The GOSPEL TRUTH

LECTURES ON THE

MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.

 By

 NATHANIEL W. TAYLOR, D. D.,

1859

VOLUME I

 

SECTION II:

THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD

AS KNOWN

BY THE LIGHT OF NATURE.

 

LECTURE XIV:

 

DIRECT ARGUMENT continued. -- Two remaining propositions considered. -- Prop. 3. The Importance of revelation renders it probable, if not certain, that God would give a revelation. -- Opposed by some. -- Their views discussed. -- Man not competent to decide on the manner, &c., of revelation. Recapitulation of argument on necessity of revelation. -- Prop. I. That which claims to be a revelation is what it claims to be. -- Conclusion.

 

 

Our third leading position is the following, viz.: The importance and necessity of a revelation to the accomplishment of the great end of God in the creation and government of this world, furnish a strong probability, not to say a moral certainty, that God would give a revelation to men.

 

In the present lecture I propose to establish this position, and also briefly the fourth, viz.:

 

IV. That which is claimed to be a revelation from God, and which is contained in the Bible, is what it claims to be.

 

I proceed then to establish the third leading position, viz.:

 

III. The importance and necessity of a revelation to the accomplishment of the end of God in the creation and government of this world furnish a strong probability, not to say a moral certainty, that God would give a revelation to men.

 

This position has to encounter a strong prejudice, which I have already had occasion to notice in another connection. Among the advocates of revelation, there are those who would rely wholly on what is called the external evidence of Christianity. They tell us "that we are utterly unable to say what God will do, and what he will not do; that the subject is altogether too high for us; that we have had experience of what man will do in given circumstances, but we have had no experience of what God will do in given circumstances; and that to pretend to determine what God will do, or what he will not do, in any given circumstances, is an act of glaring rebellion against the authority of the Baconian philosophy." That none of those defenders of Christianity, who have relied on the internal evidence, have violated the true principles of reasoning, I am not concerned to show. Be this as it may, the above opinion, in the broad and unqualified form of statement in which it is presented, is utterly incredible, as well as destitute of the least claim to the true mode of philosophizing. For to what purpose is it to inquire, or reason, or form opinions at all concerning the acts and the doings of God, if nothing can be known or concluded on the subject? What matter is it who or what God is, if from our knowledge of what He is, we can in no respect infer what he will do and what he will not do? Why is it that these men, who so zealously contend for an exclusive reliance on the external evidence of Christianity, are so suspicious of all attempts to decide what God will do and will not do? Do they themselves not believe that a perfect God, if he professes to give a revelation to man, will speak truth in that revelation? Do they not believe that a perfect God will not work miracles in attestation of falsehood? And is not this inferring and believing what God will do and will not do, in given circumstances? At least in two respects then, let them qualify their broad and sweeping position.

 

Besides, are these two the only respects in which we are competent to say what God will do and what he will not do? If there are no other acts or doings which we can surely and safely affirm that a perfect God will perform, how can we ever prove that there is a perfect God? And if we cannot prove this by his acts and his doings, and this on the principle that a perfect God will do some things and will not do other things. then how can we know that he is a perfect God, or, if he gives a professed revelation, that he will speak truth; or if he works miracles, that he does not work them in attestation of falsehood? The plain matter of fact is, that there are two modes of reasoning in respect to intelligent voluntary beings, which are alike founded in experience, and accord with the Baconian philosophy. Thus, in certain cases, experience fully authorizes us to reason from the acts of voluntary beings to their character, their principles, their designs, and to determine what these are. In other cases, having ascertained the latter from their acts and doings in some respects, experience fully authorizes us to reason from these to their acts and their doings in other respects, and to determine what these will be and will not be.

 

If I know that an artificer has begun to make a watch, with adequate power and skill to finish and give it the highest perfection, and if I know him to possess an unfaltering firmness of purpose, I may infer that he will perfect what he has begun, as particularly that he will insert a mainspring in the watch. And further, if I know that he is fully resolved to secure in the most perfect degree possible to him the true use of the watch; and if I know that he is making, or has actually made it for the use of another, who will never understand its true use unless the maker instructs him, then I may infer that he will give this instruction; and if the requisite instruction respecting the true use of the watch should be liable to, or should be foreseen to be actually connected with some incidental evil, still it is quite supposable, that the maker should evince, in the most decisive manner, an inflexible purpose to give not only the highest perfection. to the watch, but to every thing which can be regarded as the means of its perfection; so that if the end fails in any degree to be accomplished, it shall be seen that the failure is in no respect truly and properly attributable to any thing which he has done or failed to do. That such premises give such conclusions respecting man is obvious; they can do no less in respect to God, when it is remembered that he is a Being absolutely and immutably perfect.

 

If then we can know or prove certain things concerning God, then we can know and prove certain other things concerning him, and are, in view of the immutability of his purposes, more competent to say what God will do and what he will not do in given circumstances, than we are to decide the same things in respect to man. If we can know or prove what the best end of creation is, as we most assuredly can--viz., the highest well-being of all--and if we can also ascertain what are the necessary and best means of accomplishing this end, then we can say that a perfect God will propose this end and adopt these means of accomplishing it. And further, if we can know or prove that any practicable thing is either essentially or circumstantially necessary to the perfection of this system of means, or to secure the end in the most perfect degree possible to him, then we can infer, that notwithstanding any incidental evils, he will give perfection to this system of means. It is not true, then--it is indeed utterly incredible, that a benevolent God has doomed his moral creation, even under the light of nature, to the darkness and agony of utter uncertainty in respect to what he will do and what he will not do. The supposition, as it would be easy to show, subverts all natural and all revealed theology.

 

But here let me not be misunderstood. I am not saying, if we were to assume simply that God is benevolent, that we could, with no knowledge of his doings, make the same sure inferences which we can now make. I readily concede also, that man in his actual condition is wholly incompetent to say, in many respects, or in respect to many things, what God will do and what he will not do. The great point is to distinguish what man, in his actual condition, can know or prove, from what he cannot know or prove, respecting the doings of God. The presumption that fearlessly ventures to dogmatize its decisions in the dark, and the timidity that rejects truth in the broad daylight of evidence, are alike reprehensible.

 

To come then to the particular inquiry before us, can we distinguish what cannot be known or proved from what can be known or proved in respect to God's giving a revelation to this world? What I maintain is, that we can do this to such an extent as to decide with entire confidence that God would give a revelation to man; and from this fact, and in view of the nature, the adaptations and actual results of that system of religion which is contained in the Scriptures, we must conclude that Christianity is a revelation from God.

 

To prevent misapprehension then, and the confounding of one thing with another, I would here explicitly concede that we may be wholly incompetent to say in what manner God would give a revelation to man, or at what time, or to what extent. In these respects we may be unable through the want of all requisite premises to form any conclusion. More particularly in regard to the time when God would do this, I would say, that under the mere light of nature, we might be ignorant whether the revelation would be made in this or a future state. Human reason might be utterly incompetent to judge whether man's probation would not continue after death, and whether further discoveries of religious and moral truth would not be deferred to some indefinite period of man's future existence. In regard to the manner, we may be incompetent to determine whether it will be orally or by writing, by the ministry of men or of some superior agents, or even by a direct communication from himself. In regard to the extent, we may be unable to say, whether he will give it to all men of all ages and nations, or only to a part of the race. Still we can say that he will give it to such an extent, as shall be sufficient to prevent the utter defeat and frustration of his design in adopting the system. If he does not give a revelation to some extent, this design will wholly fail. We must conclude therefore that he will give a revelation to some extent, and to that degree which will best subserve his benevolent end, though we cannot determine what that extent is. In maintaining therefore that there is proof from the light of nature, that God would give to men a revelation, I affirm nothing in respect to the time, the manner, or the extent of such a revelation beyond what has now been stated. On these topics I do not pretend that we have the requisite premises for any conclusion. It is obvious however, that we may still have abundant proof of the fact, that God would give a revelation. We may have sufficient premises for one conclusion, though we have none for another. To recur to the example, we may have decisive proof that a watch-maker will complete the watch he has begun, and that he will give the requisite instructions concerning its true object, to him for whose use he makes it, and yet we may possess no means of deciding when, in what manner, and to what extent he will do the latter. While in respect to these particular points of inquiry, all may be left indeterminate and uncertain; still the fact that he has begun to make the watch, that he has proceeded so far in the work, surmounting all obstacles, and showing in every conceivable way that he is fully intent on the accomplishment of his design, that nothing can come into competition with it, nor hinder him from doing all that is necessary to give entire perfection to every thing fitted to secure the end aimed at; the fact ascertained by the most abundant and decisive experience, that he for whose use he makes the watch, will never so understand it as to secure the end without instructions from the maker--these things being known, render the conclusion unavoidable, that the requisite instructions concerning the use of the watch will be given. We have all the reasons for this conclusion which are or can be well conceived of, in respect to the acts and doings of voluntary beings in any case whatever. There is according to the supposition, no possible ground of doubt in respect to the ultimate end of the watch-maker, nor in respect to his purpose to give the highest possible perfection to the means of accomplishing it, nor the necessity of instructions in the use of the watch to the perfection of these means. Who then can doubt in regard to the fact that such information will be given?

 

Such is the argument by which we prove from the light of nature that God would give a revelation to men. To present the argument, we now recur to what we have attempted to prove in the preceding course of lectures.

 

We have seen that man from the nature of his constitution and the condition in which he is placed, is a moral being--that conformity to the law of benevolent action is the true and only means of his perfection in character and in happiness. We have seen that God, his Maker, administers a perfect moral government over this world, through an economy of grace; that in this system he aims at the great, the best conceivable end by the best conceivable means, or that this system of means is in every conceivable respect perfectly adapted to the best conceivable end--that God has proposed the highest happiness of his moral creation which he can secure as the end of his government; that he gives to the system of government which is the means of this end every conceivable perfection--that to this end and the perfection of this system of means every thing else in his whole course of providence all that can be called good, is subservient, and every thing that is evil, if it can be made to contribute to this end, is used for this purpose--that every evil which to him is incidental to the system and unavoidable in the nature of things, if the system be adopted, is incurred, or to speak in the language of theology, is purposed or decreed rather than not adopt and carry out the system. We have seen, that in administering his moral government under a gracious economy, God manifests himself as a just God and yet a Saviour--that in this way he evinces the fact, of an atonement, though not the matter and method of it, thus manifesting the immutability of his purpose, not only to accomplish the end of the system adopted, but to give the system itself the highest perfection in respect to fitness and adaptation to its end, so that instead of spreading the gloom of despair over this world of sin and guilt, he authorizes the belief of a future state, in which the order, beauty and splendor of his moral administration will be completed in the blessedness of the righteous, and in the merited punishment of the incorrigibly, wicked--results, which in the comparative amount of happiness and misery, will fully accord with the benignity and grace manifest in the system of means adopted for their accomplishment.

 

Such then is the great, the comprehensive design of God in the creation and government of this world, as presented to us by the light of nature. Reason duly employed on the subject gives us the whole and every part of it. It gives us not only the end, viz., the highest perfection of his moral creation, in character and in happiness, possible to the Creator, but also the perfection of the system of means, both in every essential respect as a system of moral government under grace, and in every circumstantial respect as involving all that can be conceived to be necessary to prevent the failure of the end, and to secure its most perfect accomplishment.

 

I now ask, what will become of this great Plan of God the Creator? Will his design in creating men moral beings--beings the most exalted in kind which he can create, be abandoned through indifference or fickleness? Will the great object of all his works--that to which every thing beside is subordinate and subservient--be relinquished as impracticable by an Omniscient and Almighty Creator? Will it prove in the issue to be a design, for entering upon which, he who sees the end from the beginning, will see that there were no reasons, or for abandoning which he will discover new reasons? Will that design of God, in forming beings in his own image, which stands forth first, brightest, greatest of them all, terminate in utter failure and defeat? Will the progress of this plan of God come to a sudden end--the moral constitution of his creatures, this whole moral system, be divested of all significance, and its author of all his wisdom and honor, and all that can deter from iniquity and secure the moral perfection of moral beings; all that can bless man, exalt God; all that can make heaven rejoice and hell tremble, be frittered away into an insignificant and degrading mockery? If the immutability of God, the infinite perfections of his Godhead--if the clear manifestation of designs worthy of himself--if their superior excellence as stamping all others with insignificance, and if their ceaseless development and unfaltering progress for six thousand years, give any security in respect to what God will do, their must we look for a full and perfect consummation of God's great design as the moral governor of men.

 

I now advert to another position, which I persuade myself has been fully established in preceding lectures, viz., the necessity of a revelation from God.

 

I attempted to show that there is a necessity of such revelation, in three respects:

 

First. To give the highest conceivable perfection to the modo of discovering truth to the human mind.

 

Secondly. To any extensive and useful discovery of truth to the mind.

 

Thirdly. To the discovery of some important truths, which the human mind could not discover without a revelation.

 

The question now is, whether, in view of this necessity of a revelation as existing in these respects, we have reason to conclude that God would give a revelation to man. I proceed then to show-

 

First, that the necessity of a revelation to give the highest conceivable perfection to the mode of discovering truth to the human mind, supposing it to be necessary for no other purpose, furnishes decisive proof that God would give a revelation to men. The argument here rests on two facts which have already been established, viz., that a revelation is necessary to the highest conceivable perfection in the mode of discovering truth to the human mind; and that God has actually evinced his design to give perfection to that system which he has adopted to reclaim and save this lost world. That a revelation is necessary to the highest perfection of a reclaiming system, so far as perfection in adaptation, fitness, and tendency to secure the end of such a system is concerned, no one will deny. Nor can I imagine any possible ground for doubt on the question, whether God, for this reason, would give a revelation to men, except one, viz.: the possibility that through perversion on their part, it might prove for the worse instead of for the better--become a curse instead of a blessing. To this I answer, that admitting this possibility, it furnishes no proof that it would in fact prove to be for the worse, nor that God would not give a revelation. I answer again, that the whole history of his providence, as I have abundantly shown, evinces a fixed purpose to give perfection to his system of moral government under a gracious economy, or to his system of reclaiming influence irrespectively of its foreseen perversion on the part of his subjects. This foreseen fact of perversion in its (almost) absolute universality, has not prevented him from giving to the system every essential perfection, nor from giving it every circumstantial perfection, to such an extent as to remove all presumption against the fact; while what he has done furnishes the highest probability of the fact that he will, sooner or later, add that of a revelation. Without supposing that God designs actually to reclaim and save one of the human race, I maintain that one design of God is too conspicuous in his providence toward this world to be denied or doubted, viz., his design to give absolute perfection to his system of reclaiming influences. The fact that he has done so much for this purpose already, in an economy of grace, bringing every conceivable influence in the universe to bear on this great object, and doing every conceivable thing to accomplish it except that of giving a revelation, is as truly decisive of his design to give perfection to this system as had he done more. Whatever may be supposed to be the reason for giving such perfection to this system as he has actually given--whether he proposes to reclaim some of our guilty race or not, or whether we can or cannot assign any reason for this perfection of the reclaiming system, or whether we can or cannot say why he has not already added a revelation, supposing that he has not, one thing is decisively proved, viz., that he chooses to give it the highest conceivable perfection. Take the case of the watch-maker. Suppose the work has progressed to a certain point--that he has done every thing, but one which is necessary for accomplishing the end proposed; he has finished a perfect watch, he has put the parts together, has inserted the main-spring, oiled the machinery, wound it up, placed it in the hands of a son for whose use he made it; he has done all this at no ordinary expense of time and labor, and with no ordinary degree of self-sacrifice; in a word, he has thus done all that can be conceived to be adapted and fitted to secure the end, except he has not told the possessor of the watch how to wind it up. And now, with all these proofs of his real design, do you, can you believe that he will never explain that to him? Suppose you cannot tell the results of giving this instruction--whether it will prove for better or for worse; suppose you can give no reason for delaying to give it for a few minutes or a few hours, can you therefore believe that the requisite instruction by the watch-maker on this material point will never be given? This, with any fair-minded man, could not be a matter of hesitation or doubt. So in respect to the reclaiming system of God. In view of what he has actually done toward giving it perfection as a system of adaptations and fitnesses, there is decisive reason for believing that he will give it absolute perfection; and in view of the necessity of a revelation to this, there is all the reason for believing that he would give a revelation, which there is for believing that he would perfect the system. And there is all the reason to believe that he will perfect the system, which the actual perfection of it in all respects but one can furnish. Having done all things necessary to its perfection but one, is there not a moral certainty that he will do that also? Having done so much, he has furnished so far as this kind of evidence is concerned, all that is possible in the case, more being impossible without giving a revelation. If too we reflect on what God actually does to give perfection to this system, how the object stands forth the first and the highest, and as it were the whole and sole object of nature, of providence, and of grace; how all things are subordinated to this; how all influences from himself, his character, his relations, his friendship and favor, his displeasure and his wrath--every influence from man himself, every influence from earth and heaven, from time and eternity, is brought to subserve this design, who can doubt that, sooner or later, the Being with whom one day is as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day, will give to such a system perfection absolute? The probability is the highest of which the nature of the case admits. If the acts and doings of God can prove any thing, they show that he would give a revelation to men.

 

It is easy to account for what he has done, on the supposition that he intends to do more; but it is not possible to account for what he has done, unless you suppose that he intends to do more.

 

God, by perfecting the system, would give higher proof that he preferred holiness to sin, than he would or could give. There is no reason for concluding that he will not perfect the system; there is therefore all the reason for concluding that he will perfect it, that the above consideration affords.

 

I proceed to show-

 

Secondly. That the necessity of a divine revelation to secure to any extent any useful practical knowledge of religious and moral truth to man, in connection with other facts, furnishes further proof that God would give a revelation to man. Let us look at the facts as already established. God, as we have seen, has, as the Creator and Governor of this world, proposed the best conceivable end, and has also adopted the best system of means for its accomplishment, with the single exception that it does not include a revelation. This great end is the highest happiness of his creation; the system of means is a perfect moral government under an economy of grace. This end will fail, and this system of means will be in vain, and worse than in vain, without a revelation. If facts--if the experience of a world for thousands of years can prove any thing, it has proved, that without a revelation from God, all the generations of men will live and die in sin. At the same time, the nature, the immutable principles of God's perfect moral government, give another and still more appalling result--the complete and eternal misery of all these creatures of God. The great, the awful experiment has been made in respect to what man as a subject of God's moral dominion, will do without a revelation. It has proved that he will sin, and only sin. The throne of God, though a throne of grace, stands on the pillars of eternal justice, proffering no pardon, giving no hope to impenitent transgressors, but frowning in terrific majesty, and dooming a world of such transgressors to just and fearful retribution. The alternative is, either the failure of God's great end in creation, even the moral perfection and consequent perfect happiness, of every moral being, involving, as it must, the utter and endless misery of all, or the gift of a revelation from God to this lost world.

 

I maintain the high probability of the latter. To estimate this aright, we must recur to all those providential dealings of God to restore man to virtue and to happiness, which so clearly and so impressively disclose his design as a moral governor. If it be said, all this may be without a providential purpose actually to restore any; I admit the bare possibility of it, but this is not evidence, it is only probability. How then is this probability to be estimated? Is there even the slightest presumption that God would give existence to such a world, to such myriads of immortal beings, with the foresight, and therefore with the providential purpose that each and all should be miserable forever? Every presumption is against it. The merest surmise of such a fact without evidence, is unauthorized and injurious, and proscribed by every principle of just reasoning. The entire want of evidence of such a fact, in view of his perfect benevolence, is proof against it. Indeed as we have already shown, there is the most satisfactory proof, that the Creator will secure such results in the holiness and happiness of this part of his moral creation, as will furnish bright displays of his infinite goodness. Nay more. We have seen in that economy of grace and mercy which he has clearly disclosed in all the ways of his providence, the sure pledge of results, in the holiness and happiness of men corresponding with its benignity and grace. Who are the objects of all this grace? The creatures of his power, the children of his love! Will God then adopt such a system of means to reclaim and save, giving it every conceivable adaptation and tendency to such an end--will he bring all creation and providence to attest his sincerity, and his overflowing kindness toward his disobedient children, without a design actually to reclaim and save, and with the knowledge and the purpose that the only result shall be the aggravation of the guilt and the ruin of all? Reflect and see what benignity and grace assail a thoughtless, wicked world at every step of life! What solicitude and earnestness to reclaim his wayward children, which none but a perfect God could feel or manifest! What riches of long-suffering and forbearance--(what evil that is not the infliction of paternal love)--what goodness leading to repentance and drawing with the cords of love and with the hands of a man--what yearnings of compassion, what bowels of mercy--what a length, breadth, height, depth in God's restoring love! And do such love and mercy thus seek their objects with the foresight that it will, and the purpose that it shall augment the guilt and ruin of them all? Is such the errand on which this mercy of God comes to this ruined world? Oh no. It is the breaking, the bursting forth of the heart of infinite love in acts of sincerest mercy actually to reclaim and save all that can be saved! It is the mercy of God, doing for each, and for all, and at every moment, all that can be wisely done. It is the decree of God unchangeable, actually to reclaim and save a multitude which no man can number, out from all nations, and kindreds, and people and tongues a decree of God unchangeable, to bring home to himself bright hosts of holy, happy immortals, to satisfy, and bless, and rejoice that heart which sought their salvation! But without a revelation all will be lost--this design of mercy will fail! Surely that mercy will not withhold from the guilty beings it decrees to save, the revelation they need. No act of paternal kindness, no gift of a father's love is so sure, as that of revelation from its God to this lost world.

Once more --

 

Thirdly: The necessity of a revelation to the discovery of some important truths which man could not discover without it, proves that God would give a revelation. I have already taken occasion to show how utterly hopeless would have been the condition of this sinful world, without the discovery which the Scriptures make to us concerning the manner in which its redemption is achieved--in other words the revelation of the triune God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, in their respective relations to the work of man's redemption from sin. The two great problems are, how shall the perverseness of rebels be subdued to love; and if subdued, how can a just God receive them to favor? Here all is mystery unsolvable, darkness impenetrable and appalling! How could human reason alone and unaided have discovered the mystery of redemption? Even when God has revealed it, reason is lost in this abyss of love and mercy, and needs all its submission to believe! Man, sinful as he is, I admit, might repent and might hope for mercy from his Maker. But would he? What bondage so strong as bondage to sin--what death so hopeless as death in sin? Who shall deliver? What power shall give life, and health, and beauty immortal to these victims of sin and death? I said man might hope for mercy. But with a just apprehension of God's fearful justice and his own desert of its fearful doom looking upon a sin-avenging God as he must, and asking how can such a God show the same abhorrence of sin and yet forgive, as he would by turning a rebellious world into hell, then it is that the terrors of God come over us; hope trembles and expires. Not that it must be so, but it always has been and always will be, with exceptions that need not be mentioned. It is not hope in a God all tenderness which we need. It is that which looks upon a just God, and with a sense of his righteous indignation toward sin, reposes calmly and sweetly in his mercy. But there is so much terror here, so much darkness and tempest around the throne of God, that in the eye of guilt, the rays of mercy fade and will not suffice. Guilt will look up with confidence, only when it sees the throne of God upheld by "the man that is his fellow." Take away "the incarnate mystery," extinguish the light that reveals the great atonement of Christianity, and where is hope for human guilt? Zeno, Socrates, Plato, Pythagoras, Epicurus, Porch, Academy, Lyceum, Infidelity, Deism, Philosophy, Human Reason, all, what can ye do, what can ye substitute for the blood of the Son of God? Extinguish that light which reveals the mercy of God through his Son, and let in the terrors of guilt and of God on this sinful world, and how would each and all, in the gloom or frenzy of despair, take their way down to everlasting burnings? Will a redeeming God then withhold that light from the world he would redeem? Will he abandon every purpose of mercy render every other manifestation of it vain, and worse than in vain; will he give up his lost creature to the perdition of hell, when he has, for the light of nature teaches it, actually made an atonement? Will he do this by concealing from their view what that atonement is? Has he made, and given abundant, proof that he has made the only atonement, by the knowledge of which conscious guilt will ever be emboldened to approach a spotless God--the only atonement, the knowledge of which will ever give hope and peace and heaven to a guilty world; and will he refuse to give the knowledge of this atonement? Has he done all this in fact for us, and will he, by refusing to tell what it is, leave us only to a certain, fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation I It is incredible. I say not at what time in this world's history, nor whether in this or a future state; but that, sooner or later, the God of grace--that God who tells us in all his works and ways that he has in purpose or in fact, made an adequate atonement for human guilt, will also reveal its nature and its power. Having done the greater, he will also do the less. No act of an immutable God, no gift of his mercy, can be more certain than that of a revelation, declaring to the faith, the wonder, the gratitude, the joy of redeemed men, "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life,"

 

I have thus attempted to establish my third leading position:

 

III. That the importance and necessity of a revelation to the great end of God in the creation and government of the world, give a strong probability, not to say a moral certainty, that he would give a revelation to men.

 

The next and last position now claims consideration, viz.:

 

IV. That which is claimed to be a revelation from God, and which is contained in the Bible, is what it claims to be.

 

The argument is this: God will give a revelation to this world. We take the Bible, and if we had heard nothing of it before, we read, examine, understand it; we see that it is exactly such a book as we have decisive reasons to believe God would give to man, harmonizing with all our just views of the character, the relations, the government of God; adapted wonderfully and perfectly to the wants, the character, the condition and prospects of man; fitted to secure the high end of his creation, even his perfection in character and in blessedness. Its actual effects confirm and illustrate its perfection as the means of this great end. The writers of the book assert its divine origin. It had not a human origin, for we have proved the necessity of just such a book from God, and that man would never make such a book. Now I ask, whence came this book? What is its origin? Is it from God, or is it not?

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