DIRECT ARGUMENT. -- Question proposed. -- Preliminary remarks. -- 1. Question to be decided by human reason. -- Limits of reason. -- Perversion of reason -- 2. Rational to believe In divine origin of Christianity on low evidence. -- Relation of Christianity to our character and life. -- Conclusions from this principle -- a. Unjust to demand high degree of evidences. Shows the true cause of Infidelity--c. The most promising method of convincing men of the truth. -- d. The reasonableness of faith in unlearned men--3. Common facts and principles must be assumed by all parties as premises of argument. -- Illustrations. -- How common premises may be fixed and agreed on. -- Arguments stated in four propositions. -- First two have been previously proved.

 

 

THE inquiry now proposed is--

 

WHETHER THE SYSTEM OF RELIGION CONTAINED IN THE BIBLE IS FROM GOD?

 

Before however we enter into the investigation of this inquiry, there are some preliminary topics which deserve a brief consideration.

 

I remark then,

 

1. That the question proposed must be decided on the authority of human reason. Deistical writers have maintained that the belief of a divine revelation involves the renunciation of reason. This is a favorite topic with Bolingbroke, Voltaire, Hume, and many others. "Our most holy religion," says Mr. Hume, "is founded on faith not on reason; and it is a sure method of exposing it, to put it to such a trial as it is by no means fitted to endure." Well had it been for the cause of truth, had the professed friends of Christianity given no countenance to this sentiment. Every enlightened friend of revelation will and must disclaim it. Christianity on its own authority is a reasonable service, and its demand on all its disciples is, "Be ready always to give an answer to every one that asketh you a reason of the hope that is in you." Reason is our only guide in religion, in examining the evidences of a revelation, in ascertaining its import, in believing its doctrines, and in obeying its precepts. If there ever was a religion addressed to human reason, and insisting that its every claim be adjudged at this tribunal, that religion is Christianity. Reason and truth can never war with each other. Reason is that high and noble power, whose sole prerogative it is to discover truth, to weigh the evidence of truth and to receive it, and it is not in the nature of the human mind, to believe either what it does not understand, or what when understood, it regards as irrational or absurd. We may indeed very rationally believe that there is more in a thing than we understand. We may believe a fact, the mode, the how of which we do not comprehend, but then the mode, the how is not the object of our faith. Concerning this, having no understanding, we have and can have no faith.

 

The true use of reason in matters of religion can easily be apprehended, if we would remember two things--one is, that man is not omniscient, and the other that he knows something. Not being omniscient, there are things which he beyond the grasp of his intellect, which for aught he knows may be true or may be false, and in respect to such, while we have no evidence either of their truth or falsehood, reason forbids all faith. But if in respect to these things, evidence come to us, whether it be by extending our vision by a telescope, or whether it be by sufficient testimony of men who have seen what we have not seen, or by visitors to our planet from some other parts of the universe--or whether it be by God himself, or by messengers from God. I say, if we have legitimate evidence respecting things, which from the limitation of our knowledge we must admit may be true, then on the basis of such evidence, reason requires faith. To a well authenticated message from God on such matters, reason in the act of unconditional surrender, appears in its true dignity, its highest glory. Who that knows what God is, can refuse to listen to a message which he believes comes from him? True, if we could suppose a well authenticated message from God delivering known falsehood, then the case would be altered. We should have opposing decisive evidence, truth opposing truth, reason in her own absolute infallibility giving opposite results--reason reduced to a quandary from which with all its boasted prowess there would be no deliverance--reason that is no longer reason, but a name, of worthlessness and contempt. But reason is now supposed to be in a condition in which it cannot be reason. The case supposed can never be, if there is such a thing as reason. The exercise of reason giving results, implies truth and the evidence of truth. There cannot be the former without the latter. A well authenticated message from God can no more deliver known falsehood, than two and two can be five. If it does, it is not from God; if it is from God it gives infallible truth. Reason then having ascertained that God speaketh, must deem it its highest honor to bow to his declaration with implicit confidence. To oppose such a message with fancies and theories of our own devising, is an infamous violation of reason's prerogative, by exalting shameless ignorance to her throne--and as to being rational or philosophical, is as ridiculous as was ever schoolman with his quiddities, or a Cartesian with his whirl-pools.

 

Further; while there are some things which fall without, there are others that fall within the limits of human knowledge and human judgment. The human mind can and must judge of the truth and falsehood of many things for itself, in entire independence of a revelation. And not only so, it can judge of truth and falsehood within given limits, and every item of its actual faith within these limits, shall be as truly rational as were man omniscient. The mind is made to know some things, and to believe some things. To refuse to confide in faith, or those judgments which are given by evidence, is to throw away and in effect to annihilate one part of the mind itself, that on which man is doomed to place reliance more extensively than on any other; and he who does it, if he does not thereby in fact become, must expect in all equity to be esteemed, an idiot. This part of the mind is made to be used, and its results are as truly and properly to be confided in, as those of intuition or demonstration. Alan then to a great extent can judge of truth and falsehood, of possible and impossible things, of evidence, its kinds, its weight absolute and comparative--particularly, he can judge of the merit and demerit of testimony, as these depend on the character and circumstances of the witness, and on the subject matter of what he testifies. He can judge of and perceive the truth and falsehood of such credentials as the performance of a miracle or the fulfillment of a prophesy, he can judge of the signs of honesty and veracity, of dishonesty and imposture, of mental imbecility and strength, of credulity and incredulity, of soundness of mind, and fanatical or enthusiastic illusion and extravagance, as these are indicated in the manner, the style, the tone, the countenance, the intellectual operations, the benevolent design, the uncompromising principle, the undaunted constancy of the witness. He can judge to a great extent of fitnesses and adaptations, of the tendencies of the great principles of action in men and in God; of what is right, what is wrong, of what man is made for, of what he is, and what he ought to be. He can see what God is, what he has done and has not done, what he is doing, what he will do and what he will not do. All this to a great extent reason can do, has a right and is bound to do. Otherwise it matters not as to the rationality of our faith, whether we are Mahomedans, Boodhists, Infidels, or Christians. If reason can make no distinctions, discover no differences, confide in no judgments, it were as rational to be one thing as another, to confide in malignity as in benevolence, to receive the illusions of Satan as the inspirations of the Holy Ghost.

 

Human reason too can judge of the subject matter of testimony, and this in every respect in which it is important to a sound and rational conclusion. It can decide in some cases what can be true, and what cannot be true; and it can decide when it cannot decide either, and can thus assign a limit to its own decisions. It can settle the important previous question, whether the subject matter of the testimony lies within its antecedent knowledge, or whether it does not. If it does not, but comes to us as information from a region which reason has not explored, and from its own limitations cannot explore, then reason can judge whether in its own nature it be credible or incredible. If incredible, it can and ought to reject it. If credible, it can then judge whether the allegation be sustained by evidence or not. If not thus sustained, then again it can and ought to reject it; if thus sustained, then why refuse to learn from one competent to instruct and entitled to confidence? Again, the subject matter may be within our antecedent knowledge, and cases of this kind may be supposed to be very diverse. It may be one in which the knowledge communicated is insignificant and worthless in itself, or in which its communication from heaven would be unnecessary and useless because already fully possessed and acted upon, or one in which the knowledge though highly useful is not possessed at all, or only partially and imperfectly, or in which the knowledge is possessed but perverted, and needs to be presented in some new and more impressive form, or it may be one in which the knowledge is attainable only, but not attained, and never will be, without such a mode of communication, or it may be one which shall be characterized by several of these facts. Of the subject matter, in all these respects human reason is competent to form the requisite judgment. On the contrary, the fact to be believed may be supposed to be utterly incredible in itself. For example, should the witness tell us that the planets do not revolve around the sun, that the sun itself does not shine, that the rivers do not run into the ocean, that the three angles of a triangle are not equal to two right angles, that a part is equal to the whole, or that man is a perfect being, loving God with all his heart, and his neighbor as himself, we should and we ought at once to confront him with our philosophical demonstrations, our daily experience and observation, our own intuition and consciousness. Thus human reason can judge, has a right, and is bound to judge of each and every thing respecting a revelation which has, or can have, any bearing on faith or no faith. Here is the prerogative, to sit in judgment on the credentials of heaven's ambassador, and on the message which he brings. When there is no evidence, let it have no faith. When there is evidence, let it judge according to evidence, and every item of its faith, whether in the form of assent or dissent, is as truly rational and trust--worthy as were its knowledge infinite.

 

But reason may be perverted. Yes, and that is our concern, and its consequences will be ours. Reason may be perverted; is reason then all our strength and all our reliance? Yes. But when I say this I mean REASON; not reason perverted. When I speak of and commend Christianity, I mean not a corrupted, false Christianity. When I speak of man, of his exaltation and dignity, of his noble powers, and the achievements of which he is capable, I mean not a corpse corrupted in its grave. Reason perverted is not reason, it is folly, madness. And because reason may be perverted, is it therefore not all our reliance and all our strength in the discovery of truth? Reason may be perverted, and therefore is not to be used! What then, in the name of reason, shall we use? Answer, in the name of reason, and not use your reason, if you can. Or answer with self-consistency, and say our folly, and you are welcome to the results. What nonsense to pretend to prove by reason that there is no reliance on reason!

 

2. It may be rational to believe in the divine origin of Christianity, on the supposition of a comparatively low degree of evidence of the fact. Those who reject Christianity have often insisted that a peculiarly high degree of evidence is requisite, to warrant faith in the divine origin of this system of religion. This claim is based on the principle, that a benevolent God in giving a religion to men, on the reception or rejection of which such tremendous consequences depend, would not fail to furnish such a degree of evidence as would infallibly secure human belief. To this I reply, that it either proceeds on the principle that faith can be compelled by evidence, to the entire exclusion of disbelief, or it does not. If it does, it rests on a false principle. The human mind can disbelieve, and has disbelieved, against the highest probable, and even against demonstrative evidence. Besides a compelled faith would be utterly inconsistent with moral responsibility on the part of man. What moral worth, what respect for God or confidence in his character would be involved in a faith which a man could not shun nor avoid. Nor is this all, it is in fact claiming that the whole system of Christianity shall be changed from a moral system to one of physical influence, and of course that it shall neither be right to receive nor wrong to reject it. The act of reception would be of physical necessity, not moral obedience. Is it then said, that the evidence might be so increased as to secure faith without compulsion? I answer, that any supposable increase of evidence, instead of securing faith, might prove the greatest calamity, since for aught that appears, men might still reject that evidence and thus greatly augment the guilt of unbelief. Suppose then, that when Christianity was introduced into the world, it had been written in the heavens above us in letters of light and fire so that all the dwellers on earth would read it, "CHRISTIANITY IS A REVELATION FROM GOD," this would have compelled the faith of men to the exclusion of disbelief, or it would not. If it would, then it would have been inconsistent with a moral system, and faith itself had been no virtue. If it would not, then like any other miracle, as that of the rending rocks, the opening graves, the rising dead, the quaking earth and darkened sun, it might have only aggravated the guilt of every unbeliever. We are therefore utterly incompetent to decide what would be the dictate of benevolence in the case. The proper question for us then, is not what a benevolent God would do, but what it is rational for us to do, in view of what he has actually done. Or, to present the question which I now wish to examine, more precisely--is it rational on our part to believe in the divine origin of Christianity, on the supposition of a comparatively low degree of evidence of the fact?

 

The infidel then will not complain, if we impute to him the opinion, that the religion which he takes so much pains to destroy, is unfriendly, or at least unnecessary to human happiness. Nor, if he can make good this opinion, shall we have any controversy with him in respect to the reasonableness of his demand for a higher degree of evidence that this religion is from God. Such a religion would, in its very nature, furnish a strong presumption against its divine origin, and a very high degree of evidence be fairly required to counteract, if indeed any degree could counteract, such a presumption.

 

But if a religion demands our faith in its divine origin, and if to believe it divine, is obviously, and in every respect essential to our true and best interests, then the case is materially changed. It is a common mistake, that a man's interest ought to have no influence on his faith. There are cases in which it removes presumptive evidence to the contrary, and even becomes evidence of truth. Were one of you to be told that your, father had disinherited you in his will, it would require more evidence to make you believe it, than if you were told that he had bequeathed to you your portion of his estate. True it undoubtedly is, that his interest should never lead him to believe without, or against evidence. But sound reason often dictate's faith, and faith that shall be practical, in view of what may be termed comparatively very slight, evidence. If in a particular case my interest will not be injured by believing if it may be greatly injured by not believing, and if it may be essentially promoted by believing, then to believe on the ground of slight evidence, so far as to control action, is the dictate of sound reason.

 

That this principle of faith is the dictate of sound reason and common sense, may be shown by its universal application in all the affairs of human life. A scheme for the accumulation of wealth occurs to the merchant, which can result in no possible loss, which may produce large acquisition, and which, neglected, may involve him in ruin. A sick man may soon die, unless some proposed remedy be used; the use of it can do no possible injury, but may restore him to health. Now what is the dictate of reason in respect to faith--that degree of faith which is necessary to action--however slight the evidence or probability, if it be real evidence, that a good result will be secured? Ought such evidence to be rejected or disregarded? Would that be sound reason? But in the case before us, we have interests at stake immeasurably more momentous. We are confessedly in the hands of an Almighty Being, and at his disposal forever. A system of religion, claiming to be from Him, is in our possession, and demands our faith in its divine origin, on the alternative of endless happiness or endless misery. To believe it to be divine, we will now suppose, can result in no real evil, but may result in immeasurable good; not to believe it to be divine may result in immeasurable evil. Who can rationally hesitate what to believe, be the balance of probability from other sources in support of the divine origin of this religion ever so small?

 

The case would be still stronger, if we were here to assume (what would be perfectly legitimate, in view of our former conclusions,) viz., that to yield to the practical influence of Christianity is indispensable to man's highest happiness in this world. Nor would it be too much to assume, as a point conceded by the most respectable infidel authors, that the practical tendency of Christianity is to perfect man in character and in happiness. If then we suppose that a man may conform his character substantially to this system of religion, without believing it to be divine, still it is undeniable that such a faith would secure to it a far higher and more perfect influence. I may go farther still. If we suppose there is no evidence to the fact of the divine origin of this religion, except that which arises from its perfect adaptation to man's moral perfection and consequent happiness, it were the highest, noblest act of reason TO BELIEVE. And further still, on the supposition of this perfect adaptation to this high end, I say, if Christianity be a delusion, disturb not my faith in its divine origin. If falsehood is better than truth, then let us have falsehood. As a moral being, who has much to enjoy and to hope for in time, and who may live onward in the ages of eternity, I cannot dispense with the influence of such a faith, nor abandon its consolations and its prospects.

 

I might add did our limits allow, that on the supposition of a low degree of evidence for Christianity, while more proof might be useless and worse than useless, there may be great advantages in exactly that degree of evidence which God has furnished. Particularly, it may be one benignant part of that system of moral discipline by which our honesty and integrity of principle are to be tried and confirmed, by which men are to be made considerate, impartial, and attentive to every degree of evidence; to be kept from levity, and contempt, and ridicule, on a subject on which their eternal well-being, and that of a world, may depend.

 

If the principle of faith which I have now presented be rational, it shows the following things, viz.:

 

(1.) The injustice of the demand for any peculiarly high degree of evidence in favor of Christianity as the only legitimate ground of faith.

 

(2.) It shows the true cause of Infidelity in those who make this demand for higher evidence, viz., that they do not regard Christianity as adapted to promote their true and best interests, and that they do not like it as a system of religion. It involves, in their view, a derangement of their plans, and a thwarting of their inclinations. I am not now saying whether they are right or wrong in this opinion, but simply that such must be their opinion. For when was it known that a man disbelieved against even the slightest balance of probability, while he fully regarded it for his interest, in every respect, to believe?

 

(3.) It shows what, in many cases, is the most promising method of convincing men of the divine origin of Christianity, viz., to show them its adaptation to man's present and future well-being. If such be the real nature of this religion, its reception or rejection must depend greatly on its being seen and understood to be what it really is. As long as the thing itself is not understood, its rejection, if not rational, is not strange, but easily accounted for. Why should a man receive a system of religion of which he knows nothing, merely because some one tells him it is from heaven? Nay more; why should he even examine the question of its divine origin? He sees nothing in its nature or its adaptations that give any importance to the question, whether it come from heaven or not; nothing of course, to render it worth a demonstration. And if with this ignorance of the thing itself, we suppose the conviction to be associated of its utter uselessness, and even of hostile tendency to good results, why should such a mind, with these views of the matter, care to know what the evidence of its divine origin is? By what asseverations of the divine origin of Mahomedanism could you induce the population of New England seriously to examine the question?

 

But now suppose a man to become well acquainted with the Bible, and to find that the book actually develops the most perfect system of means for the accomplishment of the most perfect conceivable end--a mighty scheme for a mighty purpose--a scheme and a purpose worthy of an infinite being, nothing less than a scheme or system of means to secure to a world of his intelligent and immortal creatures, perfection in character and perfection in happiness. Suppose him to see that the scheme is as simple as it is grand, as perfect in its adaptation as it is glorious in its end, as indispensable as it is useful--that it is so in the very nature of things, that it is and must be so from the very constitution of the human mind, and that the belief of it as divine has as direct a tendency to secure the result in the absolute perfection of every human being, as the belief of danger to produce alarm, or the prospect of good, the desire and pursuit of it. I ask, would not such a man be very apt to say, "I shall examine the evidence of the divine origin of this book, here is something worthy of such an origin, every presumption that it is the imposture of empires, villains and enthusiasts is removed--it may be from God, it comports with his character, it is the very thing and the only thing to accomplish the design of Him who made man, it is that, and exactly that which a benignant Creator would do for his own creatures--my highest, best immortal interest may depend on the question--I must see and know whether God has done this thing or not." I am not now saying what the result of such an examination would be, but that without some just knowledge of what Christianity is, no man will examine the question of its divine origin, and with such knowledge, no man who has not become reckless of God, and of his own immortal nature and immortal interests will refuse to examine it. It may be from God, all it says of God may be true, all it says of the Saviour, of the miracles of his power and grace, of the scenes of immortality and retribution--all it says of those who believe not may be true. He who refuses with this tremendous peradventure in view, despises God, despises a soul, the next greatest thing to God, and that soul is his own.

 

(4.) It shows the reasonableness of faith in that great number of believers in Christianity, who do not and who cannot consistently with the other duties of life, become acquainted with but a small part of the evidence on the question. Of this class of men not one in a thousand has the leisure, or the talents, or the learning requisite to examine and weigh one-half of the evidence, especially what is called the external evidence. What qualification have the greater part of believers in Christianity to enter into the controversy with Hume or Voltaire? And have they therefore no reasonable faith? Have the common people no reason to believe the almanac because they are not astronomers--to believe that an eclipse will happen as foretold because they are incompetent to calculate an eclipse themselves? Rave the same class of men no reason to believe that boats and locomotives are propelled by steam, because the philosopher has evidence that it must be so, which they have not? Plainly we may have sufficient evidence of truth without having all that which others possess. And in the present case, the author of the gospel may have intended that its great object and end and its perfect adaptation to that end, should be its chief evidence, especially to the great mass of mankind. Of this they may be perfectly competent judges. This, according to the laws of evidence, may be altogether sufficient to an honest, while more would be utterly insufficient to a dishonest mind, and while to neglect this, may be to neglect the very ground on which God has rested the proof, and required belief of by far the greater part of mankind. Accordingly, I hope to show that from the Bible alone, in the adaptation of its contents to man's perfection in character and happiness, a most conclusive argument may be derived that it is from God, one on the strength of which the unlettered peasant, ignorant, as he is of all history, and destitute as he is of all learning, shall be more rational in his belief than Hume, Voltaire and Gibbon in their unbelief with all their scholarship.

 

(5.) If the principle of faith before stated be rational, it will enable us to form a juster estimate of the amount of the actual evidence, and to see how abundant and overwhelming it must be to a well balanced mind. Nothing is more remote from the truth than the supposed confession by the advocates of Christianity, that it rests its claim on a low degree of evidence. So far from it, there is scarcely any single question on which in their view evidence may be so accumulated. Witness "the piles of authorship," not merely as made up of repetitions, but of divers arguments resting on independent grounds, and drawn from distinct sources. Let the works of Butler, of Lardner, of Paley, of Wilson, of Erskine, of Gregory, and many other modern authors, tell how in the estimation of the friends of Christianity, its proofs have been augmented in later times and down to the present hour. It is not then to be assumed, that the claim for the divine origin of Christianity rests on any thing like a low degree of evidence. It is a question to be tried, a question not to be disposed of in favor of such a claim, till some hundredth or thousandth part of the evidence shall be examined and overthrown by those who make it. If any considerable part of the evidence offered and relied on is substantial, then indeed it is abundant and overwhelming. Nay more; there is evidence in every form, of every kind and degree which can be well imagined on the subject; evidence, in the language of another, fitted alike for "the high achievement of silencing Infidelity in the lofty and academic walks of life, as well as to carry Christianity into workshops and cottages." Christianity in the fullness of her strength, if one-half of what is claimed for her be true, has arguments for Jew and Gentile, for bond and free, for men of a false religion and men of no religion--arguments "by which she may confront the powers of literature, and compel the most arrogant of her disciples to do her homage, and those also by which her ministers from the pulpit may spread a well grounded faith amidst the multitude of the people."

 

I am not now saying that such evidence does in fact, but only that it is claimed to exist; and that on the true principle of rational faith, if only a considerable part of what is claimed, does exist and is substantial evidence, then it is abundant and even overwhelming, to an enlightened and well-balanced mind.

 

3. While it is essential to a fair argument on the question of a revelation from God, that the facts and principles which constitute the premises should be mutually understood and admitted by the parties, it is true that to a considerable extent they are not thus understood and admitted. These facts are very numerous, and while some of them are understood and admitted by the parties, others are not, and others only in some general respects, but not in those on which the conclusion depends. I need not say, that it is to no purpose that the parties reason in such a case for the conviction of one another. In my own view, the fact that there has been so much of this mode of argumentation, is a principal reason that this controversy has not long since been terminated, so far as its continuance has depended on any show of argument. I say not whose fault it is. But so much is undeniable, that the premises of the argument, if any thing is accomplished by reasoning, must be understood and admitted by the parties. What is not understood must be explained, and if denied must be proved or abandoned. To see the bearing of these remarks let us take a case.

 

Suppose you have received a letter from another, having the signature of your father, and the question should arise, whether it is actually written by him. Now to take the question ab initio; if you have no father, the debate is ended before it can be really begun. If you have a father, then there is room for the question whether the letter be from him. Again, if you have a father, and yet there is some absolute impossibility that he should be the author of the letter, or of any letter whatever, this precludes all further debate; while if the possibility of his writing a letter be admitted, then the question in this respect is open for discussion. Again, let it be supposed that he is one of the wisest and most affectionate of parents, and that the letter, in respect to its contents, is wholly and even contemptibly useless and unnecessary, as advising you to eat and drink and breathe, if you would live; or suppose that without any sufficient cause or reason, and under pretexts known to be entirely groundless, it consists of threatenings to injure you even to withdraw all support and kindness, and to cast you out as a disinherited exile; suppose that in one of these respects the contents of the letter are absolutely irreconcilable with the known character of the father, here again there is a strong presumption against the supposed authorship. Again, let it be supposed that the father is not only most judicious and affectionate, but a man of high literary and scientific acquisitions; that he is, above all things, intent to secure the scholarship of his son, and peculiarly competent to aid him in attaining the highest literary eminence, and that the letter is written in subservience to this object; that it contains counsels, directions, inducements, and information, which are peculiarly fitted, and even necessary, to secure the end on which his heart is set; in a word, it is just such a letter as such a father in such circumstances would write to such a son, and you perceive some of the strongest reasons for believing that he actually wrote it. Again, as we suppose certain other things to be true or not to be true--the handwriting, the style, the manner, &c., &c., to be or not to be those of the father; or the letter to contain or not to contain allusions, implications, coincidences, statements of facts, of a certain character--these things, as they may be supposed to be or not to be, would have an important bearing on the question. Again; let it be supposed that the letter declares, that for the purpose of placing the authenticity of the letter itself beyond all reasonable doubt, that the father has done what in the case would be deemed a very singular and extraordinary thing--something which neither he nor any other man ever did before--something indeed, which if done would settle the question, but which, in your view of the case, it is absolutely incredible that he should do so incredible, that no evidence, especially no testimony, can, in your view, when simply placed and balanced against its inherent incredibility, be esteemed sufficient proof that he has done it, and yet that the authenticity of the letter is made to depend on the fact that he has done this very thing. Here again is something which bears against the alleged source of the letter. But now again, in view of the high importance and even necessity of your believing it to be from your father, in order to accomplish its object, let us imagine what was not before supposed, that your father is fully apprised of some cause, some peculiar structure of your mind, some propensity or mode of thinking, that will prevent you from believing the letter to come from him without the supposed extraordinary marks of its authenticity; and that he knows, and that you and others know, if the object of the letter is to be attained, this is altogether the best way to attain it. Now, in view of the father's ardent and supreme desire to accomplish the object, there arises a strong presumption that he will adopt the very method, which, under another view of the case, appeared so entirely incredible; for you now see a reason why he should do it, even one which renders it almost incredible tat he should not.

 

Thus you see how, on the supposition of one kind of premises, the mind is led to one conclusion, and on the supposition of another kind, to the opposite conclusion, respecting the supposed origin of the letter. Just so it is in respect to the great question, whether God has given a revelation to man. The cases are entirely analogous. And the force of an argument for a divine revelation on each individual mind will depend on the views which that mind has of what God is, what his character is, what his relations to man are, what he has done, and what he has not done, what is and what is not his great end in man's creation, and what are his particular designs toward him; what he will do to accomplish his designs; what man is, what his character is, what his relations and his destiny are; and what the Bible is, what it is in its design, adaptation and tendency, and how it agrees or disagrees with the character of God and with his relations and designs toward man. It is only as we understand these things, that we are competent to make an argument on this subject, or to judge of one when it is made. It is only as the parties in this controversy understand and are agreed in these great facts and principles respecting God, and man, and the Bible, that they are prepared to enter on the discussion with any prospect or hope of advantage. How could any man be a competent judge of the question concerning the supposed letter, who knew nothing of the character, the designs, the relations of the father, nothing of the son, and nothing of the contents of the letter? You see then, that unless the parties in the present discussion are agreed in the premises, the discussion must be fruitless.

 

Now I readily admit, that in many of the facts which constitute the premises they are agreed, but I maintain that, in many others they are not; and that so long as they are not, the argument for the divine origin of Christianity must prove ineffectual. I said they are agreed in some of the premises. They agree that there is a God of infinite natural perfection; that he is a being of a perfect moral character, or infinitely benevolent, disposed to secure the greatest amount of happiness which in the nature of things he can secure; they agree that he is the providential governor of the world, and, as the omniscient author of all things, his providential will must extend to all actual beings and events; they may also agree that he is the moral governor of men, in some very general and indefinite sense. But in respect to the particular nature of the government which God exercises over this world, and therefore in respect to the precise method, way, or means by which God aims to secure the happiness of his creatures, whether it involves necessarily in the nature of things, a perfect moral government of free moral agents by law, with a strict adherence to all the peculiar principles and influences of such a system as the best means of the best end; and if it does, whether such a system does or does not in its own nature involve the existence of evil, natural and moral, and whether it does or does not in its own nature preclude the final termination of all evil whether there is a future state, and whether we have any means of deciding what will be man's condition hereafter what hopes and what fears he would be authorized to entertain from the light of nature, whether man, without a revelation, would or could, on the basis of evidence, look forward with cheering anticipations to the future, or whether he would be compelled by the most decisive evidence only to forebode a fearful hour of retribution--on these, and many other main questions, the parties are not agreed. No one can have attentively read the controversy on both sides of this great question, without seeing that one of the parties reasons on one set of premises and principles, and the other party on another.

 

Were we to see an artificer employed in constructing a machine, though we were ignorant of its nature and its design, still, if we knew that he was neither deficient in power, skill, materials, or disposition to finish it, but was fixed and immutable in his resolution to give it ultimately, and as rapidly as the case allows, its highest perfection, we should have no doubt that the machine, whatever it might be, would be finished, and the end proposed accomplished.

 

Again; if now we suppose the purpose or end aimed at to be ascertained, this at least, in many cases, would give us the means which he would adopt, or was adopting, to accomplish his end. If his object was to propel a boat through the water, we should expect him, in these days, to make a steam-engine. If his object was to see what is to be seen in the moon, we should expect him to make a telescope; or if it was to mark the divisions of time, we should expect him to make a watch or a clock.

 

Again, let us now suppose that the machine is so far advanced, that any competent judge can decide beyond all mistake, both what the machine is, and what is its object or end. Then also such a judge can decide with entire confidence in respect to many particular thing which will be done and which will not be done by the artificer, in order to complete the machine and accomplish his end. Let it now be supposed that you and I are spectators of the progress of the work, and this particular question to arise between us and to engage us in fierce debate, viz., whether the machine when finished will contain a main-spring or not? And let us further suppose, that although there is in fact no reason to doubt on the point, that by some strange obliquity or imbecility of mind on the part of one of his, we are not agreed as to what the machine is, and you insist that the man is making a telescope, and I insist that he is making a watch. Now to what purpose shall we discuss the question concerning the main-spring, unless we can settle the preliminary question, whether the artificer is in fact making a watch or a telescope? And how can the debate be prolonged a moment with the least show of reason until this previous question is correctly decided?

 

Substantially like this, in my view, is the state of the controversy between the opposers and the advocates of a divine revelation. The former have such views of the character of God, of his object and end in the creation and government of this world, and especially of the means he has actually adopted to accomplish this end, that they can no more see a reason why God should give a revelation to men, and such a revelation as the Bible is supposed to contain, than why a skillful artificer should insert a main-spring or a pendulum in a telescope. Hence their constant asseveration--it is utterly impossible, or if obliged to qualify a little by being reminded of God's omnipotence, and of the manifestation of his direct agency in creation, still they affirm that considering the character and designs of God, and the object and nature of Christianity, it is irrational, even utterly incredible, that it should be the subject of a direct interposition from heaven.

 

The advocates of Christianity however from their premises come to the directly opposite conclusion. With their views of the character of God, of his great object and end in the creation and government of this world of intelligent beings, and especially of the means or system which he has adopted for the accomplishment of this end, there is the same reason to conclude that God would give a revelation to the world, and the very revelation claimed, which there is for concluding that the supposed artificer in making a watch, would insert a mainspring to complete the instrument. Why should not God as well as man give completeness to the means of an end?

 

But here we come to another vital question, viz., is man competent to say what God will do and what he will not do? Is not the subject altogether too high for us? When we think what God is, of the eternity of his government, and of our distance from all direct and personal observation of him and the depth of his counsels, are not the form and mode of the management of his empire, wholly inaccessible to all our faculties? I answer, if this indeed be so, then let us cease all inquiry, for to what purpose is it to inquire or reason or form opinions where nothing can be known? If it is all darkness here, then it is as dark to the infidel as to the Christian, and if the Christian cannot say what God will do, the infidel cannot say what he will not do. We may be right or we may be wrong in our conclusions, and that is all that can be said of the matter. But is it credible that a benevolent God has doomed his dependent creatures--creatures who know that their all depends on what God will or will not do, to the darkness and agony of utter uncertainty. Can it be that the almighty and supreme disposer of all destiny has given us no intimation of his designs? True indeed it is, that man is incompetent to say in many respects what God will or will not do; but in other respects, and we may safely say in all which are important to man's well-being, man is competent to say what God will and what God will not do.

 

The great point here undoubtedly is to distinguish what we can know or prove, from. that which we cannot know or prove. And what I maintain is, that we can do this to such an extent as to furnish the sure premises of irrefragable argumentation on the most momentous of all questions to man, viz., what must be his destiny and on what it depends? Nor should it be forgotten, that the argument must of course be confined exclusively to what we do know or can prove; and that we are to place no reliance on what we do not know, ignorance being alike incompetent to make either an objection or an argument. The premises being conceded, all they involve and give, must be conceded also. If there is a benevolent God, then man can say, if such a God does any thing, what he does will be better than to do nothing. If he proposes an end, it will be the best end which he can accomplish. If he adopts the means of accomplishing an end, the means will be the best which he can adopt. If man can know what the best end is, as he most assuredly can, viz., the highest well-being of all, and if man can also ascertain what are the necessary and best means of accomplishing this end, then he can say that God will propose this end and adopt these means. If man can ascertain that a perfect God has actually adopted a given system of means for a given end, then can he say that system is the best. If man can know that any practicable thing is either essentially or circumstantially necessary to the perfection of this system of means, then also he can say God will do that. Thus knowledge gives knowledge, if we know one thing we know another--if we know what a triangle is, we may know its angles to be equal to two right angles--if we know that whiteness exists, we know also that there is something white. On the contrary, if that knowledge is wanting which is necessary to further knowledge, then of course such further knowledge will not exist. If I know that one has made a watch, then I know what a watch is; and knowing what a watch is, I know it has a main-spring--if it answers the purpose for which it is made, I know it must be wound up, and if I also know either that no one could, or that no one would do this but the maker, and know that it has been done, then I know that he has done it. But if I do not know any one of these things on which my knowledge of another thing depends, then I do not know the latter. In the same manner is our knowledge of God and, of his doings more or less extended or limited. If we know or can prove certain things concerning God, then we can know and prove certain other things, and are as truly competent to say in such cases what God will do and what he will not do, as we are in like cases to say what a man will do, and what he will not do.

 

Nor can I dismiss the topic here. To maintain the doctrine of this necessary ignorance of God on the part of man, is not only to provide a refuge from the power of truth, it is to subvert all reasoning respecting God and the relations subsisting between God and his creatures. Whether there be a God or not, whether he be omnipotent, wise and good or not, are things of no importance for man to know, and for this decisive reason, such knowledge gives no results. On this principle God might as well be without power, without intellect, without goodness--the idolater's god--a thing "which the smith fashioneth with tongs and with hammers," or such as the prophet supposed who "peradventure sleepeth or is on a journey," as a being of infinite perfection. If we cannot say what God will and will not do, then there would be as much ground for love, for confidence, for hope, for joy in one sort of deity as another, and to see omnipotent malignity or even blind chance on the throne of the universe, would be as sufficient a basis for exultation and joy, as to behold a perfect God reigning there; for whatever perfection be ascribed to him, there is no telling what he will do and what he will not do.

 

On the other hand, if we know that it were better or more desirable that there should be one sort of deity than another, and better simply and solely because by knowing what he is, we can know to some extent what he will do and what he will not do, then we also know that the doing of some things is better than the doing of some other things. And knowing these things we know yet more. We know that a perfect God seeing the end from the beginning, and being immutable in his purposes, will accomplish his plans, and carry them on and out with all possible perfection to their results. And when the plan or system of things is actually adopted and developed to our inspection in its essential characteristics, we can tell what it is and what it is not. We can decide whether it is a system of mere physical agents, whether God reigns merely over material forms and animal life and sensation, and is the spectator only of the laws of matter and the acts of instinct, or whether he has adopted a moral system, and reigns over it according to the principles and laws of such a jurisdiction.

 

The argument for a divine revelation materially depends on the fact that God is administering a perfect moral government over man.

 

The proposition to be proved from this source is, THAT THE SYSTEM OF RELIGION CONTAINED IN THE BIBLE IS FROM GOD.

 

The argument divides itself into the following propositions:

 

I. God administers a perfect moral government over men.

II. By the administration of this government, God proposes or decrees to reform and bless a great multitude of our race.

III. The importance and necessity of a revelation to the accomplishment of this end, create a strong probability or a moral certainty that God would give a revelation to men.

IV. That which is claimed to be a revelation from God, and which is contained in the Bible, is what it claims to be.

 

The first two of these propositions have been sufficiently discussed in preceding lectures. We need only consider the two which remain.