ESSAY ON THE QUESTION -- IN WHAT DIFFERENT RESPECTS MAY GOD BE SUPPOSED TO PURPOSE DIFFERENT AND EVEN OPPOSITE EVENTS?

 

Importance of the question. -- Confused and unsatisfactory views In respect to it. -- Question stated hypothetically. -- Three suppositions. -- Vindications of the propriety of arguing from the purposes of man to the purposes of God. -- Supposition of a father. -- Application to the present question. -- Illustration to show the use of language.

 

 

To give the true answer to this question is of the highest importance, if we would form precise and correct views of certain controverted topics in theology. For if I mistake not, imperfect and false, or rather confused notions on this subject are the chief source of error and dispute. In the controversy between Calvinists and Arminians, some of the most important questions in debate turn upon accurate distinctions in regard to the different respects in which, or the different reasons on account of which, God may be supposed to purpose different and even opposite events. It is undeniable that events take place under the government of God, which are of a directly opposite nature and tendency. How this is consistent with the perfection of his character and government, especially if we suppose that his purposes extend to all events, has been deemed one of the most difficult of theological inquiries. Indeed nothing is easier than to present views of the purposes of God which are in the highest degree perplexing, for there seems to be hardly any subject on which truth and error can be so plausibly combined, through the ambiguity of language, or rather those elliptical forms of speech which usage sanctions. Nor is it too much to say, that apparently contradictory and inconsistent views of this subject, have been not infrequently presented and zealously contended for, even when the best intentions have been shown.

 

No two events can be more opposite in their nature and tendency than holiness and sin; and to say that God purposes the existence of both, is in Words at least to assert a contradiction. Whether such a verbal contradiction fairly involves a real contradiction, or a contradiction in ideas according to the true principles of interpreting such phraseology, may be doubted, or rather denied. In such cases of verbal contradiction, and they are not uncommon, we are bound to inquire whether the language may not according to usage have different meanings when applied to different things, and whether by giving it different meanings, the writer is not exempted from the charge of contradiction. If so, the charge is not valid. Still, in my own view the use of such language without qualification or explanation, should be carefully avoided in subjects, of controversy where advantage will be taken of merely verbal ambiguities, to misrepresent, or to become the occasion of misapprehending the real meaning of a writer. I would as far as may be, prevent the perversions of dishonesty, and force even prejudice to see. It is not however always true that dishonesty occasions contradiction on such a question. For there may not be -- commonly there is not that familiar acquaintance with the true method of using and interpreting such language which will in fact prevent misapprehension. Be this however as it may, when it is said that God purposes holiness and God purposes sin, the language is often interpreted in a manner which overlooks the fact that God may purpose opposite events in different respects or for different reasons. With such an interpretation, to say that God purposes sin, is equivalent to saying that he does not purpose holiness, and to say that he purposes holiness, that he does not purpose sin; and to say both, to saying that he purposes and does not purpose one and the same thing. But this is absurd and impossible. Since therefore these events are of such a nature that a perfect God cannot be supposed to purpose both for the same reason or in the same respect, then so to use language as to convey in fact such a meaning, is to leave the subject in inextricable embarrassment. On the other hand, if there can be no different respects in which God can be supposed to purpose these opposite events, then the universality of his purposes must be abandoned.

 

Similar remarks apply to natural good and natural evil when viewed as objects of the divine purposes.

 

Now whether it be possible or not to relieve this subject of all embarrassment and difficulty, it is plain that the only way in which we can hope to succeed in such an attempt, is by showing that God may be supposed to purpose or rather to will different and opposite events in different respects. If the subject cannot be freed from absurdity and contradiction in this way, there is no way in which it can be. Indeed this is the only way in which Calvinists have ever attempted thus to relieve it. The question in respect to them therefore is, not whether God purposes holiness and sin in different respects, or for very different reasons, but what these reasons are.

 

It ought here to be remarked that absurdity and contradiction are charged in many forms upon the universality of the divine purposes, and that to exempt the subject from inconsistency in one form, is not of course to exempt it from inconsistency in another. What therefore we have to do is, to show that inconsistency is chargeable upon the doctrine in no form or manner whatsoever.

 

It ought also to be noticed that the present question is stated hypothetically, and that in answering it we are only making suppositions authorized by the known nature of the mental acts which are the subject of inquiry. This course is adopted not only because mere suppositions are sufficient for the purpose at which we ultimately aim, but also because we do not suppose any facts to be established in respect to, the moral perfection or government of God. We are simply inquiring then what facts may be supposed, judging from the nature of things, so that these may be shown to be consistent with facts actually proved. For example, it is true that the purposes of God extend to all actual events both good and evil, and that nevertheless his character and his government are perfect. The design of the present suppositions is to show the entire consistency of these important doctrines.

 

I proceed then to specify several different respects in which God may be supposed to purpose different and even opposite events.

 

1. God may purpose an event as the means of a further end, e. g., a moral system, which has no value in itself or considered abstractly from its relation to consequences, because it is the necessary means of the greatest conceivable good, and because he knows that though the greatest conceivable good will not be, yet that the highest degree of good which he can possibly secure will be the actual result.

 

It is here supposed that the highest conceivable good, or greater good than is possible in any other way, would result from the combined agency of God and his creatures directed to the production of good, and that some less degree than this, is all that is possible to God.

 

2. God may be supposed to purpose or to prefer, that an event which he knows will not take place should take place rather than its opposite, because it is good in itself as the necessary means of the highest conceivable and highest possible good, and because he knows that he can secure its existence to such an extent that a higher degree of good can be secured by it than by any thing else in its stead.

 

3. God may be supposed to purpose an event -- i. e., to purpose that it shall be and to prefer that it should be -- which is not the necessary means of the greatest conceivable good, but which is wholly evil in its nature, tendencies, and relations, because the evil is unavoidably incidental (so far as his power is concerned) to that system which is the necessary means of the highest conceivable and highest actual good, it being true at the same time, that he can bring so much good out of the evil, that the actual result will be the greatest good which he can secure.

 

Now it is believed that these three suppositions may be so illustrated and applied to the doctrine of the universality of God's purposes, as to remove all the difficulties and objections which have been supposed to encumber it.

 

With this view I shall attempt to illustrate the propriety of these suppositions. For this purpose I remark, that since we can reason concerning the consistency of God's purposes with one another, or with other things only from what we know of our own purposes, and since in this manner every possible question on the subject must be determined, it will follow, that if man may purpose in different respects very different and even opposite events, so may God. In other words, the existence of such purposes in the divine mind is possible, so far as the nature of the purpose is concerned. To this last remark, as expressing the fundamental principle on which our subsequent reasoning depends, I request particular attention. I do so, not only because it is desirable that a principle on which so much depends, should not if false be assumed to be true, but because its correctness in this particular application is denied by some, and because it is important that in respect to it the mind should be put entirely at rest. Here then permit me to turn your attention to the precise form in Which the principle is stated. It is not then, that because mail may and does purpose different and opposite events in the different respects or for the different reasons described, that therefore God must. Though I may have occasion to show hereafter that such is the fact in respect to God's providential and moral purposes, still in the present instance I do not assert this. The position which I now take is not the assertion either that such is or that such must be the fact, but simply that what is true of man in respect to the purposes in question MAY BE true of God. In other words, I assert not the reality or the necessity of the fact, but merely its POSSIBILITY. That I am justified in taking this position, or assuming the truth of the principle as now stated, on a priori ground, or from the nature of mental operations, is evident for the following reasons:

 

1. There is no proof that the principle is not true, nor that it is not applicable to the case under consideration.

 

If this be denied, it belongs to him who deities it to support his denial. And this he must do by showing from the nature of the subject, that what is true of man in respect to his purposes either is not or cannot be true of God in respect to his. This, on a priori grounds of argument, it may safely be said cannot be done. And this, as the subject is now presented, is the only ground proper to be taken by an opponent. Other modes of reasoning will. be examined hereafter.

 

2. If our principle be denied, then it will follow that we can know nothing of the divine purposes, and of course nothing of God as a voluntary being.

 

For it is only by our knowledge of volitions, purposes, &c., in our own minds, that we know or can know what these are in another mind; and of course this knowledge is the only possible foundation of all our reasonings respecting God as a voluntary agent. If our principle be denied then, we not only cannot reason respecting what God is, but we cannot prove that there is a God.

 

3. Our principle, or rather the most absolute form of it, viz., what is true of man's purposes must be true of God's purposes, has been constantly assumed in all reasonings on the subject.

 

The principle as I have stated it, ever has been, is, and must be assumed by the very men who oppose the views which I adopt. For whatever theory they adopt respecting God's purposes, they must assume the possibility of its truth, and this simply and solely on the ground that it can be true in respect to the purposes of man. For example, if it be said that God purposes sin as the necessary means of the greatest good, this must be assumed as possible with God solely, on the ground that similar purposes are known to be possible with man. By what mode of fair controversy then is it, that a principle is denied to us, which is and must be reasoned upon by our opponents?

 

4. If they deny the propriety of reasoning from human purposes to the divine, they must give some reason for it.

 

I know of none which can be even plausibly assigned, except that God is an infinite being, and that therefore it is rational to suppose that some things may be, and are widely different in respect to God's purposes from what are true in respect to those of man. That some things may be predicated of God's purposes which cannot be of man's, is undeniable. But it is equally undeniable that some things may and must be predicated of both, as common to both. It cannot therefore be just or true, on account of diversity in some respects, to affirm diversity in all respects, and thus to maintain that nothing is true of one which is true of the other. This would be to talk of the purposes of God without the least idea or notion of the things so called. The question then is, by what principle are we to be governed in determining this diversity and agreement? I answer, the principle and the only principle is, that so far as any known truth respecting the nature of either God or man obliges us to predicate any diversity of their purposes, so far it is to be done, but no farther. This principle must be admitted, or it must be said that we may predicate diversity and agreement without a reason, and at our own option. According then to this principle, the question is this: is there any known truth respecting God or man that obliges us to say that we cannot reason from the purposes of the human mind to those of the divine; that God may not, as man does, purpose different and opposite events in different respects or for different reasons -- anything which obliges us to say that God as a moral and providential governor may not or cannot purpose obedience and disobedience to his law, in the same sense or manner, and for the same diverse reasons in which man in these relations is ever regarded as purposing these different and opposite events? I leave this question to be answered by those who adopt the opposite view.

 

5. The consequences of denying our principle and of the course taken by those who deny it.

 

Some of the consequences of denying the principle I have adverted to, such as that it puts an end to all reasoning respecting God and his character. To this it may be added, on the supposition that we may reason on the subject, that it authorizes any premises and any conclusions. We have no knowledge of truth by which to test the premises; none to forbid the most monstrous conclusions. Whether God be benevolent or malevolent, just or unjust, sincere or insincere, fearful as are consequences of doubt on these points, we have no means of deciding. Without regarding him as the subject of those acts or states of mind which in kind are the same which under these names we ascribe to men, what are the things meant when these terms are applied to God? Any thing or nothing. Besides, purposes are what they are, as right or wrong, good or bad, just or unjust, according to the reasons in view of which they are adopted. If we deny this in respect to God's purposes -- what can we know or believe in respect to them? Any thing or nothing.

 

But what is the course of our opponents? While they deny to us the right of reasoning from the purposes of the human mind to those of the divine, they do and must adopt this mode of reasoning themselves. They tell us. for example, that God purposes sin as the necessary means of the greatest good. Suppose I deny the possibility of this, as they do the possibility of the truth of my position; how can they show it to be possible that God or any being can purpose any event or this event for such a reason? Solely by appealing to the phenomena of our own minds. How came they to know that a purpose may respect its object, as the necessary means of greatest good, rather than as the necessary means of greatest evil? Plainly they never could have obtained the idea itself which their language expresses, except by, their own mental operations. While then they reason on this principle, how do they apply it? They apply it to prove, and this by their own concessions, that what they call benevolence, justice, truth, mercy, and sincerity in God, are not what these terms designate in men! Here then we may ask, what do they mean? The answer is, nothing. But this is not all. They apply it, as can easily be shown, to prove that what is esteemed malevolence, injustice, insincerity, falsehood, cruelty in men, is benevolence, justice, truth, sincerity, and mercy in God!

 

I am then fully authorized to assume that if man may, for different reasons or in different respects, purpose different and even opposite events, God MAY also.

 

Suppose then a wise and good man agitating the question whether he shall enter the marriage state: suppose him to know that if he enters this state, he shall become the father of children whose highest usefulness and happiness he shall greatly desire: suppose him to know that his children will be sons, and that to give them a liberal education at a public seminary would result in their highest conceivable usefulness and happiness, provided they should maintain in every respect a virtuous deportment during the period of their education: suppose now that much as he desires their exemplary conduct, the parent knows that placed in these circumstances, these sons will, beyond his power to prevent it, be led into a temporary course of gross iniquity: suppose, however decisive and strong as the reasons are to regret their misconduct, that nevertheless greater evil would result from any other course of education or way of life than from this, while be can also counteract in such degree the appropriate consequences of their vices, and bring so much good out of the evil, that the actual result will be immeasurably greater good than he can accomplish by remaining single, or by placing his sons in any other possible circumstances: -- now it is easy to see what would be the purposes of such a man, and how perfectly consistent they would be with each other and with the principle of true benevolence.

 

Let us apply the example to the illustration of the foregoing propositions.

 

1. To the first proposition.

 

It is obvious that such a parent would prefer a married to a single life, and the education of his sons to any other means of their usefulness and happiness in his power, because both events are the necessary means of the greatest conceivable good in the case, and because, though the highest conceivable good will not, yet the highest degree of good which he can happily secure will be, the actual result.

 

So God may purpose a system of moral government, i.e., to create moral beings with a given constitution and to place them in given circumstances under such a government, rather than to adopt any other means of good, because though such a means will not result in the highest conceivable good, it is still the necessary means not only of the highest conceivable good, but also of the highest degree of actual good which he can secure. For in the first place, it may be a very strong reason for adopting such a system, and other things being equal, it may be a decisive reason for adopting it, that it is the only means of the highest conceivable good. Not to adopt such a system might prove a source of great self -- dissatisfaction, since he would not do what he could to put it in the power of creatures to secure their highest happiness; and though from the nature of the system it is within the power of creatures to prevent, and though they should actually prevent, through their own disobedience, the result preferred by their Creator, still there would remain to him one substantial ground of self-satisfaction. For were we to suppose the amount of actual good to others from some other system equal to that which results from this, still the fact that this only is fitted to secure the highest conceivable good, would be a decisive reason for adopting it, since in this case its author would have the happiness of reflecting, not only that he had secured as much actual good to others as he could secure in any way, but had also adopted that system which was perfectly fitted to secure the highest conceivable good. Other reasons might also exist for adopting such a system, viz., to evince his benevolence and thus to support his authority as a moral governor. But secondly, such a system God would prefer to every other because it would actually result in the highest degree of good which he can secure. This system then would have a double recommendation, viz., that it is fitted to produce the highest conceivable good, and also will result in the highest degree of actual good which God can produce. More decisive reasons for adopting it cannot be conceived.

 

2. In regard to the second proposition, it is obvious that the parent would prefer that his sons should practice virtue in every instance instead of perpetrating crime, because the former would be valuable or good in itself, and also the only means of the highest conceivable good in the case.

 

In like manner God may be supposed to prefer holiness to sin in every instance in which sin takes place, i.e., to purpose holiness rather than sin in its stead as good in itself and as the only means of the highest conceivable good.

 

3. In regard to the third proposition --

 

It is obvious that the parent would purpose the existence of the vices of his sons, and prefer it to the non-existence of that system from which they are inseparable. According to the case supposed, the vices are not the necessary means of the greatest good, since virtues in their stead would result in greater good. They are however unavoidable so far as the power of the parent is concerned, if he would secure the greatest actual good which he can secure. Now as he knows these vices will take place as the consequences of what he does if he adopts the course supposed, he purposes in this sense that they shall take place; and to say this in this sense, would accord with the common usage of language. This purpose also implies a preference that these vices should take place, when their existence as a necessary consequence of the best system is compared with the nonexistence of that system.

 

Thus God may be said to purpose sin, i.e., to purpose that it shall be and to prefer that it should be. Here however we should fix our thoughts on the respect in which God may be said to have such a purpose in regard to sin. He does not then purpose its existence as good in itself; for by the supposition it is wholly evil in its nature, tendencies, and relations: not as the necessary means of the greatest conceivable good, for holiness is by our suppositions the means of the greatest conceivable good. In what respect then can God purpose the existence of sin? I answer, he purposes that it shall be as; he purposes that system, or to do that -- from which he knows it will follow as a consequence, and he prefers that it should be, rather than not adopt that system.

 

The propriety of saying that God purposes sin in such a case and in such a sense, cannot be doubted. Nothing is more common when one designs a given action or course of action, knowing the necessary consequences, to regard him and to speak of him as designing those consequences. It were easy to show that the Scriptures abound in this use of language.

 

In Proverbs, vi. 8-36, to hate wisdom, knowing death to be the consequence, is said to be loving death, i.e., choosing it. An example may be given from common life. The good of a community requires the erection of a mill and a dam; but the water overflows and destroys my neighbor's land, and I knew that it would do so. He charges me with designing it, and it may be said and would be said, that knowing the consequences, I did design it or purpose it. But is this a malevolent or benevolent purpose? Plainly the latter. A thousand similar cases might be given to illustrate the principle that a man is considered and said to design or purpose every known consequence of his actions. Otherwise no proof from action of intention is impossible. Whether the action admits of a good intention or not, still it is regarded as designed or purposed for some reason. It is not in the above case to injure my neighbor, but as incidental to that which was the means of public good. To show that this language is authorized by usage, how natural in such a case would be the following dialogue: Says A to B, "You have erected that dam to destroy my fine meadow, and you meant (purposed) to injurer me." "Oh, no," says B, "I did not mean-my object was not to overflow and destroy your meadow." "But you did," says A, "it was your object; for you knew if you built the dam it would be so." "True," says B, "I knew it would be so." "But," says A, "did you know it would be so and yet not mean it should be? Can you thrust a dagger into my heart, knowing that it will kill me, and say you did not mean to kill me?" "Why, no," says B, "but then I did not wish to injure you, that was no part of my purpose." "But," says A, "how could you know that the meadow would be spoiled if you built the dam, and yet not mean to injure me by doing it?" "Why," says B, "the end for which I built the dam was the public good, and if I could have secured this and not injured you, I should have been glad of it with all my heart." "No," says A, "you knew the meadow would be spoiled, and yet constructed the dam, knowing this; and you meant it should be so, and that I should be a sufferer."

 

It is most easy to see that this controversy is founded wholly in words, and that the only reason why the controversy can be perpetuated is because the words meant, purposed, &c., may, according to usage, be applied to that which is a known consequence of what anyone does? It is from this fact only that A's charge has any plausibility. For make now the distinction between purposing an event as the known consequence of what one does, and as an event which he regards as desirable either as good or the means of good to himself, and there could be no plausibility in the reasons assigned by A as a proof of B's unkind design.

 

The purpose of God that sin shall be, and the preference which the purpose implies, by no means alters the nature or tendency of sin. It is in no respect a better thing in its nature or tendency, because God cannot prevent its occurrence in the best system; for man can prevent it by personal holiness, and holiness in man when compared with sin and viewed as the act of man, is as far preferable. to sin in the divine mind, as that which tends to the highest conceivable good is preferable to that which tends to the destruction of all good and the production of absolute misery. Nor is sin the better because God can counteract its proper tendency and bring good out of it; for this neither makes it good in itself nor good as the necessary means of good, since there would be more good without it if man would do what he can to prevent it. There would be more good without it than with it in every instance, if God could prevent it in the precise circumstances in which it will take place. But he cannot. While therefore God, like the parent in the example given, prefers in the most unqualified manner holiness to sin, and while universal and perfect holiness on the part of men in their circumstances would result in the highest conceivable good, and while by holiness on their part no purpose of God whatever would be painfully defeated or crossed, but God's will would be done, still as God is under the necessity either of not adopting that system which is the only means of the highest conceivable good, as well as of the highest amount of good which he can possibly secure, or of adopting that system with the existence of sin as its certain consequence, he may be said, having adopted the system, to purpose the existence of sin. So that as God is not disappointed or crossed by the existence of sin, neither would he be painfully crossed by the existence of holiness.

 

Sin then, on the present hypothesis respecting its existence, is an event which God has in one respect purposed shall take place and prefers should take place; and this in perfect consistency with an unqualified preference in another respect that it should not take place. For what two purposes are more perfectly consistent with each other in the same mind, than a preference for right action on the part of others and a purpose of wrong action on their part, differing in the respects now supposed? What parent does not know that if his children live to years of accountability they will do wrong, and yet what parent does not prefer that they should in every instance do right? and yet what parent does not prefer at the same time the existence of wrong action in the case rather than to prevent it by the murder of his offspring?

 

What legislator in giving a system of laws to subjects, doubts whether there will be frequent instances of transgression, and knowing this, does not by the act of giving law (for where there is no law there can be no transgression) design that transgression shall be rather than not adopt a course which the general good demands? And yet who supposes that these facts are any proof that he does not prefer obedience to his laws in every instance? Whoever thought that discrepancy pertained to such purposes in a civil governor, or supposed that to prove his sincere preference for obedience to law, he must either give no law or resort for the prevention of crime to the indiscriminate massacre of his subjects?

 

So God's unqualified preference of holiness to sin is perfectly consistent with that purpose that sin shall be, and preference that it should be, which has now been supposed. Were he to resort to the necessary means of preventing sin in any case in which it does or will exist, greater evil would result from the change in the circumstances which would be requisite, than from permitting it to take place in present circumstances; for according to our hypothesis, greater good will be the actual result of the present system than would result from any change in it or from not adopting it.