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The GOSPEL TRUTH

MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.

 By

 NATHANIEL W. TAYLOR, D. D.,

1859

VOLUME II

 

APPENDIX -- No. I:

ESSAY ON JUSTICE AS THE ATTRIBUTE OF A PERFECT MORAL GOVERNOR.

 

 

PART I. -- CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE ANALYZED AND EXPLAINED.

 

Justice defined. -- 1. Justice a benevolent disposition. -- Manifested in subordinate purposes and executive doings. -- Relation of one to the other -- 2. Justice is a disposition to render to every one his due. -- What is it to Tender to every one his due? -- Difference between what is due and what is "his due." -- Executive acts divided into two classes, and each of these subdivided Into two. -- The cases arising under these classes considered in order. -- What is "his due" arises from a special relation, and involves a right. -- Inalienable rights. -- What is a right? -- Right involves obligation.

 

 

THERE is perhaps no one of the particular moral attributes of the Deity of which accurate views are more. important, in both natural and revealed theology, than his attribute of justice. What is justice as the attribute of a perfect moral governor? The inquiry is intimately connected with the discussion of many theological questions, as well as of the nature of a perfect moral government.

 

The word justice has, as we commonly, say, a variety of meanings in different applications. It is often applied to mere executive acts or doings, as these occur in the various forms of intercourse and business among. men. It has however another important application, and one with which we are now more directly concerned, viz., that in which it denotes a virtuous or morally right state of mind. The general import of the word, in this use of it, I propose to ascertain before I enter on the investigation of the present leading inquiry -- what is justice as the attribute of a perfect moral governor?

 

I proceed then to say, that

 

Justice, in respect to sentient beings, is a benevolent disposition or purpose of mind to render to every one his due; more particularly -- justice is a benevolent disposition or purpose of mind to render or to do to every one what ought to be rendered or done, the obligation to which arises from some peculiar relation of the object of the act, which creates and implies a right reciprocal to such obligation.

 

In defining a general complex term, like the term justice, it is convenient to employ such general terms in a leading definition as shall be more obvious and familiar, though for certain purposes they may need themselves to be defined. In this way, by a progressive analysis, we may successfully unfold the elementary ideas comprised in the complex idea. Accordingly I now propose to show the correctness of the above definition of justice, in both its general and particular forms, by a progressive analysis and explanation.

The definition of justice by the civil law is this: Justitia est constans et perpetua; voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi." This as a definition in moral philosophy, whatever may be true of it in political philosophy or civil jurisprudence, is defective in omitting the elementary idea denoted by the word benevolent employed in the definition. This elementary idea is obviously essential to the true conception of justice as a morally right act or state of the will. Nor is this definition as one in political science, or as a definition of justice on the part of men considered as simply members of the body politic, an adequate definition, since in this relation, justice on the part of both ruler and subject must include benevolence toward the body politic, or a disposition to promote the welfare of the State. Again: in this definition of the civil law, the phrase suum jus must denote, not his right, as distinguished from that to which he has a right, but the latter only. Even in this sense of the phrases the definition does not by any means include every instance of justice. The will or purpose to punish a criminal, in certain cases, is an act of justice. But it is plainly not a will to render to the criminal his right, or that to which he has a right. It is only by understanding suum jus to mean his due, in the specific sense of this English phrase, as used and explained in the foregoing definitions of justice, that the definition of the civil law, in this respect, is unobjectionable. But more on this topic hereafter.

 

Premising then, that I speak of justice only in its general meaning, when used to denote a virtuous or morally right state of mind, I remark --

 

In the first place, that justice is a benevolent disposition or purpose. Here it is important to advert to the difference between benevolence, considered as that primary moral affection which is the sum and essence of all virtue, and that which may be called benevolence, although viewed abstractly from the former, it is not virtuous. Benevolence then, as the primary morally right affection, is an elective preference of the highest happiness of all -- the sentient universe -- to every conflicting object. In this sense of the word, benevolence is to be distinguished from other and very different states of mind, which are often and properly called benevolence, viz., from any merely constitutional affection, which includes no act of will; and also from any affection which, though voluntary, directly respects only some limited degree of good to others, and which may be prompted either by benevolence or selfishness. This general or universal benevolence -- benevolence as an elective preference of the highest happiness of sentient beings -- must then be distinguished from all those limited forms of kindness or good-will with which it is so often confounded by philosophers. Benevolence which respects merely one's country, or one's circle of friends and acquaintance, or an associate company of highwaymen, is not a virtuous or morally right state of the mind. Such benevolence is prompted by selfishness, and is of course a selfish affection.

 

Again: general or universal benevolence -- benevolence as merely an elective preference of the highest happiness of all must be distinguished from all subordinate action, in the form of volitions, dispositions, or Purposes, and in the form of executive doings, to which it may lead. This state of mind, as first arising in the mind, and as a mere moral preference (Ps. lxxiii. 25), may be conceived as a mental state in which the mind has no reference to any specific or subordinate action whatever. But if we suppose, which seems to be uniformly true, that the mind in making this preference,knows that the attainment of its object depends on subsequent subordinate action, then this state will be something more than the mere elective preference of the object specified. It will involve another act of will, viz., a purpose or a disposition of mind to perform all such subordinate action as may be known to be necessary to attain the object. It is this complex mental state as including the elective preference of the highest happiness of all, and a purpose or disposition to perform all such action as may be necessary to attain its object, which is properly called benevolence, or general benevolence, universal benevolence or good will. By President Edwards it is called the love of being in general. Though this state of mind is one in which no particular subordinate action is directly willed or chosen, nor properly included, it is in a most important respect a practical principle, inasmuch as it is not only a disposition or purpose of heart, but a permanent governing principle, which in its true nature and tendency prompts to, or, etymologically speaking, arranges, or directs all those subordinate volitions, dispositions, or affections, and those executive doings, which are necessary to the attainment of its object. This state of mind is morally right, and the only act which, viewing other acts as not including it, is morally right. Being in an important sense a. permanent state of mind, whose tendency is to prompt to other mental states, it is combined with them, and the various combinations are properly called benevolent affections, dispositions, and purposes. These are the particular forms or modifications of general benevolence, or universal good-will. Each of these, for the sake of distinguishing it from others of the same class, and from general benevolence, we distinguish by a particular name. One of these particular forms of general benevolence in which the mind wills a limited degree of the well-being of another we often call benevolence, relying on the connection to show the meaning of the word. In this case there is a particular disposition or purpose to perform beneficent action prompted by general benevolence, which particular disposition or purpose, though properly called benevolence or kindness, differs from general benevolence. In another case there is a like disposition or purpose to speak the truth, which is properly called veracity. In another, there is a like disposition or purpose to render to every one his due, which is properly called justice. Any one of these particular forms of general benevolence, contemplated as including this principle, is truly and properly said to be morally right, and is properly called a virtue. But then its moral rectitude consists exclusively in the element of general benevolence, since if we conceive the particular disposition, affection, or purpose to exist, as it may, without this element of general benevolence, we necessarily conceive of it as a form of selfishness. If again we conceive of the element of general benevolence as existing in the same degree without the particular disposition, affection, or purpose, we necessarily conceive of the same degree of moral rectitude. In like manner, when benevolence is conceived as combined with any particular disposition, &c., and these as going forth in executive action, we properly speak of the entire combination as morally right action.

 

When however we contemplate justice or veracity, or any particular disposition, purpose, volition, separately from, or as not including either the benevolent or selfish principle of the heart, it is neither morally right nor morally wrong. At the same time it must be admitted that justice, veracity -- , &c., each being conceived as a particular subordinate purpose or disposition without general benevolence, and including its appropriate executive action, are in some sense right, but not morally right. They are right as they are fitted to promote some limited good necessary to the general good. It may be truly said of any of these particular acts, that it ought to be done. But its rightness or oughtness is not moral rightness or moral oughtness, for this is a predicate only of (general) benevolence, or that which includes it. The rightness or oughtness of any particular subordinate disposition or purpose and it& executive action, without including benevolence or selfishness, is the same kind of rightness or oughtness in relation to the end of action which is predicable of the structure of a watch or a pen in relation to the end for which it is made that is, a mere natural fitness. The particular virtues of justice, veracity, &c., differ from benevolence considered as the governing principle of the heart, not as excluding it, for as virtues they necessarily include it; but as including something more, viz., particular subordinate dispositions, purposes, to perform the particular actions which are necessary to the production of the general good. Benevolence, as the term is employed in this connection, is a governing, practical principle -- a controlling disposition or purpose to secure the highest well-being of all by all those subordinate particular affections, &c., and executive doings which are necessary to accomplish this end, while each particular virtue of this class consists in the benevolence which prompts the particular affection, purpose, &c., and in the particular affection, purpose, &c., which is prompted by it. In accordance with this classification, it is now maintained that justice, when the word is applied to denote a virtue -- a morally right state of mind, in the general import of the word, is benevolence, in the form of a disposition or purpose; or it is purposing with benevolence or it is a benevolent purpose or disposition -- to render every one his due.

 

In the second place, I now propose to explain and confirm the other part of the general definition given of the word justice.

 

The inquiry here is, what is it to render to every one his due? I answer, it is to render to every one, what ought to be rendered to him, the obligation to which arises from some peculiar relation of the object of the act, which results in some right reciprocal to such obligation.

 

In further explanation I remark, that an act of rendering to another his due, is executive action, and that when we speak of such an act as an act of justice, we speak of it as dictated by a benevolent disposition or purpose. Again: an act of justice may respect as its object an individual or the public; and by the object of the act, I mean not one who is the object of the act merely as an act, but one to whom it is an act of justice, whether an individual or the public, in respect to whom it is an act of justice; even including one's self, as we do, in speaking of one as doing what justice to himself requires, thus making him both the agent and object of his act. Again: the obligation to render to another his due, arises from some peculiar relation of him who is bound to perform the act. This implies a peculiar relation on the part of him to whom the thing to be rendered is due, as the ground of the obligation to render it. The relation of the debtor, which is the ground of his obligation, implies a relation of the creditor, which is also a ground of the same obligation. The latter relation is so plainly implied in the former, as equally the ground of the obligation in all cases under consideration, that I have chosen not to burden the definition with its specification.

 

Further: we now inquire concerning the phrase his due, when it is said that justice is a benevolent purpose to render to every one his due. It will be readily admitted that whatever justice dictates and demands should be rendered to another, is his due. It is then important in the present investigation, to ascertain if possible the precise import of the phrase his due. Some moralists suppose that to render to another what ought to be rendered, or to do to another what ought to be done, or to render or to do to another what is due, is the same thing as to render to another his due, or what is due to him. The error it is believed will be obvious, if we accurately determine the meaning of these different forms of expression. That to render to another what ought to be rendered, or to do to another what ought to be done, is to render or do to him what is due; and that to render or to do to another what is due, is to render or do to him what ought to be done, is undeniable. It is equally so, that to render or to do to another what ought to be rendered or done, or what is due, is in many cases to render to him his due. But that to render or to do to another what ought to be rendered or done, or what is due, is in all cases to render what is his due, cannot be pretended. How often the act of conferring a favor on a neighbor, or a friend, or a stranger, ought to be done, and is due, e. g., in relinquishing a debt, or forgiving an injury, when the favor conferred can with no propriety be said to be his due. This part of the Subject claims a more particular consideration.

 

I remark then, that there is an obvious difference between rendering to another what is due, and rendering to another what is his due. This difference may be presented in a classification of executive acts, which will show that in rendering to another what is his due, is only one species of those acts which are properly called rendering to another what is due.

 

Acts or doings then, which generally speaking constitute rendering to another WHAT IS DUE, are those which ought to be done as jetted and necessary to the highest good of the whole. It is obvious that by another is meant one or many, as the case may be.

 

This general class of executive acts may be divided into the two following classes or kinds, viz.:

 

I. Those which ought to be done as fitted and necessary to the highest good of the whole, and also of an individual.

II. Those which ought to be done as fitted and necessary to the highest good of the whole, though fitted not to promote but to impair or destroy the good of the individual.

 

These two classes of executive action may each be subdivided.

 

I. The first class may be divided into the two following classes:

(1.) Those which ought to be done as fitted and necessary to the highest good of the whole, and also of an individual, considered merely as sentient beings, and therefore not on account of any peculiar relation on the part of the objects of the act. Examples of this particular class are acts of forgiving. an injury, showing kindness to an enemy, remitting a debt, acts of hospitality and generosity, with other forms of beneficent action.

 

(2.) Those which ought to be done as fitted and necessary to the highest good of the whole, and that of an individual, considered not merely as sentient beings, but on account also of some peculiar relation of one or both of the objects of the act -- the public and the individual -- which gives rise to the obligation of such action. Examples are acts of protection, care, and kindness to children, fulfilling contracts and promises, paying the laborer his hire, rendering an equivalent for what is received, rewarding an obedient subject of law, &c.

 

II. The second class may be divided into the two following classes:

 

(1.) Those which ought to be done as fitted and necessary to the highest good of the whole considered merely as sentient beings, though fitted not to promote but to impair or destroy the good of the individual who is an object of the act, when no peculiar relation on his part gives rise to the obligation of such action. Examples are acts of imposing taxes, pulling down one's house to stop the progress of a fire in a city, compelling men to fight the battles of their country, &c.

 

(2.) Those which ought to be done solely as fitted to the highest good of the whole considered not merely as sentient beings, and though such action is fitted not to promote but to impair or destroy the good of the individual, when some peculiar relation on his part and on the part of the public gives rise to the obligation of the act. Examples are acts of inflicting punishments or penal sanctions of law.

 

This classification is sufficient to show, that every act of rendering to one what ought to be rendered, is rendering what is due, but not what can be properly called rendering to one his due. It is true that between rendering to one what ought to be rendered or what is due, and rendering to one what is his due, there is an important resemblance. Both are acts of rendering to one what is due. But every act of rendering to one what is due, is not an act of rendering to one his due. Both are acts which ought to be done -- acts of obligation, and of obligation which rests ultimately on one common basis, the fitness and necessity of action to the general good. But between these kinds of action there is an important difference. The fitness and necessity of the two kinds of action to the general good depend on very different relations, which determine such fitness and necessity, and so determine the obligation in respect to the different kinds of action. This will appear if we consider the subordinate classes or kinds of executive action above specified.

 

Let us consider those which ought to be done, as fitted and necessary to the highest good of the whole and that of an individual, when viewed as sustaining the relation of sentient beings. Take the act of forgiving one who has injured us. While it is admitted that the obligation to such action arises from the relation of the objects of the act as sentient beings, it is plain that it arises in no degree or respect from any peculiar relation of either. It will not be pretended that it depends on any peculiar relation of the public. Nor does this obligation depend on any peculiar relation of the offender; that is, on what he is or has done as an offender. The supposed act of kindness ought to be done, or would be due, had he not offended. The obligation is simply not taken away, and therefore is in no respect created or increased by the offense. For these reasons it is plain that the act cannot be properly said, in respect to the offender, to be his due, nor in respect to the public, to be their due; in other words, to be an act of justice either to him or to them.

 

Let us now recur to that class of cases, in which the obligation to action arises from the fitness and necessity of the action to the good of the public and the good of the individual, considered not merely as sentient beings, but as sustaining some peculiar relation. We see at once by referring to the examples, that the obligation to any one of these acts arises out of and is determined by the peculiar relations of the objects of the act. Every one sees that a peculiar relation exists between the laborer and his employer, which is the ground of the obligation of the latter to pay the hire of the former; and another peculiar relation between the public and the employer, by which the latter comes under obligation to the public to the same act. Similar remarks apply to the act of fulfilling a contract, and to the act of obedience to law. In the latter case, the lawgiver or government, as a guardian of the public good, is brought by the act of the obedient subject under a peculiar obligation to him, and also to the public. Thus the act of rewarding the obedient subject of law is rendering to him what is his due, and to the public what is their due. The same is true of the acts of paying the laborer and fulfilling a contract. It is rendering his due to the individual who is the object of the act, and it is also rendering to the public their due. As such, the act in each instance is properly called an act of justice to the individual who is its object, and an act of justice to the public.

 

Let us now recur to that class of acts which ought to be done solely as fitted and necessary to the highest good of the whole, though they impair or destroy the good of the individual who is the object of such action.

 

In respect to an act which falls under the first subdivision of this class, we see at once that the obligation depends on no peculiar relation of the individual who is the object of the act. For example, the obligation to pull down one's house to stop the progress of a fire in a city, while it results from the fitness and necessity of the act to the highest good of the whole, depends on no peculiar relation of the owner of the house, since the obligation would be the same were the house without an owner. Hence while this act is rendering to another what is due, and to the public what is their due, it cannot be properly said to be rendering to the individual what is his due.

 

Again: in respect to an act which falls under the other subdivision of this class, the obligation arises from a peculiar relation of the individual who is the object of the act, by which the act becomes fitted and necessary to the highest, good of the whole; and from a consequent peculiar relation of him on whom the obligation rests. For example, the obligation of a lawgiver or moral governor to punish the disobedient subject of law arises not at all from his relation as a sentient being, since this would imply an obligation to inflict suffering for its own sake; but it arises from his peculiar relation as a transgressor of law, and the peculiar relation of a lawgiver or moral governor to the public, which render the act of punishing the transgressor necessary to the highest good of the whole. Hence this act is not only rendering to another what is due, but what is his due, and what in respect to the public is their due.

 

Again, as I have already said, while the obligation to render to another his due, or the obligation of an act of justice, arises from some peculiar relation of the object of the act, this peculiar relation results in and implies some right reciprocal to this obligation. This right however does not always vest in him who sustains the relation which is the ground of the obligation. As the act of justice can never respect merely an individual as its object, but must respect either the public only or both an individual and the public, so the right which is reciprocal to the obligation of the act can never vest merely in an individual, though in some cases it may vest merely in the public, and in others there may be a right to the act on the part of an individual, and also a right to the act on the part of the public. This right can never vest merely in an individual, that is, no one as an individual merely, can possess a right which does not imply a right to the same thing on the part of the public. Such rights of individuals seem to have been claimed by some under the denomination of "inalienable rights," e. g., the right to life, to liberty, and to the pursuit of happiness. Without here affirming what can scarcely be questioned, that the rights here specified, or at least some of them, would become in some circumstances inconsistent with the highest good of the whole and therefore could not exist, one thing is plain, that if they exist at all, they must exist on the ground that they are consistent with and required by the greatest good of the whole. The public therefore must possess the right to secure, as far as may be, the individual in the possession of the blessings which his rights respect, for the possession of these blessings by him is as necessary to the highest good of the whole to which the public has a right as it is to the good of the individual. I said that in some cases a right may vest only in the public. The right to pull down a house by the police of the city, to arrest the progress of afire, vests not in the owner of the house, but only in the public or in the police as representatives of the public. The peculiar relation of the public, which is the ground of the obligation of the act, and which results in the reciprocal right of the public, is the relation of the greatest number whose highest good depends on and requires the act. The act of a moral governor in rewarding an obedient subject of law is an act of justice both to the subject and to the public. In this case there is a twofold obligation and a twofold corresponding right: there is an obligation to the obedient subject with a corresponding right on his part as an individual, and there is an obligation to the public with a corresponding right on their part. The peculiar relation of the obedient subject considered as an individual, which is the ground of the obligation to reward him, and which results in his corresponding right to a reward, is the relation of one whose highest good by his obedience is rendered necessary to the highest good of the whole; and the peculiar relation of the public which is the ground of the obligation to reward the obedient subject, and which results in the corresponding right of the public that he be rewarded, is the relation of the greatest number whose highest good depends on the act. The act of punishing the disobedient subject of law is an act of justice both to the subject himself and to the public. In this case the obligation is not an obligation to him, but to the public only. The right which corresponds to the obligation to punish him does not vest in him, as the right to a reward vests in an obedient subject. A right always respects some good; or in the language of Burke, "men have no right to what is not for their benefit." As punishment then, or a legal penalty, is only an evil to the subject, the right which corresponds to the obligation to punish him, does not vest in him but in the public only, whose benefit only it respects. The obligation to punish him arises indeed from his peculiar relation, as a disobedient subject, and on this account the act of punishing him is an act of justice to him. It is an act, the obligation to which is created by his disobedience, but it is not an obligation to him, nor does it imply a right on his part corresponding to the obligation. The legal penalty is not inflicted on the transgressor as a personal benefit to him or as the means of good to him; and since every obligation of one to another respects the good of the latter, it follows, that although in the present case there is an obligation on the part of the moral governor to punish the transgressor; although this obligation in one respect arises from the peculiar relation of the transgressor; although he deserves punishment; although punishment is his due; although the act of punishment is an act of justice to him as well as to the public; yet the obligation to punish him is in no sense an obligation to him. To him punishment is only an evil; and as no one can be said to have a right to an evil merely for evil's sake, so no one can be properly said to be under obligation to another to inflict evil upon him merely for evil's sake. Legal penalty is inflicted on the transgressor as the necessary means of sustaining the authority of law or of the lawgiver, and so as the necessary means of the general good. The transgressor by his act of transgression creates on the part of the lawgiver an obligation to punish him, and also a corresponding right to his punishment on the part of the public. Hence punishment is his due, or an act of justice to him, inasmuch as he has brought the moral governor under an obligation to punish him, not to himself, but to the public; by creating a right not on his own part to be punished, but a right on the part of the public to his punishment, which corresponds to the obligation to punish him. The peculiar relation of the transgressor, which is the ground of the moral governor's obligation to punish him, and of the right to his punishment on the part of the public, is the relation of one, who by his transgression has made his punishment necessary to the public good. Thus it appears that the obligation to an act of justice always implies a correspondent right somewhere, either in an individual and in the public, or at least in the public, and that the obligation of the act, and the consequent right to its performance depend on some peculiar relation of the object of the act.

 

But what is a right? The answer to this question will serve still further to explain and establish the present definition of justice. I proceed to say then --

 

In the third place, that the word right, in its most general import, when we speak of one as having a right, denotes the fitness to the general good which arises from some peculiar relation of the possessor of the right that some good to him which the right respects as its object should be, which also creates or implies a corresponding obligation.

 

After some explanation of terms which I deem important, I shall attempt to show the correctness of the above definition of a right.

 

A right may be that of an individual, as the right of a ruler, a subject, a parent, a child, a creditor, &c.; or it may be the right of the public, a community, a state or kingdom. As a matter of convenience in the use of language, we may conceive of the public or a community as a moral person. I shall so use the words one and another that they may be applied either to the public, to a community, or to an individual, as the case may require.

 

Again: a right always respects some good to its possessor as its object; that is, happiness, or the means of happiness, or both. It may be a right to be or a right to do, in the broadest sense of the word -- as a right to act or to forbear acting, a right to possess or to relinquish, to think, to judge, to will, to execute one's will or to have it executed by another, to confer good or to inflict evil, &c., &c.

 

Further: when I speak of the thing which a right respects, or the object of a right as that which should be, the propriety of the language in certain cases may not be obvious. For example, we say that one has a right to an estate, but who would say that the estate ought to be. We have however only to remember, that in this case, as in many similar cases, the popular form of expression is elliptical, and that the meaning fully expressed would be, one has the right to the possession and use of an estate. The propriety of saying that one's possession and use of an estate is that which should be, is at once apparent. At the same time this form of expression, or some equivalent form, is the only one which is applicable to all cases. For example, the public has a right to the punishment of a criminal as truly as one has a right to an estate, or as an obedient subject has a right to a reward. But while we may properly say in respect to the object of the right in the former case -- and so in respect to the object of every right -- that it should be, we cannot properly say of this object that it should be possessed by the person holding the right, as we may properly say this in respect to many other objects of a right.

 

Again: when I speak of the fitness to the general good, &c., that the object of the right should be, I do not mean to imply that a right or every right is inalienable, nor that it may not be relinquished in a change of circumstances, or on the ground of that which is an equivalent to the object of the right. The contrary is undeniable. One may alienate his right to property on the ground of an equivalent in money, or in the happiness which he finds in imparting good to others. A moral governor may abandon his right to punish a transgressor, and the public may abandon their right that he be punished, on the ground of an atonement, which is an equivalent in respect to the end of punishment; provided that the abandonment does not involve in any respect the sacrifice of public good. But no one can voluntarily alienate or relinquish a right, consistently with the principles of moral rectitude, knowing that the alienation or relinquishment involves a sacrifice of the general happiness.

 

Further: we often speak of one as having a right of which he is deprived, or of his not having, or of being deprived of his right. The incongruity of the language does not however obscure our meaning. We mean that he has a right, or that a right is his so far forth as having it or its being his is determined by that relation on his part which is the ground of a right, while he has not the actual possession or use of the object of the right. Thus in one sense one may be said to have a right, which in another sense he may be said not to have, or to be deprived of, and the possession of which he may have occasion to seek by force or by a legal process.

 

Once more: in common language we speak of one as having or possessing a right, or of one's right, or of a right as being another's -- being his or your or my right, and the question may naturally arise when it is said that a right is the fitness to the general good, which arises, &c. -- with what propriety or truth can this fitness, when called a right, be said to belong to one or to be his? I answer, that nothing is more common than to say that a thing belongs to one or is his, or to use other forms of expression, to describe him as its possessor when it pertains to him as inseparable from what he is or has done, or results from any relation which he sustains. In this manner we speak of one's obligation or of one's necessity, meaning an obligation or a necessity which exists in respect to him as inseparable from his circumstances, or results from some relation on his part. In the following passage from Shakespeare we have this use of the word:

 

"Were it my fatness,

To let these hands obey my blood,

They are apt enough to dislocate and tear

Thy flesh and bones." -- King Lear.

 

This is obviously equivalent to saying -- were it in respect to the true end of action (which is no other than the general good), fit or proper in my case, or in view of what I am. or the relation I sustain, "to let these hands," &c. The fitness here spoken of, whether it be that which constitutes a right or not, is the fitness which arises from the relation which one sustains, and on this ground is spoken of as his. The fitness in such a case is the fitness that an agent should act in a given manner, and the fitness which constitutes a right is the fitness that one should be the object of an action on the part of another as already described. Indeed, should one affirm in analytic language that there is a fitness to the general good arising from the peculiar relation of the laborer, that his hire should not be withheld by his employer, and this creates a. reciprocal obligation on the part of the latter, what would it be but to say that the laborer has a right to his hire?

 

With these things in view, I will now attempt to show that the particular or elementary ideas specified in the above definition constitute the complex idea of a right.

 

I remark then, that we cannot form the common and familiar idea of a right without the idea of the fitness to the general good, that the particular object of the right should be. This will be obvious from reflecting on any familiar instance of a right. We say one has a right to life, that is, to have or possess life; and so in respect to liberty, property, &c., &c. But who can conceive of the existence of the right without conceiving of the fitness to the general good, that the particular good which is the object of the right should be? If we conceive the particular good, which is the object of the right, not to be fitted to the general good, we necessarily conceive it to be inconsistent with the general good, and of course that the individual has, and can have no right to the particular good. The moment we conceive of one as having a right to any particular good, we necessarily conceive that the being of that thing is right -- that it is right that it should be -- that it is what in the case ought to be and should not be prevented by any other. But it is plainly impossible thus to conceive of it without conceiving it to be fitted to the general good; or which is the same thing, if we conceive it to be inconsistent with the general good. What possible right can one be conceived to possess to life, or liberty, or property, when his possession of the particular good is inconsistent with the general good? Or to take an example of aright of the public. What possible right has the public to the punishment of the criminal, except his punishment is fitted to promote and of course not inconsistent with the public good? Punishment is in no respect a good to the criminal himself, and if we suppose it to be in no respect a good to the public, or the means of the public good, what possible right can exist on the part of the moral governor to inflict it, or on the part of the public that it should be inflicted? Such a right would be a right to inflict evil merely for evil's sake. The act of infliction could in no respect be good to him who should inflict the evil, or to him on whom it should be inflicted, or to the public. There could be no motive to the act, and the act itself would be impossible in the nature of things. Or if we suppose the act to be possible, still it can be supposed to be possible only to unqualified malice; while the right to perform the act or the right that it should be performed, would imply that the act would be morally right. And if it be morally right to inflict evil merely for evil's sake -- to act with unqualified malice -- then I ask, what is it to act morally wrong? It is then plainly impossible to form the universal and familiar idea of a right without the idea of the fitness to the general good that the object of the right should be.

 

Again: in conceiving of a right, we necessarily conceive of the fitness of the particular good which is the object of the right, to the general good, as resulting from some peculiar relation of the possessor of the right. This may be seen in a few examples. The fitness to the general good of one's paying a debt, the payment of which is the object of a right on the part of the creditor, results from the peculiar relation of the creditor -- the relation of one who has imparted a good to another, on condition of receiving an equivalent. The fitness to the general good that a moral governor should reward the obedient subject, so far as the right to a reward on the part of the latter is concerned, results from his peculiar relation -- the relation of one who, by his obedience, has rendered his reward necessary to the general good; while this fitness, so far as the rewarding him is the object of a right on the part of the public, results from the peculiar relation of the public -- the relation of the greatest number to the highest well-being as depending on the act. The fitness to the general good of punishing the disobedient subject under a merely legal system, the punishing of whom is the object of a right, not on his part, but on the part of the public, results from the relation of the public -- the relation of the greatest number to the highest well-being so far as it depends on the act. Thus in conceiving of a right, whether it be that of an individual or of the public, we necessarily conceive of some peculiar relation of the possessor of the right, from which results the fitness to the general good of that which is the object of the right.

 

The same thing may be shown by familiar cases, in which no right can be conceived to exist, because the peculiar relation, which is one necessary ground of a right, does not exist. There are many cases in which there is a fitness to the general good, that one should act in a given manner toward another, but in which the latter has no right that the act should be done. There is a fitness to the general good, that one injured by another should forgive the offender -- that one's house should be pulled down to arrest the progress of a fire, &c., &c. But it is impossible to conceive that the offender has a right to forgiveness, or the owner of the house a right that his house should be pulled down. And one reason is, that it is impossible to conceive of any peculiar relation on the part of either from which the fitness of the supposed act arises. The relation of each is indeed such, that the supposed act done to him will subserve the general good. But the fitness of the act to this end does not arise from his peculiar relation, as the ground or reason of it. Kindness toward an offender is fitted to the general good, and would be so were he not an offender. It is so, notwithstanding his offense, and therefore does not become so by his offense. The ownership of the house does not occasion the fitness of pulling it down, to the general good. Neither the offender nor the owner of the house can appeal to any peculiar relation on his part as the ground or reason of the fitness of the supposed act in respect to him, to the general good, nor as a reason that it should be done. The one cannot say, I have injured another, and therefore I have a right to kindness from him; nor can the other say, I own the house, and therefore have a right that it be pulled down. These examples are sufficient to show that we cannot conceive of a right without conceiving of the fitness of the object of the right to the general good, as arising from some peculiar relation of the possessor of the right.

 

Nor is this all. We cannot conceive of a right without conceiving of that peculiar relation of its possessor of which I have spoken, as creating and implying a reciprocal obligation on the part of another. By this reciprocal obligation I mean an obligation which corresponds to the right in its foundation and its object. Thus there is an obligation to the laborer on the part of his employer to pay him his hire, and, a right on the part of the laborer to the payment, and both this obligation and this right are founded in the peculiar relation of the possessor of the right. What the obligor is under obligation to do or to avoid doing, the obligee has a right that he should do or avoid doing, and this obligation and this right arise from one and the same relation on the part of the possessor of the right and respect the same object: so that the obligation and the right are reciprocal; that is, they correspond in their foundation and their object. I say then, that we cannot conceive of a right without conceiving of the peculiar relation of its possessor as creating and implying an obligation to him in respect to the object of the right. As the laborer has a right to his hire, that is, to the payment of his hire by his employer, there is a correspondent obligation to pay it on the part of the latter. As the laborer has a right that none should prevent the payment of his hire, others are under a corresponding obligation not to prevent it. The same things are obviously true in respect to every other right.

 

The same thing is further obvious from the nature of obligation. Obligation is the necessity one is under, or the being bound by a necessity to do (either by acting or forbearing to act) that which is fitted to the great end of all action, the general good. As then there is a fitness to this end that the object of one's right should be, arising from some peculiar relation on his part, so from this fitness and therefore from this peculiar relation arises a necessity, i.e., an obligation on the part of another, even of every other, to act so that the object of the right shall be. Right and obligation are therefore reciprocal. If there is a right on the part of one, there is a corresponding obligation on the part of another. An essential idea or conception of a right is the idea of it, as that which in the manner explained creates and implies a reciprocal obligation.

 

It is this characteristic which constitutes the difference, or as logicians say the differentia, between a case of fitness to the general good on the part of one that a particular good to him should be, which is a right, and that which is not a right. There are, as we have seen, many instances of fitness to the general good which imply an obligation to confer good on others, or not to prevent or hinder the existence of such good, but which are not cases involving corresponding rights. But wherever we find a case of fitness to the general good arising from some peculiar relation of one that a particular good to him should be or should exist, which peculiar relation on his part creates and implies a consequent obligation on the part of another to secure or not to prevent the existence of that particular good, there we find a right. That the particular good, which is the object of the right should be, is emphatically and in a peculiar sense right in respect to the possessor of the right. It involves a rightness, i.e., a fitness to the general good, not merely as such fitness exists in many other cases, irrespective of any peculiar relation on the part of him to whom the particular good is a good, but a fitness to the general good, which arises from some peculiar relation on his part, appropriating it to him and creating an obligation to him on another or on all others to secure or not to prevent the existence of that particular good. This fitness is thus with great propriety appropriated to him from whose peculiar relation it results, and on this account is called his right, while as creating in the manner explained a corresponding obligation, it is par excellence called a right.

 

Having thus attempted to specify the several elementary ideas which constitute the complex idea of what we call a right, the question naturally arises whether any other element is essential to the complex conception. On this point I can only say that I am unable to discover any other, or at least any other which is not fairly included in the specification.

 

According to what has been said, justice, considered as a morally right state of mind, may be said, in general terms, to be a benevolent disposition or purpose to render to every other his due; or more particularly, justice is a benevolent disposition, or purpose to do to every other what ought to be done, the obligation to which arises from some peculiar relation of the object of the act which creates and implies a right reciprocal to such obligation.

That this definition of justice may be more fully apprehended I have defined by progressive analysis and explanation the leading terms used in the above forms of definition, and particularly the term right, and shown, if I mistake not, that a right is the fitness to the general good, which arises from some peculiar relation of its possessor, that its object should be, thus creating and implying a corresponding obligation.

 

With this import of the word justice in view, I next propose to consider some of the kinds or species of justice.

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