Second leading propositon. -- God's administration is equitable -- proved by showing, 1. That God has given the best law, 2. That he distributes good and evil equitably. -- In opposition to this proposition, the unequal distribution of good and evil has caused the chief difficulty. -- Various theories resorted to. Is the difficulty real? -- (a) Greater difficulties in denying God's equity than in admitting it. -- (b) No proof against it; for God is not inequitable in treating men better than they deserve, nor in treating them worse. More rational to regard this distribution as explicable in some unknown way. God may be administering a moral government under a gracious economy. -- (c) There Is satisfactory proof for his equity -- the arguments probable and cumulative.

 

 

IN support of our leading proposition,--THAT GOD IS ADMINISTERING A PERFECT MORAL GOVERNMENT OVER MEN, I have attempted to show, that he is administering a moral government, as a peculiar kind of government, and in some proper import of the language. I now proceed, as I proposed, to show. The equity of his administration.

 

For this purpose it is necessary only to Show --

 

1. That God has given to men the best law;

2. That in the distribution of good and evil in this world, he does not show himself as departing from, but by this means and others, as adhering to the principles of exact equity.

 

I remark then:

 

1. That God has given to men the best law. What I maintain on this topic is, that the law of benevolence, or the law of benevolent action is the best law; and that God has given this law to men. After what has been said in previous lectures, I deem it sufficient to add, that men, as moral beings, know that they are under the law which requires them to prefer the highest happiness of all--of God and his sentient creation--to every object in competition with it, and so to will, purpose, or intend at all times, and in all circumstances, to do the greatest good in their power.

 

2. God, in the distribution of good and evil in this world, does not show himself as departing from, but by this means and others, as adhering to the principles of exact equity.

 

If a moral governor gives the best law, and also does, or shows himself determined to do those things which are necessary to manifest or express his highest approbation of obedience, and highest disapprobation of disobedience, the equity of his administration is established. He may not establish his rightful authority; he may be a selfish being, and in other ways prove himself such, yet in the case now supposed, the equity of his administration cannot be impeached.

 

It is not however supposed, that God manifests the highest approbation of obedience, and the highest disapprobation of disobedience in this world, in every possible way or mode of their manifestation. It is not pretended that he fully and directly expresses these feelings in the distribution of good and evil in this world, or makes it according to the principles of exact justice or perfect equity; though, as I claim, this distribution involves no violation of these principles, nothing inconsistent with a strict adherence to them. What I maintain is, that while he does not show that he adheres to these principles merely by the distribution of good and evil, his manner of doing so, even in this world, is such, that taken in connection with other things, it fully and convincingly shows his adherence to them.

This is quite supposable. A temporary, short suspension of full and exact retribution does not necessarily involve the least departure from, or violation of, any of the principles of exact justice, nor, as the case may be, does it in the least degree obscure the fact, that a moral governor adheres to these principles in his administration. There may be good and sufficient reasons for the temporary suspension of rewards and punishments, and at the same time, full and satisfactory proofs that the principles of exact justice are not violated nor abandoned.

 

The unequal distribution of good and evil in this world, as it is called, has occasioned the principal difficulties on this interesting subject. It has appeared on a superficial view! of Divine Providence, to involve a plain departure from, or rather a palpable violation of, the principles of exact justice. The error lies in not regarding the system of God's moral government over men as begun or entered upon, but not yet finished--as in progress, not completed--a system, perfect in all its principles as one of influence, not yet carried out into all its issues and results. Hence, it is often represented, not only as imperfect in its present stage of progress, but as actually marred with palpable injustice in the distribution of good and evil. The righteous it is said, are often cast clown in affliction, while the wicked are crowned with prosperity.

 

Hence, it is naturally asked, if God sustains his authority as a perfect moral governor by adhering to the principles of strict equity in his administration, why does he distribute good and evil in this world in a manner so apparently inconsistent with these principles? This difficulty, so far as I know, has not been removed by any satisfactory explanation. Some theologians, to give plausibility to their reasonings, have resorted to the theory of a future life, in which, as they would have us believe, these violations of justice will cease, and be followed with merited rewards to the righteous, and just punishments to the wicked. This solves no difficulty; for it concedes that the principles of justice are in this world actually violated; and how can even a single violation of justice be consistent with the perfect equity of his administration?--Others that they may avoid, rather than meet and remove the difficulty, have adopted an arbitrary and unauthorized notion of justice in God, one which represents it as neither dictated by benevolence, nor as consistent with it, and which would therefore, dishonor the throne of a usurper and a tyrant. Thus it is, that occasion has been furnished for the triumph of Infidelity in its favorite conclusion,--that the moral government of God, instead of being maintained according to the unbending principles of eternal justice, is a mere system of tenderness, which does not distinguish between right and wrong; and indulgence, which accommodates itself to all iniquity. Thus it is, I may also add, that many who take the name of Christians, to quell the disturbance and alarm which they feel when they think of Heaven's Sovereign as a God of justice and of judgment, sink all that is venerable and awful in his dominion, into the lovely and easily defied imbecility of parental fondness.

 

In view of the supposed difficulty arising from the manner in which God distributes good and evil in this world, it may be well to inquire, before we abandon the equity of his moral administration, whether there are not greater difficulties in denying than in admitting it, or rather, whether the difficulty which appears so formidable is not rather imaginary than real, and whether the evidence is not decisive and satisfactory, that he adheres to the most exact principles of equity, without the shadow of violation of them, in his moral government over men.

Such are my own views of the subject; and to these three topics of inquiry I shall now direct my remarks.

 

I propose to show in respect to the equity of God's moral administration:

 

In the first place, that there are greater difficulties in denying than in admitting it.

 

In the second place, that there is no proof against it; and In the third place, that there is satisfactory proof in support of it.

 

In the first place, there are greater difficulties in denying than in admitting that God adheres to the principles of equity in his moral administration. The importance and bearing of this remark are, not that it proves even if true, our present position, but that if true, it shows how extremely irrational is the confident denial of it.

 

God, as we have seen, has furnished unequivocal proofs of the fact that he administers a moral government over men. This fact creates a strong presumption against the supposition that he would destroy all ground of confidence in his character and of respect for his authority, by violating the principles of equity in the distribution of good and evil. The difficulty of admitting such a conclusion is great and peculiar, when we reflect that the author of this system is the omniscient, almighty and immutable Creator. That such a God should give existence to moral beings, adapting their nature to the great end of conformity to the rule of benevolent action; that he should show that rule to be the expression of his will by every part of their nature and every circumstance of their condition, so that their perfection in character and in happiness depends on conformity to that will; that he should clearly evince his purpose to dispose of their happiness as obedient or disobedient, in such a manner as to make it their true and highest interest to obey his will; that he should reveal himself as immutable in his designs--adopt a course so fitted to secure the confiding homage of his moral creation, and at the same time utterly defeat that end by palpable violations of equity, in the distribution of good and evil--to believe all this involves us in no trivial difficulties. It is to suppose that by one course of action he furnishes entirely sufficient and satisfactory evidence of the equity of his government, and yet that by another course of action he proves the utter want of equity in his administration. That an earthly ruler should fall into such inconsistency, through want of foresight or power, or from fickleness of purpose, we might believe. But to ascribe such inconsistency to God, is to suppose it to exist in a case in which the only known causes for it do not exist. If then it be difficult to believe the equity of God's moral government on account of the apparently unequal and unjust distribution of good and evil in the world, it is more difficult in view of other undeniable facts, to believe that this government is not administered in accordance with the principles of entire equity. If to believe its equity we must reject evidence, it is not less true that to disbelieve its equity we must reject evidence more decisive. If it is irrational to believe it, it is more irrational to disbelieve it.

 

I remark --

 

In the second place, that there is no evidence from the distribution of good and evil in the world, that God does not act on the principles of strict equity in his moral administration. The only conceivable ways in which God can show the want of equity in the distribution of good and evil, are the following: either by conferring less good, inflicting more evil than is deserved, or by conferring more good or inflicting less evil than is merited; or in other words, by treating his subjects worse or better than they deserve.

 

I remark then --

 

That he evinces no want of equity by treating any of his subjects worse than they deserve. Diversified as are the moral characters of men, there is one truth too obvious and too important to be overlooked in this argument--viz., that none of the subjects of God's moral government are entitled to the least good, but as transgressors of his law deserve evil only. This remark I deem worthy of particular attention, not only on account of its bearing on the present argument, but because, if I mistake not, it has been overlooked or denied by most ethical writers. In the ablest treatises on this subject, I find it constantly assumed, not only that there are wicked men who do not receive deserved punishment in this life, which is indeed undeniable, but that there are good men who do not receive a merited reward--an assumption I must think as palpably false as can be easily imagined in the view of every mind which has any adequate conception of the divine law, and the principles of human action. Recognizing then the undeniable fact of human guilt and the principles of merit and demerit before advanced; and remembering how much more good all who are accountable for their conduct enjoy, and how much less evil they suffer than they deserve, God's providential distribution of good and evil is exempted in one respect from the reproach of injustice. There is no deficiency of good as a reward, there is no excess of evil as a penalty. All enjoy more good and suffer less evil than they deserve. God then does not violate the principle of equity by withholding from any of his subjects merited good, nor by inflicting on any undeserved evil, i.e., by treating any of his subjects worse than they deserve.

 

Again; God evinces no want of equity by treating any of his subjects better than they deserve. The good conferred is far greater, and the evil inflicted on all far less than their deserts. The main point however is not decided by this fact. It is true indeed, if we assume that equity demands the execution of penalty immediately on transgression, that to treat the transgressor better than he deserves, by delaying the execution of the penalty, would be a violation of equity, which however may allow what it does not require. It allows the instant punishment of the transgressor; but it cannot be truly said to demand it in all cases. An atonement may be provided, or delay to punish maybe required for some useful purpose, some reasons of State. In respect to the present fact, viz., that God treats his subjects better than they deserve, there are two questions to be decided. One is, whether he is executing legal sanctions, or whether the good is conferred as a legal reward, and the evil inflicted as a legal penalty. The other is, whether the present, or even any execution of legal sanctions, in all conceivable cases, is necessary to and demanded by the perfect equity of his administration.

 

It is here important also to ascertain, on the supposition of a violation of the principles of equity in treating subjects better than they deserve, wherein such violation consists. It is conceded then, that the withholding of merited good and the infliction of deserved evil, would be a violation of the rights of the individual subject or subjects, admitting of no vindication. Could such a fact be found under the government of God, any attempt to vindicate the equity of his administration would be vain. But to treat subjects better than their desert, is at least no violation of their rights as individuals. But if it can be clearly shown that the public good suffers by treating subjects better than they deserve, then the act is as truly one of injustice to the public, as the treatment of individuals worse than they deserve would be an act of injustice to them. In respect to these two modes, there is one possible and very material difference. While a moral governor cannot treat subjects worse than they deserve, without palpable injustice to them as individuals, and I may say to the public also, it is quite possible that he should treat them better than their deserts, without injustice either to them as individuals or to the public. The case is supposable, that some temporary delay in the execution of penalty after the commission of crime, should greatly subserve the public good and increase the efficacy of law. No rights of the public, or of individuals, would be interfered with or violated by it, and no injustice done to either. Nor is this all. It is also supposable that a moral governor, especially one of infinite wisdom and power, should devise and adopt some expedient by which subjects should be treated better than they deserve, or even be entirely exempted from penal evil, without a violation of the rights of the public. Such cases are credible, there being no evidence to the contrary. Why then say that it can make no difference, Whether we suppose that God, in the distribution of good and evil in this world, executes legal sanctions or not, since if he does, he violates the principles of equity, by treating subjects better than they deserve; and if he does not, he abandons them altogether and leaves his authority as a lawgiver wholly unsupported; for I readily concede, that if God does dispense good and evil in this manner, as legal sanctions, (and this is extensively maintained by theologians) he violates the principles of equity. To treat men so much better than they deserve, and this in the execution of legal sanctions, would be manifest injustice to the public. But I deny that there is the least evidence, that in the distribution of good and evil in this world, he is executing legal sanctions; and of course, that there is the least evidence furnished by it, that he is not adhering to the principles of strict equity in his moral administration.

 

On this position the decision of the question now before us chiefly depends.

 

I remark then --

 

That it is more rational to regard the apparently unjust distribution of good and evil as a fact incomprehensible by us, and yet in some unknown manner consistent with the equitable administration of God's moral government, than to pronounce it absolute proof of want of equity in his administration. Let it be remembered that the only possible or supposable inconsistency in the case is, that he treats his subjects better than they deserve during a very short period of their existence, even that of human life. It is not incredible that there should be much that is incomprehensible under the government of God. This is indeed no reason why we should overlook or disregard the least legitimate evidence against the equity of his government; but it is a reason why we should carefully discriminate between what is and what is not legitimate evidence. If any thing occurs under the government of God which we can pronounce an undoubted violation of the principles of equity, then we may, and ought so to do. If we knew that God treated any of the subjects of his moral government worse than they deserved, we should be authorized and required to assert the existence of injustice in his moral administration, and if we, knew that in the execution of legal sanctions, or in that punishment which he inflicted on transgressors to sustain his authority, he treated any better than they deserved, this too, as we have seen, would be a decisive manifestion of injustice to the public. But we do not know nor can we prove, that the treatment in question is in the way or form of a strictly legal procedure, and of course that it is not perfectly consistent with the equity of his administration. It is not difficult to see how or in what manner this may be. A temporary delay of punishment may be one means of more effectually securing the end of punishment. As in human governments, public trials are of great importance in giving effect to law; so in the divine, men in this world, like the criminal waiting his day of trial and execution, may be destined to meet God in judgment, and to receive a just retribution in a future state of existence. I speak here of the mere credibility of this, which is all that my argument now requires. The reasonable supposition that punishment may be delayed as a useful expedient of moral government, and that subjects should for a little season be treated better than they deserve, precludes all evidence from such treatment against the perfect equity of God's administration.

 

Again; there is yet another way in which to treat subjects better than they deserve, may be consistent with the equity of God's moral government. It is a reasonable supposition that God may be administering this government under a gracious economy, or through an atonement. It does not, as facts show, lie beyond the limits of conjecture. There is no proof to the contrary. Our ignorance of the ways or means, by which God would dispense pardon to the transgressors of law consistently with his justice, is no proof that there are none. To affirm such an impossibility in respect to God, would be obvious presumption on the part of human ignorance. Nor does the fact that some heathen philosophers maintained the impossibility that a just God should forgive sin, prove that there is not sufficient evidence, under the light of nature, to authorize even the belief of the contrary. To say nothing of the prevalence of the opposite opinion evinced by expiatory sacrifices, the assertion of such an impossibility must be admitted to be false by the Christian, and wholly unauthorized by the infidel. It is not incredible then, that God in some way, or by some expedient, should, consistently with perfect justice, become placable to offending man. The fact therefore, that he treats the subjects of his government better than they deserve, furnishes no evidence that he does not administer his government on the principles of strictest equity.

 

That there may be no misunderstanding on this point, let me say that I do not affirm that the distribution of good and evil in this world, either is or is not consistent with the equity of God's moral administration. I affirm only the possibility of such consistency,--that there is no proof that the one is inconsistent with the other; and that, for aught we call say to the contrary, it may be consistent with it. We know not either; and as mere ignorance is not competent to make an argument, neither is it competent to make an objection. The feet, in and of itself, is no evidence for or against the equity of God's moral administration. We are thus turned back to what we know, and have proved, to those facts which we have already established. These, as I now claim, and proceed to show--

 

In the third place, furnish satisfactory proof that God adheres to the principles of equity in his moral administration. To estimate justly the force of our present arguments, let it be kept in mind, that there is no evidence against the truth of our position,--that there is not, in the entire providence of God, the least departure from the principles of exact justice, in his moral administration. The question then is, whether there are any facts, which in such a case furnish legitimate and satisfactory proof that he does adhere to these principles. This is what I now claim. To illustrate the nature and the force of this argument, let us recur again to our example. A skillful artificer has begun to make a watch:--so much of the machinery falls under our observation, and we know so well its essential parts, that we can be at no loss in respect to the object of its construction. He has entire ability to finish, and to give it that perfection, as a whole, which shall correspond with the absolute perfection of all the parts which we have seen. There is no reason to believe that he will not finish what he has begun, while from his known decision of purpose and vigor in execution, as well as from the actual progress of the work, there is every reason to believe that he will. I ask now, is it rational, or is it not, to believe that the watchmaker will complete his work? Will he omit to insert the mainspring, or any other essential or important part of the machine? No one can doubt, or think of doubting.

 

Such then, is the argument now to be presented for the equity of God's moral government over men. I shall offer it only in a general form, intending to consider it more particularly hereafter.

 

God then, has in fact established a moral government over men, and actually entered on its administration. He has shown his great design to administer such a government over them by the constitution of their nature, and all the circumstances of their condition. He has given them a law or rule of action, not less clearly than had it come forth with a living voice from his throne. In this fact, and in all the modes of his providence he shows himself as assuming the right to reign over men as a lawgiver; and maintains that right by also showing that he has their happiness entirely at his own disposal, and will in fact dispose of it, as they obey or disobey his will, so as to make it for their true and highest interest to obey. He thus clearly reveals himself as their sovereign, claiming submission in the way of supreme prerogative, and reigning in the exercise of absolute authority. His administration is in no respect marred by the slightest act of injustice. Nothing has transpired to prevent God, the next moment, and with the ease of omnipotence, from revealing himself in the glories and terrors of exact justice. Will he ever do this I Will he, or will he not, after this short and momentary life, give this perfection to that system of moral government which he has begun? Has he departed from the principles of perfect justice in dispensing good and evil to his accountable subjects? Never. Will he ever depart from these principles? Will he consent, that this moral system shall want the strength, dignity and glory which these principles alone can give it, and terminate in failure, dishonor and mockery? Will not a system of jurisprudence begun by heaven's Sovereign, and carried forward, not only without injustice, but with every indication of exact justice which the present stage of its progress, so far as we can say, admits, be carried out to a full and perfect consummation in the issues of perfect righteousness? I say not here what these issues will be--I decide not whether man's probation will or will not be prolonged after death; whether a merely legal economy will or will not be followed by a just retribution to all, nor whether the final results will or will not be those of a gracious economy. But I ask, whether the results will not show that God is now, and ever has been administering his moral government over men on the principles of perfect equity? The grand question is, what idea shall we form of God as the governor of his moral creation? It becomes us to fix on some view of God in this relation that shall be definite, intelligible, rational, and on which we can rely. Is the throne of God then sustained only by the arm of his power, threatening us with the terrors of omnipotent despotism? Has it no other basis than the sensitiveness and imbecility of paternal fondness and indulgence? Or does it stand in its true grandeur on the pillars of eternal justice? The first I concede is palpably inconsistent with the abundance and benignity of his gifts, as well as too appalling to be admitted even by those whose principles lead to such a conclusion. If now we adopt that view of God which represents him as too indulgent to adhere to the unbending principles of exact justice, then what is to be done with certain stubborn matters of fact? Why has God so obviously assumed the high prerogative of moral dominion over men? Why has he given them a law absolutely perfect in precept and unbending in its claims? Why in the very nature, adaptation and tendencies of all things within and without us, has he shown that there is absolutely no sure and infallible way to avoid complete misery and obtain perfect happiness, but by obedience to his law? Why does he compel men to know and feel, notwithstanding all their wishes to the contrary, that whatever may be the issues of his government, they will be at least above all contempt,--such as accord with the attributes of an infinite Being, and enthrone him, if not in the confidence and affections, at least in the homage and awe of his intelligent creation? Why is it that he places himself before man so constantly in all the majesty and terrors of absolute and august sovereignty by the calamities, woes, and death of his sentient creation--afflicting, agonizing the work of his own hands, and yet never swerving from the principles of perfect justice? Is this fiction, or is it fact? Is all this nothing but the overflowings of sentimental tenderness; or are these the results of God's displeasure for man's wickedness, telling us what perfect justice can, and with fearful probability will, do in some future hour of full retribution? Death--that heaviest thunderbolt of God's wrath that ever falls on this groaning creation--what is death? What is it? what will it do with that frail imagination of yours that God is all tenderness? Look over these terrors of God and say are they to lead us to suppose ourselves the mere "nurslings Of his fondness," instead of the subjects of his righteous and holy dominion? Is all this only to make us light-hearted when death comes to look at us in earnest? Is all this designed only to lead us to make merry around the death-bed of others or on our own, or to amuse ourselves with trifles when we or others are falling into the hands of the living God? No. The fear of God as a righteous lawgiver and judge, is no superstitious fear. God does not reveal himself to us throned in the soft and smiling radiance of an indulgent deity, caring more for our happiness than for our moral conduct. He does not show himself diffusing only bliss over this world without respect to the doings of those who dwell on it. If he shows himself deserving any thing, it is to make man good that he may be happy; if he shows approbation, it is of virtue; if disapprobation, it is of vice; if he shows himself immutable in any thing, it is in his approval of the one and in his disapproval of the other. In a word, if God shows himself as aiming at any thing, designing any thing in his government of this world, it is to maintain the perfect equity of his moral administration. What he has so obviously begun in the assumption of this high prerogative, in giving his perfect law to his moral creatures, and in this whole economy of legislation, he will finish. It is his great design. To this all things else are manifestly subservient. It is the all in all of God, our maker, to enthrone himself amid the grandeurs of eternity, the righteous moral governor of his moral creation. Death will not arrest the progress of this design, nor defeat its consummation. It will only disclose the actual results of principles already manifest--only draw aside the curtain that now faintly conceals the full effulgence of God, within that high and inviolable sanctuary, where justice and judgment are the habitation of his throne forever.