Plan of argument -- Certain characteristics of the system are undeniable, viz., the Mosaic system reveals God as national king and tutelary deity. -- All its laws are from God. -- It was administered to some extent by a human magistracy, as well as by an extraordinary providence. -- It involved political propitiatory rites, &c. -- It was sustained expressly only by temporal sanctions. -- Exterior action Is the criterion but not the rule of judgment. -- That it was a theocracy evident from its religions services; also from its direct or primary design. -- It was a positive, as distinguished from a moral institution. -- It was a civil government, administered by God, as distinguished from a civil government, administered by man. -- Its late beginning and transient continuance.

 

 

HAVING attempted to show what a theocracy is, I now proceed to show --

 

II. That the Mosaic law was a theocracy, i.e., that the government of Israel by Noses was one in which God assumed the two relations of national king and tutelary deity toward that nation, and by the civil magistrate, and also by an extraordinary providence, administered their entire civil polity, through propitiatory rites, under an economy of grace; thus exhibiting, in a natural and representative method, his higher system of moral government over them, and over all men, as moral and immortal beings.

 

Before I proceed directly to offer the proof of this proposition, I remark, that there is one great and prominent fact, and a principle resulting from it, which are ever to be remembered in all our reasonings on this subject. The fact is, that the Israelites when delivered from Egypt, and when receiving the law from Moses, were thoroughly Egyptian in their character, education, language, modes of thought, opinions, habits, and usages. The principle resulting from this fact is, that the true God, in revealing himself to this people in the two great relations of their king and their God, would and ought to be understood, and would intend to be understood, in the true Egyptian meaning of the language employed in this revelation of himself. Especially are these things so, provided that there is no evidence to the contrary, and that every consideration supposable in the case to confirm this meaning of the language, actually exists. Assuming then, what I claim to have decisively proved, that the government of Egypt was a theocracy, and that the Israelites when brought out of Egypt could have had no idea or conception of any other government than that of a theocracy, it follows, according to the principle above stated, that the government which God. by Moses instituted over Israel, in the only authorized and just view of it, must have been regarded by that people as a theocracy, and therefore was a theocracy.

 

I shall now attempt to establish the truth of my leading proposition, by considerations which not only prove its truth, but which will more fully unfold the nature of the Mosaic system, than could well be done in a somewhat general definition. These considerations will be derived --

 

In the first place, from some prominent and undeniable characteristics of the Mosaic law as given to Israel.

 

In the second place, from the character, views, opinions, &c., of the Israelites, as wholly Egyptian, when they received the law.

 

In the third place, from a common use of language in the early ages of the world, in which one thing is spoken of chiefly to denote another.

In the fourth place, from the New Testament.

 

That the Mosaic law was a theocracy is evident --

 

I. From some obvious and undeniable characteristics of the law as given to Israel.

 

That the government of this people was, in some general and essential respects, a theocracy, according to the view now taken of such a government, I suppose will, to a great extent, be admitted. I suppose that it will be admitted --

 

First, that God assumed toward this people the two great relations of national king and tutelary deity.

 

Secondly, that the whole Mosaic system -- all its laws -- emanated from God, and were clothed with his authority.

 

Thirdly, that this government, while administered to some extent by a human magistracy of divine institution, was also administered by an extraordinary providence.

 

Fourthly, that it involved through propitiatory rites and sacrifices suited to its nature, a system of grace in the forgiveness of civil or political transgression.

 

These essential characteristics of a theocracy in the government of Israel, I suppose to be too obvious to require proof.

 

There are yet others which may be more questionable. I remark therefore --

 

Fifthly, that this government over Israel was directly sustained and enforced by no other than temporal sanctions.

 

Here the question is not, whether a future state of rewards and punishments is revealed in the Old Testament. What is now maintained is, that the Mosaic law or Jewish theocracy, was enforced only by temporal sanctions. For proof of this, I deem it sufficient to refer only to the 27th, 28th, and 29th chapters of Deuteronomy. In the 27th, the Jewish lawgiver directs the manner in which the curses of the law shall be published to all the people and assented to by them. In the 28th, we have a full and unambiguous description of these curses, and of the opposite blessings. Both are exclusively of a temporal nature. Nor could the language have been more explicit to this purpose, according to ordinary usage, had there been no future state. In the 29th chapter, it appears that the threatened evils were not exclusively national, or such as could be inflicted on the whole nation, but that the individual who violated the law became liable to similar punishments. Vide verses 19, 20, and Heb. ii. 2.

Sixthly. I allege that external or overt action, though not the rule, is the only criterion of judgment in the administration of the law of the theocracy. God, in assuming the relation of national king toward Israel, and giving them law, never lowered or obscured the standard of right moral action, but required them to love him with all the heart, mind, soul, and strength, the only spirit of loyalty due to a Being of infinite perfection. As tried by this perfect rule of action, he ever assumed, and proceeded on the assumption, that all were sinners or transgressors, and as such must be condemned or cursed. Deut. xxvii. 26, and Gal. iii. 10. The light of truth shone so strongly on this fact, that the people, at least the candid and enlightened, fully conceded it by their frequent and formal confessions. Their offerings and sacrifices, voluntary and commanded, proved the same thing. And especially did the great sacrifice, made once a year for the sins of all the people, show that all were transgressors of that perfect rule of action which was common to both the national and the moral government of God, and that God never relinquished the prerogative of searching the heart and trying the reins. And yet the omniscience of God, as the national sovereign, never interposed in the administration of the national law, or theocracy. The laws of this system, as such, like other national laws, were designed to secure that spirit of loyalty due to the national king, and thus to secure such overt action as would promote, and to prevent such as would hinder, the well-being of the State, as a temporal or earthly community. It was also designed to secure those outward forms of worship, which were appointed to produce an almost constant recognition of the only living and true God as the tutelary deity of the nation, and thus strongly to impress on them their dependence on him for their national prosperity. This was the direct design of those civil laws in which their burdensome ritual was enacted and enforced.

 

And here, that we may not confound, as is too often done, the two co-existing kinds of government -- the national government of God over this people, as citizens of the State, and his moral government over them and all other men, as moral beings -- it becomes important to show wherein these two kinds of government, in the present case, agree, and wherein they differ.

 

The law of requirement then, that is, the substantial rule of action, is necessarily the same in both the moral and the national system. This results from the fact, that the same perfect Being is. the supreme sovereign and lawgiver in both, and therefore, in the form of a rule of action, could require in both nothing less than that spirit of loyalty which is due to his perfect character, with all its specific expressions in subordinate action demanded by circumstances. Thus God, in this law or rule of action required every Israelite as a subject of his national government, in every act whether of worship, or other overt service or conduct, to love him with all his heart, and with all his soul, not less than as a subject of his moral government. Every Israelite, viewed in relation to either government, was under this perfect rule of action for all moral beings, and if tried and judged by this perfect rule of action, must be convicted of not having observed all the words of this law to do them, and by it must therefore be condemned. But none but the Omniscient King could justly judge the people according to this perfect rule of action; nor he, without making the law of his moral government both a rule of action and a rule of judgment. Had he done this, the national government would have terminated at once, as it were, in the eternal retribution of its subjects as moral beings. Besides, that this perfect rule of action is not the rule of judgment in either system is evident, since each system, instead of being administered on strictly legal principles, is combined with and modified by an economy of grace, providing mercy and forgiveness on condition of repentance. Hence, legal sanctions are not adjudged or executed under either system according to the perfect rule of action under each, but under each according to a rule of judgment instituted and modified by grace. This rule of judgment also is and must be the same under both systems. From the character of the lawgiver, this must require, some degree of personal holiness as the condition of acceptance; nothing being more incongruous and unsupposable, than that such a lawgiver and judge should, even under a gracious economy, lower the condition of the slightest favor to entire impenitence and unbelief, i.e., to the utter want of personal holiness. This would be a formal exemption of the impenitent from punishment, and an avowed relinquishment of all claim to the lowest degree of that spirit of loyalty which is due to such a lawgiver. The rule of judgment then, so far as made known by the language of the lawgiver -- so far as clear promulgation, or precise specification in terms can determine it, is the same under both systems.

 

It requires, in formal and explicit specification, REPENTANCE, i.e., some degree of personal holiness. No subject, as related to either system, however according to some other principles he may be treated, has any warrant to conclude or suppose that he is truly accepted, or regarded with actual favor, by the lawgiver, any further than he is truly penitent in his sight. The lawgiver has said nothing, done nothing, to authorize on this point any other conclusion.

 

But we now come to a difficulty, or at least, what is very commonly supposed to be a difficulty -- one which, if I mistake not, has occasioned very unsatisfactory exhibitions of the Jewish theocracy. This difficulty arises from overlooking the necessary principle in the administration of a national government, though it be a theocracy -- that of making overt or external action the criterion, but not the rule of judgment. This distinction between le rule and the criterion of judgment, though it seems not to be at once obvious to every mind, is of vital importance. The necessity of adhering to this principle in the administration of all civil law, does in no respect change the rule of judgment, which requires in all cases, a true spirit of loyalty to the ruler, in the present case, to God, the national king of Israel. Adherence to this principle is only the necessary mode of determining the question of the spirit of loyalty, compliance or noncompliance with the actual rule of judgment. Instead of determining it by the direct inspection of Omniscience, the Omniscient National King himself conforms to this universal and necessary mode of determining conformity to the rule of judgment. Nor does he in this way in any degree obscure, or render doubtful to reason or common sense, the actual rule of judgment as requiring the loyalty of the heart. The subject tried and judged, even when accepted and rewarded on account of merely external action as the only criterion of his loyalty, still knows that he has not secured the favor of his Omniscient Sovereign, but only the external expression of his favor. Such hypocrisy is the subject's own fault, not that of the sovereign or the law. The rule of judgment is plain, and if the necessary criterion of judgment is, through the perversion of the subject, made the occasion of hypocrisy, still this criterion is the best which the nature of the case admits of, and the evils resulting from it are far less than would result from adopting any other. For, while a spirit of loyalty furnishes the best security that the ends of civil government, in overt action and its results will be obtained, and ought therefore to be required, still the well-being of the State is secured by that overt action which is the expression of this spirit. I add, that the administration of this system in adjudging and executing sanctions, was to a great extent, committed to rulers and judges with whom external action could, of course, be the only criterion of judgment. Accordingly, as in other cases of civil government, a rule of evidence was prescribed, and external action only made the proof of loyalty or disloyalty to the national king.

 

The same thing is substantially true in respect to that part of it which God reserved to himself, and administered by an extraordinary providence. God here proceeded as rigidly on the Principle of making overt action on the part of the nation and of individuals, the criterion of obedience and disobedience, and of conferring good and inflicting evil, as ever did any human magistrate. So far as subjects were externally obedient, they were, according to the only possible mode of administering a civil government, adjudged and treated as in principle obedient to the rule of judgment; and so far as they were externally disobedient, they were adjudged and treated as in principle disobedient to the rule of judgment.

 

Thus God was pleased to give to his chosen people a political or civil government, and to proceed more humano in every part of its administration. Every step of his providence, in awarding temporal sanctions, and the mode of it, show that he disposed of their civil affairs only in accordance with the principles of civil government; and though he interfered by a supernatural providence, he did so only in conformity with these principles.

 

Seventhly. That the Mosaic system was a theocracy, is evident from those laws of the system which respected what are commonly called "the religious services" of the people. Most writers on this subject speak of the laws of this system as "political laws, requiring religious duties, rites, sacrifices, offerings and worship." Now I cannot but regard this not only as a false, but as a peculiarly unfortunate use of the word religious, as fitted to conceal the distinction between what was strictly and simply "political," and what was, in the lowest authorized sense, "religious." The error in my view, consists in overlooking the fact, that the twofold relation of national king and tutelary deity is merely apolitical relation -- the latter as truly as the former. It is true, as I have already said, that in every law of the theocracy, the requirement reached the heart. This is true in every instance of rightful civil or national government -- the specific nature of this spirit of loyalty being determined in each case by the character of the national king or ruler. Still, in each case it is a merely political requirement, as enacted by political authority and for political purposes. Obedience and disobedience to such a requirement are merely political obedience or political disobedience; and this, whether God or man be the national ruler, and whether the spirit of loyalty be due to the one or the other. The former indeed, contemplated under certain relations, would be a morally right or religious principle or state of mind. But it has also other relations which are by no means essential to it as a religious principle, and which result from it solely as commanded by, or as obedience to, civil law. As such obedience, it secured by promise the favor of the tutelary deity, in long life and great temporal prosperity; while contemplated simply as religious principle, it had no such connection. To call any of the services, even the morally right principle, as claimed by the law of the theocracy or civil law, religious service or religious worship, or by any name when contemplated as obedience to civil law, which shall imply that it sustains any other or higher relations than those of mere civil obedience, is a false and unfortunate use of language. Even the word holy, when applied to this people, denoted nothing beyond obedience to civil law, and as such simply described it as related to the promises of the national system. From the mere word, no inference could be made of any higher relation of those to whom it was applied, than that of subjects of civil government, who evinced by external conduct a spirit of loyalty to their national king, and were thus entitled to the temporal blessings which he, as national God, had promised to such obedience. Thus it appears that God, as the national king and tutelary deity of Israel, in the administration of a theocracy over this people, and in its true and proper effects and consequences, no more held them responsible for religious service properly so called, or personal piety, or true spiritual religion in its higher relations to the allotments of men in a future state, than does any wise and good human ruler. It is true, that God, as a national ruler, in claiming of his subjects a spirit of loyalty, claimed more as his due, than any human ruler can properly claim as his due. Still, this spirit of loyalty to him as national ruler, no more sustained, as such, those relations which pertain to what is properly called religion, piety, spiritual holiness, than does the spirit of loyalty to a human magistrate sustain these relations. I am not saying that those services required by the theocracy, which are often called" religious," were not peculiar, and did not sustain a peculiar relation. They were peculiar, and yet common to every theocracy. Their relation was peculiar on account of the peculiar arbitrary relation of God, as the tutelary deity of the nation, dispensing by a supernatural providence, national blessings and national calamities. They were services rendered to him in view of his relation to them, and their consequent relation to him, in respect to these temporal blessings and evils, and not to him as their moral or spiritual ruler, nor as arising from their relation to him as moral or spiritual beings.

 

It will greatly confirm the views now given of the Mosaic law, to show in this place, how decisively they refute a common objection to it. It has often been said, that as a civil or national law, it punished its subjects for matters of opinion, and the instance especially appealed to, is that of the sincere idolater. This dishonorable imputation has been commonly countenanced by the advocates of its divine authority. It is now denied as entirely groundless. God as we have seen, could not, consistently with his own character, claim in the form of requirement any thing less of men than that truly spiritual state of the heart which is his due, and which of course implies a just conception of his character. But then we have seen, that this same state of mind as required by God as the moral governor of men, and as required by God as national king of citizens in their relation to the State, must sustain very different relations. Viewed as required by the moral governor, it is piety, spiritual religion, with its eternal relations. Viewed as required by the national king, it is simply political loyalty in temporal relations. The same things, mutatis mutandis, are true of the opposite act or state of mind. In its relation to God as national king, idolatry is not to be viewed as spiritual impiety, but only as a civil offense with its essential relations. As such, it was simply treason -- crimen læsæ majestatis. This relation was not destroyed or changed by any other relation to God's moral government, no more than the same political crime is with us. As a civil offense, it was therefore justly punishable by civil law. This is decisively confirmed by the fact, that God, as a civil though an omniscient lawgiver, never judged and determined any subject of this law, by the omniscient inspection of his heart, to be an idolater. The law was never applied to the internal belief, which was manifested by no overt act, and which of course, could not be tried before a civil tribunal. The secret idolater, believing and trusting in false gods, was indeed guilty of spiritual impiety; but no law of the theocracy could punish him for this. And further, in this same state of mind, he was in principle guilty of rebellion against the national king. But for this, so long as it was not manifested in overt action, no process of civil law could reach him. On the contrary, the civil law gave him full protection, until, by overt action, he showed his practical denial of the authority of the national king. It was then, in such a case, and for such a reason, and not for a matter of mere opinion, that he was to be punished as a political offender. A conscientious idolater -- if we suppose such an one -- could no more be punished for a mere matter of opinion under the Mosaic law, than could be a conscientious murderer or blasphemer, &c., and neither could be punished for a matter of opinion, but only for action, which simply as a civil offense, showed him to be an enemy of the State.

 

Eighthly. I infer the same thing from the direct design of the Mosaic institution. By this institution God designed, primarily and directly, to reveal himself as the only living and true God, in the single relation of the national king and tutelary deity of Israel; though, as we may see hereafter, indirectly by this means, in the higher relation of moral governor. That such was the primary design of the theocracy is as obvious, as that the Mosaic system was a political or national system in every essential respect, or even in any respect at all. God's spiritual or moral government over men as spiritual, moral, and immortal beings, and a civil government even in his hands, axe in their very nature, ends and modes of administration so essentially diverse, that they can not be identified, or made, to coalesce in one system of government. How for example, could a civil government as such, require personal religion, spiritual religion, piety, holiness, of its subjects in its true and essential nature and relations; or how be administered according to the direct inspection of the heart by omniscience; and how could the moral government of God require spiritual religion, except in its spiritual relations, or be administered in any other way than by the direct inspection of the heart? If these two kinds of government, though in the hands of the same Being, are, as we have seen they are, entirely distinct, then God, when revealing himself as the only living and true God, in the single relation of national ruler, does not, as identical with this relation, nor as any essential part of it, reveal his higher relation of the moral governor of men as moral and immortal beings. I am not saying that the latter relation may not be in some way inferred from or represented by the former. But I maintain that each is distinct from the other; that each is, complete in itself; that each might exist by itself without the other; and that therefore two things, so different and distinct, cannot be so combined as to lose their distinct and separate nature and identity. God then, in revealing himself to Israel as the only living and true God in the comprehensive relation of national king and tutelary deity, did not in so doing directly reveal himself in the higher relation of the moral governor of men, but only as the one true God in the former relation. The Mosaic institution therefore, was simply a national or civil institution. All its relations were civil, temporal relations. Even the requirements, which were the same as those of God's moral government, and when viewed as elements or parts of it, were spiritual and holy, in the highest sense, yet as elements or parts of the Mosaic system, sustained only civil and temporal relations. The Mosaic institution therefore, was primarily and directly designed to reveal God to Israel in the single relation of national God and tutelary deity; and was of course in its only true and essential nature, a national or civil institution of that peculiar kind called a theocracy.

 

It may serve to illustrate and confirm the foregoing view of the subject to remark, that, when in common language, we speak of what a thing is, we speak, at least for the most part, not of its absolute, but of its relative nature. Thus we say of a stone, it is heavy; meaning its relative nature, or its absolute nature as related to the earth, and within the sphere of its attraction. But the same stone with its absolute nature unchanged, were it to be removed at a certain distance from the earth, and placed within the sun's attraction, would cease to be heavy, in this new condition of existence. All such terms as right, good, bad, holy, righteous, &c., and such also as bard, Aft, heavy, &c., are relative terms. Thus, when we speak of action as holy in its highest or spiritual sense, we mean its relative nature; i.e., its nature as related to the highest interests of moral beings. Viewed however, in its nature in relation to the State, or to the well-being of the body politic, especially in its relative nature in the Hebrew commonwealth under its theocracy, it has another relative nature than its relative nature in the highest sense. This relative nature of such action, so peculiar, and arising exclusively from the relation of this people to God as their national king and tutelary deity, in Hebrew usage was called holy. Thus the same action is properly conceived and spoken of as holy, in the highest sense, without including in it the conception of its political relation under the Hebrew theocracy; and also as holy denoting its political relations, without including the conception of its holy nature in the highest sense. This shows how entirely distinct, in the true conception of things, wag the civil government which God administered over Israel as a State, from the moral government which he administered over them as moral and immortal beings; and how it is that the former could wholly cease, and the latter remain immutable and eternal.

 

Ninthly. I infer the same thing, from the nature of the Mosaic system, as a circumstantial or positive, in distinction from a moral institution. In the use of these terms however, I must briefly explain my meaning. By a moral institution or government of God over men, I mean that which necessarily results from the essential nature and essential condition or circumstances of men as moral beings. This essential nature and there essential circumstances are absolutely unchangeable so long as men are moral beings; nor can the moral government of God over such beings cease for a moment, let circumstances change as they may. By a circumstantial or positive institution of God over men, I mean one which arises from and depends on other things or circumstances than those which are essential to their high relation as moral beings; that is, on circumstances which are changeable and often change. It is appointed by a perfect God in one set of variable circumstances, and not in another, because the circumstances in which it is ordained furnish the reason for its appointment or ordination. It is indeed, authoritative and binding in all circumstances in which it is ordained, for it is ordained only in those variable circumstances, which are the reasons for investing it with the authority and obligation of a divine command; all which is proved to its subjects by the character and promulgated will of its author. It is therefore changeable and changes, as certain variable circumstances of moral beings change, while moral government over moral beings is unchangeable, so long as they are moral beings. A theocracy therefore is not immutable as is moral government, but is in an important respect circumstantial, arbitrary, or positive. It is circumstantial, as its establishment depends on the variable circumstances of moral beings; and it is arbitrary or positive, as its universal obligation and authority are wholly determined by a formal positive enactment of unexplained sovereignty. Its whole nature as a civil law or institution, is an arbitrary nature -- a nature which so entirely depends on the will of God, that he can create or annul it and its obligation, by imparting to it, or withholding from it, civil relations at his pleasure, without changing its nature, relations, or obligation, as a moral law or institution. It is thus, I may say, that the apostle has described the whole Mosaic institution in Eph. ii. 15, and in Col. ii. 14. This will appear hereafter, from his use of the word _____, of which the plural form used by him cannot, I think, be better rendered than by positive institutions as now explained.

 

Such, beyond all denial, was the Mosaic law -- the theocracy of Israel. It resulted wholly from the peculiar circumstances of this people. It was a law or system to them which in some sense it was not to any other. Without specifying these circumstances in detail, it is sufficient to say, that God had made peculiar promises to their fathers concerning these their descendants -- the promise of great temporal prosperity the promise that the knowledge of himself should not be utterly lost in the world by the encroachments of idolatry; that through them it should be imparted to other nations, and that from them the seed of Abraham, should the Redeemer come, to the end that these promises so peculiar might be fulfilled, and this peculiar and high destination of this people accomplished; a theocracy -- a civil government, clothed with God's authority -- became, from the condition of circumstances of this people in Egypt, so far as man can see, the fittest means, that by connecting the knowledge of the true God thus intimately, even essentially with their civil government and their existence as a nation, the former could not be annihilated without the annihilation of the latter. Such a government, in its general nature and form, was in accordance with the civil government of other nations, and peculiarly adapted to the peculiar circumstances and usages of those over whom it was established. How plainly then, was it what I have called it, a circumstantial, or. better, a positive institution? How plainly incredible that God, in becoming a civil ruler -- a political king of one nation, or of all nations -- should so lower the two great spiritual requirements of his moral government -- the one the perfect rule of action, and the other the actual rule of judgment to men (as moral and immortal beings), that these rules or laws should sustain simply the relation of civil laws, awarding only temporal rewards and punishments through external action as the sole criterion of adjudication, except this government was merely a circumstantial institution.

 

Tenthly. The same view of the Mosaic law will be corroborated, if we consider the difference between a civil government administered by God, and civil government administered by man. Of all civil government, the true object or end is to secure by the influence of its authority, the highest well-being of the State as a community of earth and time. This authority, of the civil governor, or the civil authority which is to be employed for the temporal well-being of the State, though always absolute while acknowledged by its subject, is to be estimated and measured in its degree by the degree of the governors qualification to rule, i.e., by his competence and disposition to govern in the best manner. At the same time, the spirit of loyalty on the part of subjects, founded in a due regard for the well-being of the State, as a temporal community, is to be graduated by the known qualifications of the governor for his office, supposing him always to possess the degree of qualification which justly entitles him to reign. Thus his authority and their loyalty would properly vary in degree, as the governor might be a superior man or a higher being, as an angel. Still, his authority would be merely civil authority, i.e., merely a right to govern according to the principles of such a jurisdiction; or, in general, to enact and enforce law for the temporal well-being of the State. He has and can have no right to enact laws designed to control or to secure the spiritual well-being as such of his subjects, or to regulate or determine the religious faith or opinions as such of his subjects, either Pagan or Mohammedan, Infidel, Jewish or Christian, Protestant or Catholic. Such prerogative pertains to no civil ruler, whether man or angel; nor so far as we can say, to God himself under this relation. If God, as the national king of Israel, may be said in claiming the spirit of loyalty due to himself, so far virtually to claim a right religious belief, still he never assumed the prerogative of enforcing either claim by temporal rewards and penalties. It was not disobedience to either claim as such, or as seen and known by his omniscient eye but it was such disobedience, only as evinced by overt action, for which he inflicted or ever threatened to inflict, the pains and penalties of the national law. If then, we suppose God himself to assume the relation of a civil governor of a State, taking the whole civil authority which had before existed in the hands of men into his own, he would indeed possess a higher degree of civil authority than his predecessor; and the spirit of loyalty due on the part of subjects to their king or civil governor, ought to be that which is fitted to his infinitely perfect character, and perfect qualification to govern the State in the best manner. Still, the civil authority which he has assumed, and had a right to assume, though taken from the hands of another, is in its essential nature and relations civil authority, and it is nothing more. He was the perfect moral governor of men before assuming the relation and prerogatives of a civil ruler over the State.

 

Civil government then, as a kind of government, is one and the same thing (though differing circumstantially in the degree of its authority in different cases), whether in the hands of man, or of an angel, or of an archangel, or of God. It is, at the same time, so diverse as a kind of government from that higher kind of government which God administers over men, as moral beings, in their high relation to eternity, that, while they are easily confounded, they should be accurately distinguished according to their essential difference. Thus distinguished, what can be more rationally believed, than that God, the rightful moral sovereign of all men as moral beings, should, in view of the condition of this lost world -- in view of his relation to Abraham, and of the condition of his descendants in Egypt, and especially for the great purpose of accomplishing his highest design and richest promise of mercy to our sinful race -- assume the relation of a national king and tutelary deity over the people of Israel -- hold and perpetuate, for long centuries, the administration of this national or civil system of government over that people in his own hands -- keep the entire administrations of the two systems wholly distinct -- render the inferior system ever prominent and subservient as a temporary representation of the higher, until its object and end should be fully accomplished in the advent of the Great Redeemer of all -- then entirely abolish the inferior system, so leaving all civil authority and power to revert to human hands, and all this as an overwhelming and everlasting confirmation of the higher system, so worthy of himself, as one to be consummated in the issues of eternity?

 

To a clear apprehension of the subject before us, there is yet in some minds perhaps, a difficulty which it is desirable to remove. Thus it may be inquired -- since the authority of God as the moral governor of men as moral beings, remains unimpaired over them, and especially since the apostles Paul and Peter (Rom. xiii. 1, &c., and 1 Pet. ii. 13) so expressly and earnestly enjoin submission to existing civil government as the ordinance of God and for conscience' sake -- how is it, that every civil government is not clothed with divine authority; or, that the authority of God as a moral governor does not, in its own proper influence, directly reach the duties and conduct of men, as citizens or members of the State, and bind them to obey the enactments of civil government? I answer, that a true rendering of the passages referred to, instead of one dictated by the assumed doctrine of the divine right of kings, will correct some common mistakes of commentators, and show what is the meaning of these apostles. I remark then, that nothing is plainer in these passages, than their distinct recognition of the difference between God's authority as a moral governor over men as moral beings, and the authority of civil government over men as its subjects; for both apostles simply employ one kind of authority, viz., God's authority as a moral governor to enforce submission to another kind of authority, viz., man's authority as a civil ruler. When or where had these governments of the nations derived their authority from God, as had the national government of Israel? Or how, in any way, came they to possess this divine authority? We know the method and the means by which the civil government of Israel was clothed with God's authority. He assumed every prerogative of an absolute national king over this people. He became their legislator, enacting with his own authority their every law. Nor was there the shadow of any other civil authority than his own, or that which was directly and expressly derived from it, in the entire administration of their national system. When has he done this for any other nation? Now the apostle Paul speaks of "the powers (________, authorities) that be; which of course, are not mere abstractions. He speaks not of civil government in the abstract but of civil authorities or governments actually existing, which they to whom he wrote knew, and which we know, were as exclusively of human origin as is the authority of a city or of a school. This is placed beyond all denial by the passage in I Pet. ii. 13, where the apostle says, "Submit yourselves to ____ _________ ______, every human creation, for the Lord's sake, whether it be to the king as supreme, or unto governors as unto them as sent by him," &c. What can be more plainly taught, than that the authority of civil government is simply human authority, and has solely a human origin? Thus while both these apostles represent every civil government in its essential, inherent authority, as a merely human institution, and do not weaken this authority, or the obligation of the subjects arising from it, they lay upon them in addition to this, another and higher authority, even Gods authority over them as moral beings, to submit to this civil human authority, whenever or wherever it exists.

 

To confirm this view of the subject and to remove any doubts arising from the common translation, and the more common interpretation of the passages referred to, I shall, as briefly as may be, further present my own views of the meaning of these apostles, in the context. Paul then, plainly asserts, that there is no instance of the existing power or authority, of which he speaks, which is not generally speaking from God'; and then, to show his more particular meaning, adds: These existing powers (_____ ________), authorities of human origin, are ordered (__________) not by revelation, but ordered, appointed, in his providential, purposes -- arranged in his providence, and designed to be in each case the existing thing which it is, neither more nor less -- a human institution with its own peculiar human authority, obviously fitted while existing as such, and shown to human reason, by the nature and condition of human society, to be fitted to promote the well-being of the State, and indirectly the highest good of the universe, and thus to swell the sum total of good. They are like many other human institutions, originated, devised, and adopted by men, as obviously dictated by human reason, as parts of the providential arrangement (_______, v. 2.) of God, for the well-being of men on earth: for example, as parental government in the family, that of tutors and governors in colleges, schools, &c. The parent and the schoolmaster are each bound, or under obligation to God to assume authority, to devise and administer government in their respective relations in view of its necessary utility to the family and the school. But they are under this obligation to God not as a national king or ruler, but as the moral governor of men as moral beings. The Jews entertained the false and almost invincible prejudice, that human authority was no authority, and that no national government had the least authority whatever, except God's express and direct authority as given to it, and assumed on his part by formal revelation enacting its laws, &c. Accordingly, the apostles are at great pains to show the contrary. They not only distinctly and expressly recognize the authority of every existing civil government, as originated by man (_________ ______), but inculcate submission to this simply human authority by a still higher authority. Thus Paul: Whosoever resisteth (______________, arrays himself against) this human authority of an existing civil government a providential arrangement of God, or an establishment of God brought into existence by his providence resisteth in so doing, what? Not an ordinance of God clothed with his authority as a national ruler, by express revelation as in the case of the Jews; nor yet even as that which in this manner he had required men themselves to establish, or, in respect to the form of it, given the least direction or instruction; but a merely human institution brought, under God's providential ordering of human agencies and instrumentalities, into existence by men for the temporal well-being of States or nations. By resisting any such human institution, man could not resist what is properly called a divine ordinance, involving the universal divine right of kings, the most foreign and even contemptible idea to a Jewish mind as applied to the kings of the Gentiles, but a merely human institution (_________ ______), purposed, and brought to pass, in the providence of God, for the temporal well-being of the State. He therefore, who should resist, overthrow or destroy in any case, such a means of good, or any other means of good so important, so useful and even necessary to men as social beings here on earth, acts wickedly as a moral being: instead of doing good from right moral principle, he does evil from wrong moral principle. To show this, if possible still more plainly, the apostle says (v. 5): "There is a necessity that you should be subject, not only to avoid the penalty of the civil institution, by which only its authority can be supported when resisted, but also for another and far higher reason -- on account of conscience, which will condemn you for acting morally wrong, as moral beings, in contravening the will of God as the moral governor of men, though this will is shown, not by revelation but by the utility of civil government." He then proceeds to inculcate, FOR THE SAME REASON, their duties as citizens of the State to pay tribute, and then their duties in social life, from the great moral principle of love to their neighbor. The apostle Peter also inculcates submission to civil authority, as exclusively from men (_________ ______) from respect to the will of Christ, whether it be to the king, &c. (v. 13) -- "as the servants of God" (v. 16) enjoining upon them, in two distinct precepts, to fear God, and to honor the king (v. 17). He then recognizes the same moral obligation to another merely human institution, saying, "Servants, be subject to your masters (_________), with all fear, &c., and this for conscience toward God" (verses 18, 19). But not to dwell longer on this part of the subject, I only ask, When, since God abolished the Jewish theocracy, has he assumed the relation of national king or tutelary deity over any other nation, or promised national temporal blessings, or threatened national temporal calamities to nations, as they should obey or disobey his laws as the moral governor of men as moral beings?

 

These considerations are deemed quite sufficient to show how entirely distinct the moral government of God over men is from a national or civil government, whether the latter be a theocracy like the Mosaic law, or a merely human institution; and that while the former or Mosaic law, was merely a civil government in the form of theocracy. What under the national government were primarily and properly civil enactments, as the ten commandments were, would indeed lose this character after the abrogation of the Mosaic or national law, but so far as they were moral precepts, or could with the shadow of propriety or truth be called such, they were binding on all men before the Mosaic law was given, and equally so as moral precepts while that law existed, and after its abrogation. Lex stat, dum ratio manet. Should any of these be enacted by the civil law of a State as involving overt action useful to the State, they would as such be merely civil laws, to be enforced only by civil authority with only temporal sanctions, and not by such authority as being in their nature moral precepts. Under this aspect or character, they are not civil laws but divine, and can be enforced by no authority, even that of a whole senate of kings, but only by the authority of God as the moral governor of men.

 

Finally. That the Mosaic law was simply a national institution appears from its late beginning and transient continuance. What the apostle has said on this subject, in Gal. iii., we shall presently see. I advert to it in the present connection to show, that had the Jews reasoned from the known facts in the case, as they ought to have reasoned, they would have adopted the same argument, and come to the same conclusion with the apostle. From the creation of man in paradise, God assumed toward him the high and immutable relation of a perfect moral governor -- a relation to which every other was forever to be subservient. The first form of this government was that of a strictly legal system, consisting of a perfect rule of action to men as moral beings, which was also a perfect rule of judgment, and designed as such to secure their absolute moral perfection. From the hour of man's apostasy however, this particular form of this system was greatly modified. Without impairing in the slightest degree its adaptation to secure the absolute perfection of men as moral beings, a method of grace was combined with it, by which its rule of judgment was changed. It was as thus modified, not only divinely fitted as before to restore to obedience to its perfect rule of action a race of sinful moral beings, but also by its rule of judgment, to restore them as fully to the favor and friendship of their offended sovereign as had they never sinned. Such became now the form of God's perfect moral government over men, permanent and eternal, with a perfection excluding, in every essential respect, all further modification or change. His system of moral government for a sinful world, in its substantial fullness and glory, though not in its minuteness of detail, was revealed to the first parents of our race immediately on their apostasy, and with its heavenly light shone on the world from the beginning of the patriarchal dispensation. Its reclaiming power and saving influence were effectually disclosed in Abel, in Enoch, in Noah (Heb. xi. 4, 5, 7), and doubtless in multitudes besides. There were it is true, sad and awful counteractions of its benign tendency which only proved its reality, while God by his vindictive judgments in this world for two thousand years, more impressively upheld and enforced his authority as the moral governor of men, than he ever has since in this world's history. Thus, for this long period, God presented himself to men, in one, it may almost be said in only one -- every other being subservient to this -- high and august relation, that of their perfect moral governor, "merciful and gracious" which his absolute right to reign over them fully sustained. Nor can it be said with the least plausibility of truth, that he did not impart by revelation all that religious and moral truth to men, and in every essential form of doctrine and of precept, which was sufficient to reclaim every individual to whom the revelation came. From the calling of Abraham and during the Abrahamic dispensation, God greatly in some respects, augmented both to this patriarch and to his descendants, the light of that truth which he had before revealed in the promise of Eden. This advance in revelation however, consisted in greater particularity of detail, and greater clearness and fullness of exhibition, rather than in any essential addition to its comprehensive import. Indeed it would be difficult to find, either in the decalogue or in any subsequent part of the Old Testament, one moral precept viewed in its moral aspect, and as universally binding on men, which cannot also be found clearly revealed, or at least well understood, under the Abrahamic dispensation. So greatly was the light of religious and moral truth increased by this covenant -- this _______ -- so rich, abundant, and superabundant were its promises to the righteous, not merely in temporal, but in eternal blessings (Gen. xvii), so clearly and fully did this covenant unfold the only way of acceptance with God -- the nature of religion and of moral duties -- all truth which was necessary, if unperverted, to form the character of the perfect man (Gen. xvii. 1), that the apostle (Gal. iii. 8) calls it the Gospel preached before unto Abraham. With this revelation of God's moral government to Abraham and his descendants, and through them designed for all nations, comprising every thing of moment to men as moral and immortal beings, and being as constituting the Gospel itself, incapable of higher perfection -- being the Gospel itself -- we come, in the history of this people, within less than five centuries, to another peculiar, widely, even essentially different dispensation from any which had preceded it, Twenty-five centuries since the creation of the world had passed away, and neither the Mosaic law, nor any thing essentially like it from God, had been heard of by men. This dispensation could add nothing to, and take nothing from that which already existed, and was already perfect and unchangeable. It has been distinguished as the Mosaic dispensation. It was that in which God, after delivering the descendants of Abraham from a long and cruel bondage of four hundred years in Egypt, placed and continued them under a system of government, which he established and administered over them by Moses. But was it that perfect moral government and only moral government, which God had administered over men as moral and immortal beings since the first apostasy -- the only one which he will administer in common to all men to the end of time, and according to which he will judge the world in righteousness and fix the allotments of all in eternity? Was the Mosaic law in its true and essential character, the covenant made with Abraham -- was it the Gospel? Plainly whatever else it was, it had not one essential characteristic of God's moral government over men; not one, in respect to its authority, its requirements, its administration, its sanctions, or its retributions. For these as we have seen, were each and all political or civil in their nature and relations. In all these respects, it was a separate distinct institution, and as such might have subsisted in its peculiar individuality, though God's moral government had never been revealed, or even had had no existence. What then, I ask again, was the Mosaic law given to Israel at so late a period of this world's history? Did it add any thing to, or take any thing from that moral government of God, which was already absolutely perfect and unchangeable? What addition to or subtraction from such a government of God -- a government which, from its very nature and the nature of its promises, could be justly viewed in its high and essential characteristic only as moral, and therefore in duration, eternal -- what addition to, or subtraction from such a government of God, either in its authority, its theology, or its ethics, could any unperverted rational mind conceive to be made, by an institution which had not a single characteristic except that of a national or civil government? Could it be supposed that the latter should annul the former?

 

And now I further ask, what could these descendants of Abraham, with unperverted minds, with their Egyptian education and notions of government, and especially with their knowledge of the recent origin of this Mosaic law as a new system of government, now just instituted for them by the God of their fathers, judge this law to be? If they knew any thing of the covenant with Abraham, the moral government of God, they knew in one respect; what the Mosaic law was not. They knew well what a theocracy was. They well understood, that in and of itself it was simply a peculiar -- compared with what we call such -- national institution, deriving its whole authority, in every instant of its existence, directly and solely from a National Divinity, who assumed and acted in the relation of the national king and tutelary deity of the nation over whom he thus reigned; and who administered such a government over his subjects as a representative system -- thus representing another and higher system of moral government over them as moral and immortal beings. What else then, could these descendants of Abraham rationally and honestly believe the Mosaic law -- a law before unheard of since the creation of the world as coming from the one only living and true God, now given by Abraham's God exclusively to them as his descendants -- what else could they conclude this new law from the God of the fathers to be, but a theocracy with its unquestioned and unquestionable characteristic of a representative system?

 

If now we appeal to facts, we cannot doubt after what the apostle has told us (Heb. xi. 29), that among those who came out of Egypt, and among those of subsequent generations, there were some, more or less, at different periods of their history, who were the sincere worshipers and true servants of God; who like Abraham and other patriarchs died in faith, and who not having received the promises, i.e., the things promised, embraced them. This in its true import, can involve nothing less than embracing the comprehensive promise of justification by faith, unto eternal life. This was universally the method of justification relied on by pious Israelites, from the giving of the law at Sinai to the coming of the Messiah. Now whence had these men the knowledge of this method of justification before God, as the moral governor of moral and immortal beings? Not directly from the Mosaic law; for this, though a revelation from God to this people, revealed nothing directly or expressly of this method of justification for men as moral beings. Were this people then, living under this grand and only system of revelation given to any portion of the human race, left by it for fifteen centuries as destitute of all instruction concerning the true method of justification to eternal life, as had this revelation not been given? Was Gods revelation during this long period, stationary, or retrograde? Was the light of salvation by the Abrahamic covenant, left to go out in darkness? or was it, as commonly supposed, progressive? But how progressive, or rather how did the Mosaic law shed one solitary ray of the light of truth on the most momentous of all subjects to sinful men, their justification to eternal life; how, unless as a lower system of national government it did represent, and was proved to right reason to represent God's higher system, of moral government through grace -- the covenant made with Abraham -- the substantial Gospel itself; and then how, by any conceivable mode of representation, could this higher system of truth have been so clearly, so fully, so impressively unfolded to the minds of men, as by that super-natural system of national law and national providence which God administered over Israel? If we imagine ourselves to have lived thus, as it were with God in sight every day and hour -- with such sensible manifestations of his presence and majesty as a jealous God, yet showing mercy to thousands, it would seem that the impression of his method of salvation might have been stronger than that from the transcendent intellectual and moral grandeur of the glorious Gospel, as now given by the Great Teacher and his apostles. That such was the tendency of the former mode of revelation compared with the latter, and considered in relation to the degradation, and prejudices, and perverseness of the minds of those to whom it was given, there can I think be no doubt. Indeed, if we would form some just estimate of the fitness of the Mosaic economy to its high and ulterior design, we must consider the almost noon-tide light and splendors of the Gospel, which broke through the clouds of that economy when approaching its end and consummation. How sweet, and rapturous, and heaven -- anticipating were some of the songs of David! How grand, how sublimely entrancing, some of the themes and visions of Isaiah, as of one standing before the throne of God! How did some of the later fervid prophets of Israel already begin to summon a sinful nation to repentance and faith, as with the last trump, announcing eternal retribution as at hand! And how in so doing was the Mosaic economy, so to speak, used and appealed to, as a system of illustration and representation! And what was all this, but the progress of God's revelation, begun in the promised redemption in paradise, enlarged by the divine comprehensiveness and rich and wonderful details of the Abrahamic covenant, and still brightening onward, in the most impressive illustrations conceivable of the Mosaic economy, till the meridian sun of Christianity is ready to break in full effulgence on a benighted world!

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