The GOSPEL TRUTH

MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.

 By

 NATHANIEL W. TAYLOR, D. D.,

1859

VOLUME II

 

APPENDIX -- No. III:

ESSAY ON THE QUESTION -- IN WHAT DIFFERENT RESPECTS MAY GOD BE SUPPOSED TO PURPOSE DIFFERENT AND EVEN OPPOSITE EVENTS?
 

PART II. -- OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED.

 

1. To suppose that the highest conceivable good is impossible with God, is inconsistent with omnipotence -- 2. God could have prevented some sins which he has permitted, and thus caused a less amount of sin -- 3. The theory requires that less than the highest conceivable happiness should exist, and less glory to God -- 4. Also that the glory of God as a moral governor should be diminished, so far as this depends on the obedience of his subjects.

 

 

THE following objections maybe made against the views maintained in the preceding discussion

 

1. It may be said that the greatest conceivable good is possible with God; that so far as it can be supposed to depend on the prevention of sin, as an omnipotent being he must be able to prevent it; and that it is highly dishonorable to God to suppose otherwise.

 

The question is not, whether it be possible for God to prevent sin. This he might certainly have done by not creating moral beings who are beings capable of sinning. But the question is, whether it may not be impossible on the ground that it may involve a contradiction, that God should give existence to free moral agents and prevent all sin. Or thus, whether if it, be possible for an agent to sin, it may not be impossible to prevent his sinning. I am aware that in the estimation of some, such an inquiry savors strongly of irreverence and presumption. I must however be allowed to ask, whether it is not equally irreverent and presumptuous to affirm that God could have prevented all sin in his accountable creatures but would not; or that a moral universe comprising the endless guilt and woes of hell is more desirable to a benevolent God, than one in which the purity and joys of universal holiness should reign without measure and without end? Surely it were no very palpable dishonor to God, to suppose him to prefer the universal holiness and consequent perfect happiness of his moral creatures, and that he should do all he can to secure such a result, and yet that some would rebel.

 

I here wish it to be distinctly noticed, that I do not affirm that God could not prevent all sin in a moral system, but simply that its prevention in such a system may be impossible to God. I shall have occasion further to consider this topic hereafter, and propose therefore briefly to reply to the present objection by showing that --

 

It cannot be proved that God could give existence to free moral agents and prevent all sin.

 

It will then be admitted that there are but two possible sources of argument on this point, viz., fads and the nature Of moral agency. But facts furnish no evidence; for there is no instance in which there is a known certainty That sin will not exist in moral creatures, which certainty may not depend on the system with which all the sin that exists was certainly connected.

 

I ask, who can show that the continued holiness of elect angels and redeemed men does not depend on the identical system from which sin, in respect to divine prevention, is inseparable? Now it will be admitted that the system remaining exactly the same, i.e., the nature and circumstances of the beings remaining the same, all the sin which has taken place certainly would take place. The principle that the same causes or antecedents, in the same circumstances will be followed with the same effects or consequents, our opponents admit. It is then a matter of absolute demonstration, that to prevent the sin there must have been some change in the system in which it has taken place. But who can determine all the consequences of even the least change in the system? Even supposing God to leave done that which would leave prevented the sins of one individual, who can affirm that the requisite interposition for the purpose had not resulted in a vast increase of sin in the universe, even in the apostasy and augmented guilt of the individual himself?

 

Such is the universal attraction which unites the worlds which are scattered through infinite space in one system, that the annihilation of a single particle of matter would instantly cause some change throughout the material system; nor can it easily be told how long before the whole would rush to chaos.

 

Who can say that had God changed the moral system in one iota, that all heaven long ere this had not been in revolt? or that the consequence of any possible change had not been universal and endless sin in all moral creatures? No one. To what purpose then, is it to allege instances of the prevention of sin under a given system of influences, to prove that God could have prevented all sin under some other system? Facts then do not furnish a particle of evidence that God could have secured more holiness in a moral system than he has secured.

 

It is often inconsiderately supposed and asserted, that if God can prevent one moral being from sinning, he can another and all. This mode of reasoning, conclusive as it may be in respect to physical phenomena, has obviously no application to the actions of free moral agents. The very interposition which would be requisite to prevent the sin of one, might become the occasion of a universal and hopeless revolt.

 

I now remark, that the nature of moral agency not only furnishes no evidence that God could prevent all sin in moral agents, but precludes such evidence. It is not to be forgotten that whatever influence God may be supposed to use to prevent sin in moral agents, it must be consistent with the fact of moral agency and leave the power to sin unimpaired. How then can it be proved a priori, or from the nature of the moral agent, that he will not gin under any supposable influence, when he can do either right or wrong? These facts remain as premises to be reasoned from in the case. But what is plainer than that while these things are so, no inference can be drawn from the nature of the agent in respect to what he will do. The fact that he can do right is no proof that he will do right; for he can do wrong. And surely the fact that he can do wrong is no proof that he will not do wrong. How then can it be proved a priori that a being who can do wrong in counteraction of all that God can do to prevent him, will not do wrong?

 

But this is not all. The nature of moral agency precludes all proof that God can prevent sin in a system of moral agents. For as we have conceded, although it may be true that God by a given system of influence may render it certain that some moral agents will never sin, yet it does not follow from this that he could do this by any other system than exactly that with which the sin of others is certainly connected.

 

In any other system of an equal number of moral agents than that which God has adopted, it may be true so far as any evidence to the contrary can be adduced, that there had been more sin than in the present. Of course it may also be true that God in that other system could not have prevented this greater degree of sin. How then can it be proved that he could have prevented it? This would be supposing that what may be true in view of all the evidence in the case, i.e., that what cannot be proved to be false, can be proved to be false.

 

Again: it may be true so far as any evidence to the contrary is concerned, that God has prevented sin in the present system so far as he can prevent it in any. Of course it may be true that to suppose that he could have prevented it beyond what he has, would be to suppose that he could do what it may be true he could not do. When will it be proved that God could have done that which it may be true he could not have done?

 

Further: it may be true that to suppose God to have prevented sin in moral beings would involve a contradiction. For it may be true that he has done all he can do to prevent sin in these beings without destroying their moral agency. And to suppose him to prevent sin in moral beings by destroying their moral agency, is to suppose him to prevent sin in moral beings who are not moral beings.

 

But it may be said that God could foresee every future cause of sin, and could have so arranged events as to prevent the occurrence of every such cause: for example, he could foresee and could have prevented the existence of that particular temptation which was the cause of the sin of our first parents; and if it be supposed that some other occurrence would have led them into sin if this had not, that he could have prevented this also, and so on, and thus have kept sin out of the world -- I answer, that in preventing the occurrence of such causes of sin he must either remove or prevent every thing which can be a cause of sin, i.e., every thing of the nature of inducement or temptation, or he must not. Should he remove every such thing, he would destroy the possibility of moral action in man, since if there were no good which man could choose rather than. God, there could be no preference of God to other good; and of course no moral action would in such a case be possible. Should he on the other hand not remove or prevent every such cause of sin, then he would leave that which might in the event prove the cause of sin beyond his power of prevention. If it here be said that he might have permitted some inducement to sin to remain, yet so trivial in itself and so nearly nothing compared with the inducements to holiness that it should in no instance prove the occasion of sin -- I answer, that the objector does not know nor can he prove that it could be done. For how can he know or prove a priori, that a being who can sin will not sin, however trifling the inducement? The susceptibilities of man to good, be the source of that good what it may, or the degree of good which he is capable of deriving from it what it may, are capable of indefinite excitement, or of such as shall prove the occasion of sin; and how such a being will act depends more directly on the degree of excited propensity toward an object than on the real or comparative value of the object. If it be said that God might have given different susceptibilities to man -- I answer, that this supposition only turns us back to a similar alternative to that just stated, viz., that man's susceptibilities must be such that he can or that he cannot sin. If he cannot sin he cannot be holy; and if he can sin who can prove a priori that he will not?

 

Besides, facts are altogether against the theory of the objectors; for both angels and men have sinned in circumstances in which the inducements to sin were comparatively slight. It was certain beforehand that they would sin in these circumstances, and that God could not have rendered it certain that they would not sin, for this would involve the absurdity of rendering the sin certain and not certain at the same time. How then can it be proved that by any change of circumstances such beings would not sin? If insignificance of motive would render the prevention of sin certain, why did it not in these cases?

 

After all, the objector may still insist that the supposition that God could not prevent all sin in a moral system is highly dishonorable to God -- it is to limit the Holy One of Israel. I answer, it is not dishonorable to God to suppose that he cannot accomplish contradictions; that he cannot perform impossibilities in the nature of things; nor is it dishonorable to God to suppose that it may be impossible to him to do what may involve a contradiction. And I challenge any one to show that it is not an impossibility -- that it would not in fact involve a contradiction to suppose that God could prevent all sin in free moral agents. Such as we have shown may be the fact. Our opponents cannot show that it is not. Must we then, to honor God, assert that he can do that which for aught can be shown to the contrary, may involve contradiction and absurdity? Is God to be honored by the assertions of mere ignorance? Is it essential to render him that homage which is his due, that we assert that to be true of him which for aught that can be shown to the contrary may be utterly false?

 

It ought here to be further remarked, that such a view of the subject does in no respect limit the power of God. In the assertion that it may be impossible that God should prevent all sin in a moral system, I refer merely to an impossibility which may exist in the nature of things, and of course not to the want of any conceivable power in God; to an impossibility to which power bears no relation, and with which it has no concern. If greater power existed it would not remove the supposed impossibility, and to talk of the want of power or a limitation of power in God as the reason why he does not prevent sin, is, on the present supposition, like talking of a limitation of his power as the reason why he does not make a part equal to the whole.

 

But further, if it still be insisted that my supposition does limit the power of God, so does the theory which I oppose, and in precisely the same manner. It supposes thwart God cannot secure the greatest good without the existence of sin. On both schemes there is an impossibility involved, and an impossibility founded in the nature of things. And why is it more dishonorable to God to suppose an impossibility resulting, from the nature of moral agency, than to suppose all impossibility resulting from the nature of sin? Why is it more dishonorable to God to suppose that he cannot prevent a free agent from sinning, than to suppose that he cannot produce the greatest good without sin? Why is it more dishonorable to supposed, that God cannot do what it may be true is impossible in the nature of things, than to suppose that that may be true or is true which cannot be true, viz., that sin is better than holiness?

 

Once more: the theory opposed dishonors God not only by limiting his power, but according to a concession which must be made, by limiting his goodness. If it be true that the more holiness the more happiness, as I shall attempt to show hereafter, then God, who according to the theory opposed could produce universal holiness, could also produce universal happiness, or more than he has produced, but would not. But it is essential to the perfect goodness of any being that he produce all the happiness he can produce. How directly then and unequivocally does the theory now opposed impeach the goodness of God!

 

It is then an assumption wholly gratuitous, that God could have prevented all sin and secured universal holiness in a moral system -- an assumption far more dishonorable than the supposition that he could not, and a mere supposition is all that I now present, and all that my purpose in the present discussion requires.

 

Obj. 2. It may be said that God could have prevented at least some sins which he has not prevented, and that thus there had been less sin than actually exists; as for example (for I here concede to the objector the privilege of an appeal to Revelation), if the mighty works done in Capernaum had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they had repented. I answer, that the supposition which I have made does not imply that God could not have prevented each and every sin which has taken place or which shall take place. But it is supposed that he could not have prevented any sin which has taken place or which shall take place, in the precise circumstances of its actual occurrence; and it will be granted that it was certain that all the sin which has taken place would take place. It is further supposed that God could not have prevented all sin; for although it be admitted that he could have prevented by a change of circumstances each and every sin that has taken place, it is no proof that he could have prevented other sins in their stead. And if it be said that he could have brought sinners to repentance, and thus have prevented subsequent sins, this may be admitted; and yet the change in circumstances necessary to such prevention might have been immeasurably for the worse, since the effect might, beyond his power of prevention, have been a hundredfold more sin on the whole. Had he brought Tyre and Sidon to repentance by miraculous interposition, it might have occasioned a revolt in heaven; yea, these very individuals might have apostatized, and the result to them have been immeasurably greater evil. Indeed, had the circumstances of men and angels been such that they had continued holy to the present hour, there is no proof that the final result had not been universal sin and hopeless impenitence. It may have been, so far as God's power to secure the result is concerned, indispensably necessary to the perpetuated holiness of elect angels and redeemed men, that they should encounter exactly that degree of temptation and trial, with all its results and circumstances, through which they and their ruined companions shall have passed. It is therefore supposable not only that God could not have kept all sin out of his moral creation, but that to have changed the circumstances of men or angels in the least respect would have resulted in immensely more sin than has resulted from their actual circumstances.

 

Obj. 3. It may be said that according to the theory now advanced, less happiness than the highest conceivable will exist, and that therefore less glory will accrue to God from his works than the highest. I answer, that the glory that will accrue to God from his works depends not on the degree of happiness actually secured, but on the fact that he has secured the greatest amount which he can secure. Now, according to our supposition, God has done all he could do to secure the greatest conceivable good, and this so far as it depends on the agency of creatures; and not only so, but he has done that which will secure the greatest actual good which he can secure. And in what way could God make a fuller display of his benevolence -- in what way appear more glorious? Must he secure more good than he can secure to make a perfect display of his benevolence, and to bring to himself the highest degree of glory?

 

But, says the objector, if according to the present theory creatures had done what they ought to have done and could have done, there would have been more holiness and more happiness, and thus greater glory to God: I ask how? In that case God had done no more than he has now done, and as the degree of his glory depends on what he does in manifestation of his benevolence, and as he would have done nothing to manifest his benevolence in that case which he has not done already, the degree of his glory could have been no greater.

 

If for the sake of giving force to the objection, the objector should suppose another being able to secure and actually securing the highest conceivable happiness, and ask whether such a being would not be more glorious in consequence of such a result, than the God whom I suppose, I answer, undoubtedly. But why? Because he would show himself possessed of power which does not belong to the latter, and not because he would show himself possessed of greater benevolence; for to secure the highest happiness the latter shows himself disposed if he could, and the question wholly respects his glory as this consists in the display of his benevolence. Besides, the objection proceeds on a supposition which is inadmissible, viz.: that greater power may pertain to another than that which I suppose to belong to God; for the present theory implies that infinite or the greatest conceivable power cannot prevent sin in the moral creatures of God. Of course his glory cannot be diminished by the fact that he does not display greater power. Indeed the greater power supposed in the objection is power to effect impossibilities, which can add nothing to the glory of one who is supposed to possess it.

 

But I ask the objector, on what ground or principle the highest glory accrues to God, according to his scheme? He says, on the principle that God produces the highest conceivable good. I then ask, how does he secure this result? And here he must admit that he does not secure it by the perfect holiness of creatures, and of course that the glory of God suffers in this respect as much on his scheme as on mine. But he will say, God produces the highest conceivable good, by the existence of sin, which is the necessary means of that good. But I ask, why does this bring the highest glory to God? He says, because he produces the greatest good that can be produced. But I ask again, why does producing the highest degree of good that can be produced, bring to him the highest glory? The only answer is, because he produces all the good he can produce; for it is plain that if we suppose him to produce all the good he can, and other agents to add to that amount, this would not add to his honor or glory. So that on the objector's scheme as well as on mine, the highest glory accrues to God on the principle that he secures all the good he can. On this point the only difference between his is, whether the highest conceivable good is possible to God, though we may differ so far as the present objection to my theory is concerned. And on the supposition that the highest good is not possible to God, which is implied in my theory, I only ask who can imagine the glory of God to be the less because he does not secure it, i.e., because he does not perform impossibilities?

 

Obj. 4. It may be further said, that God as a moral governor is glorified by the intelligent voluntary homage of obedience to his law on the part of subjects, and that so far as such obedience does not exist, so far his glory is diminished. In reply, I would remark, that this objection differs from the former in assigning a different reason why the highest glory does not accrue to God according to the present theory, the former assigning the diminution of happiness, the latter the diminution of the homage of obedience. In answer to this objection, I would say that while it is to be admitted that the obedience of subjects honors God as a lawgiver, it is also true that equal honor or glory accrues to him in this character from the execution of the penalty on transgressors, or from sustaining his authority in any other way. Now as all the honor or glory of God as a moral governor depends on the simple fact that his authority is sustained, and as this is the only respect in which they can be affected by the obedience or disobedience of subjects, so if they, disobey and thus do what they can to dishonor him, he has the remedy in his own power. He can still sustain his authority either by punishment or in some other way, as he pleases. And since to sustain his authority by his own acts is equally honorable to him as to sustain it by the obedience of subjects, disobedience cannot lessen his authority, and of course cannot lessen his glory.

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