, as many indeed have said, that all men become perfectly holy at the moment of death, and that this change prepares them for immediate and everlasting happiness. In answer, I would inquire what evidence you have for this opinion. Are you acquainted with any events in nature which are analogous to it? According to this opinion, thousands and millions who have lived all their days in sin, and actually become more and more hardened in iniquity, and perhaps closed their probationary life in some very daring act of wickedness, have been suddenly changed and prepared for heaven. This must have been the case with the inhabitants of the old world, who were destroyed by the delude; with the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah, and the cities of the plain; with Pharaoh and his hosts; and even with the traitor Judas, the son of perdition. But have you ever known any events in nature which bear any analogy to this? With what sudden changes of this very favorable kind are you acquainted?

But perhaps you believe that the unrighteous will suffer a temporary punishment in the world to come, and that this will be the means of their conversion, and will prepare them for everlasting happiness. But, I ask again, where is the proof of your opinion? With what events are you acquainted which furnish evidence that such salutary effects will result from punishment in the world to come? Do such effects result from it in the present world? Is it a fact, that such is the constitution of nature, that punishment uniformly tends to make the wicked better? Is it a fact, that the more a criminal is punished, the more effectually he is, reformed? Is this the case generally with Sabbath breakers, who have been prosecuted and fined for violating the sanctity of the Lord's day? Is this the case, too, with thieves, who have been publicly scourged for their larcenies? And do counterfeiters, swindlers, and perjurers descend from the ignominious pillory and come forth from the gloomy dungeon, evidently purified by the fire of their chastisement? This evidently is not the case. But if punishments do not convert the wicked in the present world, what evidence have we that they will do it in the world to come? We certainly have none from the analogy of nature.

But if the case were otherwise, and it could be proved that future punishment will inevitably produce repentance, it would by no means follow that the damned will certainly be saved. If their punishment should humble and reform them, it would still be uncertain whether God would pardon and release them from suffering. In the present world we know he does not do it. Repentance and reformation do not prevent the evil consequences of past transgression. Health ruined, reputation blasted, and interest squandered, by intemperance and voluptuousness, we certainly know cannot be restored by mere repentance and reformation.

But if God's treatment of us in the future state will be of the same nature which we find it to be in this, what evidence can we have that repentance will procure a release from punishment then, which it does not procure now? Since we know that repentance does not stop the evil consequences of sin in this world, how can we know that it will stay the arm of avenging justice in the world to come? Since there are evidently cases in which crime and misery are so connected that repentance ever so sincere and reformation ever so complete cannot separate them in this world, how do we know that this will not be the case with sinners in the world to come? Most certainly the analogy of nature affords no such assurance.

On the one hand, it affords no assurance that punishment will certainly lead to repentance; nor, on the other, that, if it did, repentance would certainly lead to salvation.

But you say you rely with confidence on the goodness of God. You cannot believe that the unbounded goodness of the Creator is consistent with the final misery of any of his creatures.

I answer; if the unbounded goodness of God is inconsistent with the final misery of any of his creatures, why is it not inconsistent also with their present misery?

It is a fact, too obvious to be denied, that the goodness of God is not such as excludes evil from existence. If it were true that the goodness of God possesses this quality, there would be nothing felt among all his creatures, except uninterrupted and perfect happiness. Now, if this were the case; if no evil did exist in the world; if all rational beings were virtuous and happy; evidence of the continuance of such a state of things would be highly probable. If we observed and experienced nothing but virtue and happiness in the world, we should naturally conclude that evil probably never would be felt upon the earth. I say probably, because even in this case we should not have positive proof. We should have no positive proof that evil did not exist somewhere; nor that it certainly would not be introduced among us. Merely not having evidence that evil would come, could not afford proof that it certainly would not come. It is possible that there may be some worlds in the universe where evil never has been known. Now the inhabitants of such worlds would have much better ground to infer from the goodness of God the universal happiness of rational beings, than we have. Yet such an inference would be infinitely erroneous. This our miseries loudly teach.

The fact is, the moment we allow the principle that a Being of perfect goodness cannot suffer the existence of evil among, his creatures, the inference becomes irresistible that the great Deity, the Creator of the world, is not a Being of perfect goodness. Or, if we adopt the principle that evil is not inconsistent with the perfect goodness of God, then we cannot infer, from the mere goodness of God, that evil will ever cease to exist. If infinite wisdom and goodness chose that a system of finite beings, embracing both good and evil, should exist, then we do not know that this kind of system will not continue to exist time without end. There is no principle of reason which evinces the contrary. For it is obvious that the continuance of evil cannot be any more contrary to the divine goodness than the present existence of it. The same argument, then, from the goodness of God to prove universal future happiness, will equally prove universal present happiness. The argument, therefore, is false because it contradicts fact. In reasoning from the goodness of God merely, we have as much evidence that all mankind are now, and always have been, perfectly happy, as we have that they ever will be. But we certainly know that God has not that kind of goodness which prompts him to make all mankind happy in this world; how then can we know that he has that kind of goodness which will prompt him to make them all happy in the world to come?

Our divine Creator has so constituted things that some men are virtuous and others wicked in this world; how then do we know that this will not be the case in a future world? He has constituted things so that some are happy and some are miserable in the present world; how then do we know that this will not be the case in the world to come?

The existence of evil in this world certainly proves one of two things; either the divine Creator is not perfectly good, or the existence of evil is consistent with perfect goodness. If we allow the former inference to be correct, and suppose that the Deity possesses only a partial measure of goodness, we surely cannot know that he will make all men happy hereafter. For certainly the idea that God is only so far good as to make men partially happy in the present state is not enough to prove that he will make them all perfectly happy in a future state. But if we adopt the other inference, and allow that the existence of evil is compatible with perfect goodness in the Creator, we are then left without the least shadow of an argument that the goodness of God will ever exterminate sin and suffering. What is now consistent with the goodness of God, may be consistent with it millions of years hence, and even for ever. The mere perfect goodness of God, therefore, affords no evidence that evil will ever come to an end. It affords no proof that all men will be made permanently happy.

It is a fact, that such is the present constitution of things that some objects are pleasing to some men and displeasing to others; the same things which give happiness to some men, give disgust and misery to others. The plain and humbling doctrines of the gospel; the pure and spiritual worship of God; lively, ardent, and animated zeal in religion; these things give high joy and satisfaction to some, and occasion deep disgust to others. Now we have no evidence that this state of things will not continue for ever. The joys of heaven being purely religious joys, there is nothing unnatural or irrational in the idea that these things should give high joy and satisfaction to all those whose taste is prepared to relish them; and intolerable disgust and anguish to all those whose taste is opposed. So long as this is the present state of things, we have no evidence from reason that any essential alteration will take place in a future state. It is clear, therefore, that the analogy of nature or the light of reason affords no evidence, that all mankind will be happy in the world to come.

If, then, the light of reason affords no proof that all men will be happy in a future state, where shall we go for the requisite evidence? Shall we go to the Bible? Is it there to be, found? Does the sacred volume clearly and decidedly teach that there is no such thing as evil in the world to come? That there is no danger of being hurt of the second death? Does it inform us so plainly that there is no danger of our being mistaken and deceived, that all sin and suffering will be hereafter completely destroyed and for ever unknown? Do the oracles of the living God explicitly inform us that mankind, whether they repent or not, whether they believe or not, whether they are holy or not, will all assuredly attain to perfect happiness, when death has transmitted, them from time to eternity? If the inspired writers believed while they wrote, that mankind will all become finally happy, we should suppose they would have plainly expressed the sentiment. We should suppose they would have expressed themselves so plainly, that no persons would ever be in any doubt concerning their meaning. If all mankind will be finally made happy, then it is just as certain that the wicked will be happy in the world to come, as it is that the righteous will. And, if the inspired writers believed this, we should suppose they would have expressed their belief And if they have expressed their belief that the wicked are as certain of final happiness as the righteous are, we should suppose they would have done it plainly. We should suppose they would have done it so plainly that no one would be in any danger of misunderstanding their meaning. We should suppose they would have been as plain and explicit, when they expressed their belief that the wicked will be finally saved, as they were when they expressed their belief that the righteous will be saved. Now it is a fact, that whenever the inspired writers speak of the future state of the righteous, they speak in a language which is so plain that no one can misunderstand their meaning. Indeed, the instance was never known of any person's entertaining any doubts whether the righteous in the world to come will be happy. Now, if the inspired writers believed that there is the same certainty that the wicked will be finally saved, why have they not expressed this belief in the same open, frank, and unequivocal manner? If they believed this doctrine and were honest, it is not seen why they have not done it. If they, believed that the wicked will be finally happy, why should they be any more liable to speak of their future state, in a way calculated to lead people to believe that they never shall be happy, than they were to speak of the righteous in that way? It is a palpable fact, that the Scriptures never, in a single instance, speak of the righteous in a way which can lead any one to suppose that they shall never be happy. It is also a notorious fact, that the Scriptures do uniformly speak of the wicked in such a way as has generally led people to believe that they never shall see life. Indeed, it is uniformly the case through the Bible, that the language which is used in describing the future state of the wicked, is directly the reverse of that which is used in application to the righteous. Now, how is this reconcilable with common honesty on the part of the sacred writers, if they supposed that the wicked shall all be finally saved? On the ground that they believed such doctrine, there is a kind of double dishonesty running through the whole course of their writings. For it is a truth that they never have, in a single instance, plainly and explicitly expressed this belief. They have never once said that a wicked man, dying in impenitence and unbelief shall surely find mercy, or be eventually pardoned, or be finally restored. And the reason of this neglect has not been because they have never spoken of the death of the wicked, for they have often spoken of it. Here, then, is one part of the dishonesty. The other is whenever they speak of the death of the wicked, and the future state of the impenitent and unbelieving, they uniformly represent them as in a ruined and hopeless state. They assure us that "the hope of the wicked is as a spider's web," and "like the giving up of the ghost;" that "the hope of unjust men perisheth;" and that "when a wicked man dieth, his expectation shall perish." Now how can this language be reconciled with common honesty, if the writer of it at the time he wrote really believed that all the wicked shall in some future time be restored? One inspired writer assures us, that "He that being often reproved, hardeneth his neck, shall suddenly be destroyed, and that without remedy." But, how can this be reconciled with common honesty if the writer really believed that when the wicked are destroyed there shall be a remedy? The prophet Ezekiel denounced a woe against those who "strengthened the hands of the wicked, that he should not return from his wicked way by promising him life." Now where was the honesty of the prophet when he denounced this woe, if at the same time he believed that a promise of life might be truly made to the wicked? Indeed, if there was a just ground on which life, might be promised to the wicked, the woe would more justly apply to those who refuse or neglect to make them this promise. If the prophet had believed that the wicked should eventually see life, and had been honest, he would have said, Woe unto them who refuse or neglect to promise life to the wicked. But where do we find so much as a single passage in the whole Bible which is evidently of this import?

If the wicked shall in some future day be restored to the favor of God, Jesus Christ undoubtedly knew it. He, too, is a teacher to whom no one would wish to impute dishonesty. He was always frank, candid, and unequivocal in all his declarations. He was always willing to disclose the whole truth. He gave abundant testimony that the righteous shall be saved. He spake on this subject so plainly that no one can misunderstand him. But has he with equal plainness declared that the wicked shall be saved? or that they shall be finally restored? The passages in which he has declared that the righteous shall be saved are almost innumerable. Will any one pretend that he has made this declaration as often concerning the final state of the wicked? But why should he not do it as often if the doctrine is true? Surely we need as much evidence to convince us that the wicked shall be finally saved, as we do to prove that the righteous shall the saved.

But why should I inquire for so many declarations of Christ concerning the final salvation of the wicked, when it is a solemn fact that there is not one. No, in all our Lord's discourses, in which he seemed to speak of every thing, there is not a single declaration to be found which promises life to the wicked. But, on the other hand, his discourses abound with contrary declarations; "that they shall be destroyed;" and that "where he goes they shall never come." And these awful denunciations are as numerous as his promises of life to the righteous. When we look for Christ's promises of life to the righteous, we find they are numerous. If we look to find, in his discourses, promises of life to the wicked equally numerous, we look in vain. If we look to find, in all his discourses, so much as a single promise of life to the wicked, we again look in vain.

But if we look for his denunciations of wrath against the wicked, and his unequivocal threatenings that they shall not see life, we find them in abundance. These we find quite as often, and quite as plain, as we do his promises of life to the righteous. Now, what is the evident and inevitable conclusion to be drawn from this fact? Supposing Christ to be an honest, candid, and faithful teacher of truth, what shall we conclude?

Let us look at a few of Christ's plain and candid representations of truth in relation to this subject, and see how they would be likely to appear to a candid and impartial bearer. We will begin with the parable of Lazarus the rich man.

"There was a certain rich man, which was clothed in purple and fine linen, and fared sumptuously every day. And there was a certain beggar named Lazarus, which was laid at his gate, fall of sores. And it came to pass that the beggar died, and was carried by the angels into Abraham's bosom. The rich man also died, and was buried: And in hell he lifted up his eyes, being in torments, and seeth Abraham afar off, and Lazarus in his bosom. And he cried, and said, Father Abraham, have mercy on me; and send Lazarus, that he may dip the tip of his finger in water and cool my tongue; for I am tormented in this flame. But Abraham said, son, remember that thou in thy lifetime receivedst thy good things, and likewise Lazarus evil things; but now he is comforted, and thou art tormented. And besides all this, between us and you there is a great gulf fixed; so that they which would pass from hence to you cannot; neither can they pass to us, that would come from thence." Now if Christ may be considered a plain, honest, and candid teacher of truth, what must we understand from this representation? Would a candid and impartial hearer obtain an idea from it that there is any ground of hope for the wicked in a future world? Would he not rather obtain the idea that when the wicked die they have then received all their good things, even to a drop of water, which they ever can receive? Would not an impartial hearer understand the language of Abraham to the rich man as fairly implying all this! The rich man petitioned for a single drop of water. Abraham told him he could not have it. And then assigned two reasons why he could not. One was because in his lifetime he had received his good things. What an awful thought! that because he had received his good things he now could not any more receive any favor, no, not so much as a drop of water. And the other reason is equally awful and decisive. A great gulf was fixed between them, so that it was impossible for any one to pass. Now if we may suppose that Christ was honest and candid, and did not wish to make any wrong impressions on the minds of his hearers; nor to state things in a manner which would be liable to lead them into a belief of erroneous sentiments; what must we think of the representation in this parable? If our Lord had designed the parable for no other purpose than to give assurance that those who die in wickedness shall never be saved, or obtain any future favor, however small, I ask, how could be have represented this truth in a more forcible and plain and unequivocal manner?

The parable of the tares of the field is also equally explicit. "Another parable put he forth unto them, saying, The kingdom of heaven is likened unto a man, which sowed good seed in his field. But while men slept, his enemy came and sowed tares among the wheat, and went his way. But when the blade was sprung up, and brought forth fruit, then appeared the tares also. So the servants of the householder came and said unto him, Sir, didst thou not sow good seed in thy field?. From whence then hath it tares? He said unto them, An enemy hath done this. The servants said unto him, Wilt thou then that we go and gather them up? But he said, nay; lest while ye gather up the tares, ye root up also the wheat with them. Let both grow together until the harvest, and in the time of harvest I will say to the reapers, Gather ye together first the tares, and bind them in bundles to burn them; but gather the wheat into my barn." That this important parable might be correctly understood, our Lord has himself, in his usually plain and honest manner, explained it. His explanation is this: "He that soweth the good seed is the Son, of Man; the field is the world; the good seed are the children of the kingdom; but the tares are the children of the wicked one, the enemy that sowed them is the devil; the harvest is the end of the world; and the reapers are the angels. As therefore the tans are gathered and burned in the fire; so shall it be in the end of the world. The Son of Man shall send forth his angels, and they shall gather out of his kingdom all things that offend, and them that do iniquity, and shall cast them into a furnace of fire; there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth." This explanation is so remarkably plain that all comment upon it is utterly needless.

In the parable of the supper also, Christ teaches in language most explicit, that all who slight the invitation, shall be for ever excluded. "Verily I say unto you, that none of those men which were bidden, shall taste of my supper."

In Christ's description of the day of judgment, he explicitly teaches the same truth. "When the Son of Man shall come in his glory and all the holy angels with him, then shall he sit upon the throne of his glory; and before him shall be gathered all nations; and he shall separate them one from another, as a shepherd divideth his sheep from the goats, and he shall set the sheep on his right hand, but the goats on the left. Then shall the king say unto them on his right hand, Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you, from the foundation of the world. Then shall he say also unto them on the left hand; Depart from me ye cursed, into everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels. And these shall go away into everlasting punishment; but the righteous into life eternal." Now who can suppose, if Christ was honest and unwilling to mislead the people, that he would make such plain and pointed declarations concerning the future state of the wicked; and make them too so often, and in fact make no other representation concerning their future condition; if at the same time, he believed that they all will be finally happy! The supposition is too absurd to be believed. Either Christ did not believe that the wicked who die in their sins will finally be saved; or, he did not honestly declare his sentiments. Indeed, the common manner of his preaching was such as actually made the impression on the minds of his hearers that the wicked will be finally destroyed, "and that without remedy." They who heard him, received the impression also that the number of those who will finally perish in their sins will be much greater than the number of the saved. His preaching, instead of leading them to think that he supposed all would be saved, was directly calculated to make them believe that he supposed but few would be saved. He preached, "Strait is the gate, and narrow is the way, which leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it;" but "Wide is the gate, and broad is the way, that leadeth to destruction, and many there be which go in there at." Preaching in this manner, it is not strange that people should believe he held that but few will be saved. Hence we read that one said unto him, "Lord, are there few that be saved?" Now, how unaccountable it must be if Christ preached that all will be saved, that any of his hearers should ask such a question! Lord, are there few that be saved? Who ever yet heard of any person's putting such a question to a Universal preacher? It was however, a very natural question to ask Christ. It was a question which the general tenor of his preaching was calculated to prompt. But let us see how he answered it. If he had preached in such a manner that his hearers had not clearly understood his meaning, here was a most favorable opportunity to make further explanation and correct their mistake. If he believed that all will be finally saved, here was a most favorable opportunity to make it known. It was, indeed, an opportunity which he as a teacher could not honestly avoid improving for the purpose. For, if, he had hitherto kept his sentiments on this point concealed, he was here brought to a trial--that must disclose them; or, he must absolutely refuse to answer an honest question; or, he must declare an untruth. For the very question is asked him, "Lord, are them few that be saved? Does he say no? The number saved cannot properly be called few. They are many. Does he say; By far the greater part will be saved? Does he say; All will eventually be restored? No, nothing like this. But his answer is directly the reverse. His answer is, "Strive to enter in at the strait gate;" that gate which, in another place, he declared but few find. For, says he, "many will seek to enter in and not be able." The many will not be able. These an they that go in at the wide gate, leading to destruction. Now, who that believes, Christ was honest and acquainted with his subject can; suppose that he believed in universal salvation; or, in final restoration! Our Lord continues his answer still further. "When once the master of the house is risen up, and hath shut to the door, and ye begin to stand without and to knock at the door, saying, Lord, Lord, open unto us; and he shall answer and say unto you, I know you not whence ye are. Then shall ye begin to say, we have eaten and drunk in thy presence, and thou hast taught in our streets. But he shall say, I tell you I know not whence ye are; depart from me, all ye workers of iniquity. There shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth when ye shall see Abraham and Isaac and Jacob, and all the prophets in the kingdom of God, and you yourselves thrust out."

But, perhaps you wish to know whether Christ is not the Saviour of the whole world?

I answer, yes; and he knew perfectly well how many of the whole world would embrace the salvation he offered, so as to be actually saved by him, and expressly assured us that the number of such is but few.

Do you ask, then, in what sense he can be called the Saviour of the whole world? I answer; in the same sense that a physician may be said to be the physician of a whole town when there is no other one, and this one; is abundantly able to do all the business if the people would apply to him; while at the same time one half of the sick have no faith in him and will not apply to him, and actually die for want of his help.

And now, reader, let we tell you; that Jesus Christ is your Saviour; but if you do not believe in him and make application to him for pardon, you must die in your sins, and perish for ever. On the authority of his own word I assure you, "He that believeth not shall be damned."

Finis.

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