APPENDIX.
REMARKS ON THE DOCTRINE OF
UNIVERSAL SALVATION.
HAVING exhibited in the foregoing
work a view of atonement which, if correct, sets aside one
of the principal arguments on which reliance has been had
for the vindication of the doctrine of universal salvation,
I propose to add here a few observations on what I apprehend
must be the principal remaining arguments in favor of that
system.
I certainly shall not err by assuming
that the above-mentioned sentiment ought never to be
embraced without the most conclusive evidence of its truth.
For, certainly, nothing short of the most enlightened
assurance that the scheme cannot possibly prove false, can
justify any one in risking the salvation of his immortal
soul upon its correctness.
But where shall we find this clear
evidence, this infallible proof on which a man may safely
venture his eternal all?
I know of but two sources from which
evidence can be derived, namely: The analogy of nature, and
the doctrines of revelation. If the sentiment cannot be
proved from one or the other of these, it may safely be
affirmed that it is without support.
By the analogy of nature, I mean the
correspondence of one thing with another in the natural
world. The laws of nature are supposed to be steady and
uniform in their operation. Events, which have uniformly
occurred in time past, we believe will continue to occur
uniformly in time to come. Our evidence in favor of the
continued occurrence of these events, is from the analogy of
nature. And this is the only principle (except immediate
revelation from God), upon which we never calculate any
future event with any degree of certainty or even
probability. We believe that day and night, seedtime and
harvest, summer and winter, will continue to succeed each
other. These events have succeeded each other so long and so
uniformly as to prove that they occur according to the
uniform laws of nature. So long, therefore, as the laws of
nature remain what they now are, these events will regularly
occur. Our belief in their future occurrence, therefore, is
reasonable, because it is according to the analogy of
nature.
Since the earth always has yielded
productions necessary to supply the wants of man and beast,
it is reasonable to believe it always will until it is
destroyed. But the evidence on which this belief is founded,
and which, indeed, renders it reasonable, is the analogy of
nature.
But is there any thing in the analogy
of nature which affords evidence that mankind will all be
happy in the world to come? What are the facts in nature
from which their future salvation can be certainly inferred?
Are they all happy now? Have they always been perfectly
happy? If so, the analogy of nature certainly does afford an
argument in favor of their future happiness. But if not, if
pain and misery always have prevailed among them, why is it
unreasonable to conclude (judging from the analogy of nature
merely), that pain and misery probably always will prevail
among them? The fact that pain and misery prevail among
God's creatures now, proves irresistibly that they are not
incompatible with his government. Why, then, is it
unreasonable to conclude that they always will prevail, at
least in as great a degree, as they always have
done?
Will you tell me, that although
mankind suffer pain and misery, in their present existence,
yet there are certain principles of improvement in their
condition which constantly tend to a better state; that the
longer they live, the more knowledge they acquire and the
more happy they become; and that in this way the operation
of these principles will prepare them for complete and
perfect happiness in the next period of their
existence?
I answer. If this were a fact, and,
the evidence of it clear, if the supposed principles of
improvement in the present condition of human existence have
a manifest and constant operation as has been supposed; if
the longer men live the happier they become, and this were
the case with them universally; it certainly would be
reasonable to conclude that they will probably be happier in
the next period of their existence. From the analogy of
nature, we should conclude that their miseries probably will
come to an end. The same mode of reasoning from the past to
future, which would lead to the conclusion that they will
suffer pain and misery in the world to come, would also,
from this supposed fact, justify the belief that probably
this pain and misery will eventually become extinct. We
should expect they would suffer pain and misery in the
future world, because they always had, in a greater or less
degree, suffered them in this world. But according to the
supposed fact, their pain and misery in this world had
constantly diminished; so that if they could have stayed
long enough here, their suffering continuing to diminish in
its accustomed ratio, would eventually have become extinct.
I see not but this would be a fair argument.
But the argument fails because the
supposed fact, on which it is founded does not exist. It is
not true that mankind do grow happier, the longer they live.
It is not true that their sufferings do universally and
constantly diminish with the multiplication of their years.
It is not true that extreme old age is the period of human
life which approximates nearest to a state of perfection in
happiness. No, this is not the period of earthly existence
universally desired on account of its perfection of health,
its freedom from perplexing care, and its exquisite relish
for the pleasures of life. In these respects, the period of
youth is evidently far preferable. The supposed fact,
therefore, instead of being true, is actually the reverse,
of truth. The conclusion must therefore be
reversed.
How often do we hear persons say,
that their childhood and youth have been far the most happy
periods of their life! But, if there is a just foundation in
human experience for the remark, it certainly furnishes an
argument from the analogy of nature, very unfavorable to
future happiness. If mankind are afflicted with pain and
misery during all that part of their existence with which we
are acquainted; and not only so, but this infelicity
actually increases, and their situation in relation to
happiness becomes more and more unfavorable the longer they
live; if their capacity for happiness actually decreases, as
they approach a future state, until their present life is
terminated in the agonies of death; certainly, no argument
from analogy can be hence drawn in favor of their future
happiness.
Moreover, in the present state of
existence, it is an obvious fact that the happiness and
misery of mankind very much result from their own character
and conduct. This is strikingly the case with the miseries
of poverty, disease, and disgrace, which so uniformly
overtake the idle, the intemperate, and the dissipated. And,
indeed, almost every case of human misery on earth may be
traced to some impropriety of conduct in the sufferer. But
if improper conduct subjects to suffering in this life, it
is certainly reasonable to suppose it will subject to the
same calamity in the life to come. If a man who possesses an
unholy, revengeful, and malicious disposition cannot be
happy in this life, what reason have we to suppose that he
can be happy in the life to come? Since mankind manifest
very different dispositions and characters, and are
evidently happy or miserable, very much according to this
difference in the present world, we have reason to expect
that this will continue to he the case in the world to
come.
But perhaps you will say, as many
indeed have said, that all men become perfectly holy at the
moment of death, and that this change prepares them for
immediate and everlasting happiness. In answer, I would
inquire what evidence you have for this opinion. Are you
acquainted with any events in nature which are analogous to
it? According to this opinion, thousands and millions who
have lived all their days in sin, and actually become more
and more hardened in iniquity, and perhaps closed their
probationary life in some very daring act of wickedness,
have been suddenly changed and prepared for heaven. This
must have been the case with the inhabitants of the old
world, who were destroyed by the delude; with the
inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah, and the cities of the
plain; with Pharaoh and his hosts; and even with the traitor
Judas, the son of perdition. But have you ever known any
events in nature which bear any analogy to this? With what
sudden changes of this very favorable kind are you
acquainted?
But perhaps you believe that the
unrighteous will suffer a temporary punishment in the world
to come, and that this will be the means of their
conversion, and will prepare them for everlasting happiness.
But, I ask again, where is the proof of your opinion? With
what events are you acquainted which furnish evidence that
such salutary effects will result from punishment in the
world to come? Do such effects result from it in the present
world? Is it a fact, that such is the constitution of
nature, that punishment uniformly tends to make the wicked
better? Is it a fact, that the more a criminal is punished,
the more effectually he is, reformed? Is this the case
generally with Sabbath breakers, who have been prosecuted
and fined for violating the sanctity of the Lord's day? Is
this the case, too, with thieves, who have been publicly
scourged for their larcenies? And do counterfeiters,
swindlers, and perjurers descend from the ignominious
pillory and come forth from the gloomy dungeon, evidently
purified by the fire of their chastisement? This evidently
is not the case. But if punishments do not convert the
wicked in the present world, what evidence have we that they
will do it in the world to come? We certainly have none from
the analogy of nature.
But if the case were otherwise, and
it could be proved that future punishment will inevitably
produce repentance, it would by no means follow that the
damned will certainly be saved. If their punishment should
humble and reform them, it would still be uncertain whether
God would pardon and release them from suffering. In the
present world we know he does not do it. Repentance and
reformation do not prevent the evil consequences of past
transgression. Health ruined, reputation blasted, and
interest squandered, by intemperance and voluptuousness, we
certainly know cannot be restored by mere repentance and
reformation.
But if God's treatment of us in the
future state will be of the same nature which we find it to
be in this, what evidence can we have that repentance will
procure a release from punishment then, which it does not
procure now? Since we know that repentance does not stop the
evil consequences of sin in this world, how can we know that
it will stay the arm of avenging justice in the world to
come? Since there are evidently cases in which crime and
misery are so connected that repentance ever so sincere and
reformation ever so complete cannot separate them in this
world, how do we know that this will not be the case with
sinners in the world to come? Most certainly the analogy of
nature affords no such assurance.
On the one hand, it affords no
assurance that punishment will certainly lead to repentance;
nor, on the other, that, if it did, repentance would
certainly lead to salvation.
But you say you rely with confidence
on the goodness of God. You cannot believe that the
unbounded goodness of the Creator is consistent with the
final misery of any of his creatures.
I answer; if the unbounded goodness
of God is inconsistent with the final misery of any of his
creatures, why is it not inconsistent also with their
present misery?
It is a fact, too obvious to be
denied, that the goodness of God is not such as excludes
evil from existence. If it were true that the goodness of
God possesses this quality, there would be nothing felt
among all his creatures, except uninterrupted and perfect
happiness. Now, if this were the case; if no evil did exist
in the world; if all rational beings were virtuous and
happy; evidence of the continuance of such a state of things
would be highly probable. If we observed and experienced
nothing but virtue and happiness in the world, we should
naturally conclude that evil probably never would be felt
upon the earth. I say probably, because even in this case we
should not have positive proof. We should have no positive
proof that evil did not exist somewhere; nor that it
certainly would not be introduced among us. Merely not
having evidence that evil would come, could not afford proof
that it certainly would not come. It is possible that there
may be some worlds in the universe where evil never has been
known. Now the inhabitants of such worlds would have much
better ground to infer from the goodness of God the
universal happiness of rational beings, than we have. Yet
such an inference would be infinitely erroneous. This our
miseries loudly teach.
The fact is, the moment we allow the
principle that a Being of perfect goodness cannot suffer the
existence of evil among, his creatures, the inference
becomes irresistible that the great Deity, the Creator of
the world, is not a Being of perfect goodness. Or, if we
adopt the principle that evil is not inconsistent with the
perfect goodness of God, then we cannot infer, from the mere
goodness of God, that evil will ever cease to exist. If
infinite wisdom and goodness chose that a system of finite
beings, embracing both good and evil, should exist, then we
do not know that this kind of system will not continue to
exist time without end. There is no principle of reason
which evinces the contrary. For it is obvious that the
continuance of evil cannot be any more contrary to the
divine goodness than the present existence of it. The same
argument, then, from the goodness of God to prove universal
future happiness, will equally prove universal present
happiness. The argument, therefore, is false because it
contradicts fact. In reasoning from the goodness of God
merely, we have as much evidence that all mankind are now,
and always have been, perfectly happy, as we have that they
ever will be. But we certainly know that God has not that
kind of goodness which prompts him to make all mankind happy
in this world; how then can we know that he has that kind of
goodness which will prompt him to make them all happy in the
world to come?
Our divine Creator has so constituted
things that some men are virtuous and others wicked in this
world; how then do we know that this will not be the case in
a future world? He has constituted things so that some are
happy and some are miserable in the present world; how then
do we know that this will not be the case in the world to
come?
The existence of evil in this world
certainly proves one of two things; either the divine
Creator is not perfectly good, or the existence of evil is
consistent with perfect goodness. If we allow the former
inference to be correct, and suppose that the Deity
possesses only a partial measure of goodness, we surely
cannot know that he will make all men happy hereafter. For
certainly the idea that God is only so far good as to make
men partially happy in the present state is not enough to
prove that he will make them all perfectly happy in a future
state. But if we adopt the other inference, and allow that
the existence of evil is compatible with perfect goodness in
the Creator, we are then left without the least shadow of an
argument that the goodness of God will ever exterminate sin
and suffering. What is now consistent with the goodness of
God, may be consistent with it millions of years hence, and
even for ever. The mere perfect goodness of God, therefore,
affords no evidence that evil will ever come to an end. It
affords no proof that all men will be made permanently
happy.
It is a fact, that such is the
present constitution of things that some objects are
pleasing to some men and displeasing to others; the same
things which give happiness to some men, give disgust and
misery to others. The plain and humbling doctrines of the
gospel; the pure and spiritual worship of God; lively,
ardent, and animated zeal in religion; these things give
high joy and satisfaction to some, and occasion deep disgust
to others. Now we have no evidence that this state of things
will not continue for ever. The joys of heaven being purely
religious joys, there is nothing unnatural or irrational in
the idea that these things should give high joy and
satisfaction to all those whose taste is prepared to relish
them; and intolerable disgust and anguish to all those whose
taste is opposed. So long as this is the present state of
things, we have no evidence from reason that any essential
alteration will take place in a future state. It is clear,
therefore, that the analogy of nature or the light of reason
affords no evidence, that all mankind will be happy in the
world to come.
If, then, the light of reason affords
no proof that all men will be happy in a future state, where
shall we go for the requisite evidence? Shall we go to the
Bible? Is it there to be, found? Does the sacred volume
clearly and decidedly teach that there is no such thing as
evil in the world to come? That there is no danger of being
hurt of the second death? Does it inform us so plainly that
there is no danger of our being mistaken and deceived, that
all sin and suffering will be hereafter completely destroyed
and for ever unknown? Do the oracles of the living God
explicitly inform us that mankind, whether they repent or
not, whether they believe or not, whether they are holy or
not, will all assuredly attain to perfect happiness, when
death has transmitted, them from time to eternity? If the
inspired writers believed while they wrote, that mankind
will all become finally happy, we should suppose they would
have plainly expressed the sentiment. We should suppose they
would have expressed themselves so plainly, that no persons
would ever be in any doubt concerning their meaning. If all
mankind will be finally made happy, then it is just as
certain that the wicked will be happy in the world to come,
as it is that the righteous will. And, if the inspired
writers believed this, we should suppose they would have
expressed their belief And if they have expressed their
belief that the wicked are as certain of final happiness as
the righteous are, we should suppose they would have done it
plainly. We should suppose they would have done it so
plainly that no one would be in any danger of
misunderstanding their meaning. We should suppose they would
have been as plain and explicit, when they expressed their
belief that the wicked will be finally saved, as they were
when they expressed their belief that the righteous will be
saved. Now it is a fact, that whenever the inspired writers
speak of the future state of the righteous, they speak in a
language which is so plain that no one can misunderstand
their meaning. Indeed, the instance was never known of any
person's entertaining any doubts whether the righteous in
the world to come will be happy. Now, if the inspired
writers believed that there is the same certainty that the
wicked will be finally saved, why have they not expressed
this belief in the same open, frank, and unequivocal manner?
If they believed this doctrine and were honest, it is not
seen why they have not done it. If they, believed that the
wicked will be finally happy, why should they be any more
liable to speak of their future state, in a way calculated
to lead people to believe that they never shall be happy,
than they were to speak of the righteous in that way? It is
a palpable fact, that the Scriptures never, in a single
instance, speak of the righteous in a way which can lead any
one to suppose that they shall never be happy. It is also a
notorious fact, that the Scriptures do uniformly speak of
the wicked in such a way as has generally led people to
believe that they never shall see life. Indeed, it is
uniformly the case through the Bible, that the language
which is used in describing the future state of the wicked,
is directly the reverse of that which is used in application
to the righteous. Now, how is this reconcilable with common
honesty on the part of the sacred writers, if they supposed
that the wicked shall all be finally saved? On the ground
that they believed such doctrine, there is a kind of double
dishonesty running through the whole course of their
writings. For it is a truth that they never have, in a
single instance, plainly and explicitly expressed this
belief. They have never once said that a wicked man, dying
in impenitence and unbelief shall surely find mercy, or be
eventually pardoned, or be finally restored. And the reason
of this neglect has not been because they have never spoken
of the death of the wicked, for they have often spoken of
it. Here, then, is one part of the dishonesty. The other is
whenever they speak of the death of the wicked, and the
future state of the impenitent and unbelieving, they
uniformly represent them as in a ruined and hopeless state.
They assure us that "the hope of the wicked is as a spider's
web," and "like the giving up of the ghost;" that "the hope
of unjust men perisheth;" and that "when a wicked man dieth,
his expectation shall perish." Now how can this language be
reconciled with common honesty, if the writer of it at the
time he wrote really believed that all the wicked shall in
some future time be restored? One inspired writer assures
us, that "He that being often reproved, hardeneth his neck,
shall suddenly be destroyed, and that without remedy." But,
how can this be reconciled with common honesty if the writer
really believed that when the wicked are destroyed there
shall be a remedy? The prophet Ezekiel denounced a woe
against those who "strengthened the hands of the wicked,
that he should not return from his wicked way by promising
him life." Now where was the honesty of the prophet when he
denounced this woe, if at the same time he believed that a
promise of life might be truly made to the wicked? Indeed,
if there was a just ground on which life, might be promised
to the wicked, the woe would more justly apply to those who
refuse or neglect to make them this promise. If the prophet
had believed that the wicked should eventually see life, and
had been honest, he would have said, Woe unto them who
refuse or neglect to promise life to the wicked. But where
do we find so much as a single passage in the whole Bible
which is evidently of this import?
If the wicked shall in some future
day be restored to the favor of God, Jesus Christ
undoubtedly knew it. He, too, is a teacher to whom no one
would wish to impute dishonesty. He was always frank,
candid, and unequivocal in all his declarations. He was
always willing to disclose the whole truth. He gave abundant
testimony that the righteous shall be saved. He spake on
this subject so plainly that no one can misunderstand him.
But has he with equal plainness declared that the wicked
shall be saved? or that they shall be finally restored? The
passages in which he has declared that the righteous shall
be saved are almost innumerable. Will any one pretend that
he has made this declaration as often concerning the final
state of the wicked? But why should he not do it as often if
the doctrine is true? Surely we need as much evidence to
convince us that the wicked shall be finally saved, as we do
to prove that the righteous shall the saved.
But why should I inquire for so many
declarations of Christ concerning the final salvation of the
wicked, when it is a solemn fact that there is not one. No,
in all our Lord's discourses, in which he seemed to speak of
every thing, there is not a single declaration to be found
which promises life to the wicked. But, on the other hand,
his discourses abound with contrary declarations; "that they
shall be destroyed;" and that "where he goes they shall
never come." And these awful denunciations are as numerous
as his promises of life to the righteous. When we look for
Christ's promises of life to the righteous, we find they are
numerous. If we look to find, in his discourses, promises of
life to the wicked equally numerous, we look in vain. If we
look to find, in all his discourses, so much as a single
promise of life to the wicked, we again look in vain.
But if we look for his denunciations
of wrath against the wicked, and his unequivocal
threatenings that they shall not see life, we find them in
abundance. These we find quite as often, and quite as plain,
as we do his promises of life to the righteous. Now, what is
the evident and inevitable conclusion to be drawn from this
fact? Supposing Christ to be an honest, candid, and faithful
teacher of truth, what shall we conclude?
Let us look at a few of Christ's
plain and candid representations of truth in relation to
this subject, and see how they would be likely to appear to
a candid and impartial bearer. We will begin with the
parable of Lazarus the rich man.
"There was a certain rich man, which
was clothed in purple and fine linen, and fared sumptuously
every day. And there was a certain beggar named Lazarus,
which was laid at his gate, fall of sores. And it came to
pass that the beggar died, and was carried by the angels
into Abraham's bosom. The rich man also died, and was
buried: And in hell he lifted up his eyes, being in
torments, and seeth Abraham afar off, and Lazarus in his
bosom. And he cried, and said, Father Abraham, have mercy on
me; and send Lazarus, that he may dip the tip of his finger
in water and cool my tongue; for I am tormented in this
flame. But Abraham said, son, remember that thou in thy
lifetime receivedst thy good things, and likewise Lazarus
evil things; but now he is comforted, and thou art
tormented. And besides all this, between us and you there is
a great gulf fixed; so that they which would pass from hence
to you cannot; neither can they pass to us, that would come
from thence." Now if Christ may be considered a plain,
honest, and candid teacher of truth, what must we understand
from this representation? Would a candid and impartial
hearer obtain an idea from it that there is any ground of
hope for the wicked in a future world? Would he not rather
obtain the idea that when the wicked die they have then
received all their good things, even to a drop of water,
which they ever can receive? Would not an impartial hearer
understand the language of Abraham to the rich man as fairly
implying all this! The rich man petitioned for a single drop
of water. Abraham told him he could not have it. And then
assigned two reasons why he could not. One was because in
his lifetime he had received his good things. What an awful
thought! that because he had received his good things he now
could not any more receive any favor, no, not so much as a
drop of water. And the other reason is equally awful and
decisive. A great gulf was fixed between them, so that it
was impossible for any one to pass. Now if we may suppose
that Christ was honest and candid, and did not wish to make
any wrong impressions on the minds of his hearers; nor to
state things in a manner which would be liable to lead them
into a belief of erroneous sentiments; what must we think of
the representation in this parable? If our Lord had designed
the parable for no other purpose than to give assurance that
those who die in wickedness shall never be saved, or obtain
any future favor, however small, I ask, how could be have
represented this truth in a more forcible and plain and
unequivocal manner?
The parable of the tares of the field
is also equally explicit. "Another parable put he forth unto
them, saying, The kingdom of heaven is likened unto a man,
which sowed good seed in his field. But while men slept, his
enemy came and sowed tares among the wheat, and went his
way. But when the blade was sprung up, and brought forth
fruit, then appeared the tares also. So the servants of the
householder came and said unto him, Sir, didst thou not sow
good seed in thy field?. From whence then hath it tares? He
said unto them, An enemy hath done this. The servants said
unto him, Wilt thou then that we go and gather them up? But
he said, nay; lest while ye gather up the tares, ye root up
also the wheat with them. Let both grow together until the
harvest, and in the time of harvest I will say to the
reapers, Gather ye together first the tares, and bind them
in bundles to burn them; but gather the wheat into my barn."
That this important parable might be correctly understood,
our Lord has himself, in his usually plain and honest
manner, explained it. His explanation is this: "He that
soweth the good seed is the Son, of Man; the field is the
world; the good seed are the children of the kingdom; but
the tares are the children of the wicked one, the enemy that
sowed them is the devil; the harvest is the end of the
world; and the reapers are the angels. As therefore the tans
are gathered and burned in the fire; so shall it be in the
end of the world. The Son of Man shall send forth his
angels, and they shall gather out of his kingdom all things
that offend, and them that do iniquity, and shall cast them
into a furnace of fire; there shall be wailing and gnashing
of teeth." This explanation is so remarkably plain that all
comment upon it is utterly needless.
In the parable of the supper also,
Christ teaches in language most explicit, that all who
slight the invitation, shall be for ever excluded. "Verily I
say unto you, that none of those men which were bidden,
shall taste of my supper."
In Christ's description of the day of
judgment, he explicitly teaches the same truth. "When the
Son of Man shall come in his glory and all the holy angels
with him, then shall he sit upon the throne of his glory;
and before him shall be gathered all nations; and he shall
separate them one from another, as a shepherd divideth his
sheep from the goats, and he shall set the sheep on his
right hand, but the goats on the left. Then shall the king
say unto them on his right hand, Come, ye blessed of my
Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you, from the
foundation of the world. Then shall he say also unto them on
the left hand; Depart from me ye cursed, into everlasting
fire prepared for the devil and his angels. And these shall
go away into everlasting punishment; but the righteous into
life eternal." Now who can suppose, if Christ was honest and
unwilling to mislead the people, that he would make such
plain and pointed declarations concerning the future state
of the wicked; and make them too so often, and in fact make
no other representation concerning their future condition;
if at the same time, he believed that they all will be
finally happy! The supposition is too absurd to be believed.
Either Christ did not believe that the wicked who die in
their sins will finally be saved; or, he did not honestly
declare his sentiments. Indeed, the common manner of his
preaching was such as actually made the impression on the
minds of his hearers that the wicked will be finally
destroyed, "and that without remedy." They who heard him,
received the impression also that the number of those who
will finally perish in their sins will be much greater than
the number of the saved. His preaching, instead of leading
them to think that he supposed all would be saved, was
directly calculated to make them believe that he supposed
but few would be saved. He preached, "Strait is the gate,
and narrow is the way, which leadeth unto life, and few
there be that find it;" but "Wide is the gate, and broad is
the way, that leadeth to destruction, and many there be
which go in there at." Preaching in this manner, it is not
strange that people should believe he held that but few will
be saved. Hence we read that one said unto him, "Lord, are
there few that be saved?" Now, how unaccountable it must be
if Christ preached that all will be saved, that any of his
hearers should ask such a question! Lord, are there few that
be saved? Who ever yet heard of any person's putting such a
question to a Universal preacher? It was however, a very
natural question to ask Christ. It was a question which the
general tenor of his preaching was calculated to prompt. But
let us see how he answered it. If he had preached in such a
manner that his hearers had not clearly understood his
meaning, here was a most favorable opportunity to make
further explanation and correct their mistake. If he
believed that all will be finally saved, here was a most
favorable opportunity to make it known. It was, indeed, an
opportunity which he as a teacher could not honestly avoid
improving for the purpose. For, if, he had hitherto kept his
sentiments on this point concealed, he was here brought to a
trial--that must disclose them; or, he must absolutely
refuse to answer an honest question; or, he must declare an
untruth. For the very question is asked him, "Lord, are them
few that be saved? Does he say no? The number saved cannot
properly be called few. They are many. Does he say; By far
the greater part will be saved? Does he say; All will
eventually be restored? No, nothing like this. But his
answer is directly the reverse. His answer is, "Strive to
enter in at the strait gate;" that gate which, in another
place, he declared but few find. For, says he, "many will
seek to enter in and not be able." The many will not be
able. These an they that go in at the wide gate, leading to
destruction. Now, who that believes, Christ was honest and
acquainted with his subject can; suppose that he believed in
universal salvation; or, in final restoration! Our Lord
continues his answer still further. "When once the master of
the house is risen up, and hath shut to the door, and ye
begin to stand without and to knock at the door, saying,
Lord, Lord, open unto us; and he shall answer and say unto
you, I know you not whence ye are. Then shall ye begin to
say, we have eaten and drunk in thy presence, and thou hast
taught in our streets. But he shall say, I tell you I know
not whence ye are; depart from me, all ye workers of
iniquity. There shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth when
ye shall see Abraham and Isaac and Jacob, and all the
prophets in the kingdom of God, and you yourselves thrust
out."
But, perhaps you wish to know whether
Christ is not the Saviour of the whole world?
I answer, yes; and he knew perfectly
well how many of the whole world would embrace the salvation
he offered, so as to be actually saved by him, and expressly
assured us that the number of such is but few.
Do you ask, then, in what sense he
can be called the Saviour of the whole world? I answer; in
the same sense that a physician may be said to be the
physician of a whole town when there is no other one, and
this one; is abundantly able to do all the business if the
people would apply to him; while at the same time one half
of the sick have no faith in him and will not apply to him,
and actually die for want of his help.
And now, reader, let we tell you;
that Jesus Christ is your Saviour; but if you do not believe
in him and make application to him for pardon, you must die
in your sins, and perish for ever. On the authority of his
own word I assure you, "He that believeth not shall be
damned."
Finis.
|