The GOSPEL TRUTH

LECTURES ON THE

MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.

 By

 NATHANIEL W. TAYLOR, D. D.,

1859

VOLUME I

SECTION I:

WHAT IS A PERFECT MORAL GOVERNMENT?

OR,

MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT.

 

LECTURE IV:

 

V. A perfect Moral Government Involves the exercise of authority through the medium of law. The nature of law further unfolded -- 4. It must express the Lawgiver's preference of the action required, to Its opposite, all things considered -- 5. It implies, that the Lawgiver can be satisfied with obedience, and with nothing but obedience, on the part of the subject -- 6. It expresses his highest approbation of obedience and his highest disapprobation of disobedience.

 

 

THESE three propositions may at first sight appear to be so nearly equivalent, as to supersede any necessity for distinct consideration. The difference between them however, and the importance of distinguishing them, for the purpose of exposing opposite errors will be obvious from the discussion.

 

4. The law of a perfect moral government must express the lawgiver's preference of the action required to its opposite, all things considered.

 

Some have maintained it to be consistent with the nature of such a law, that it express the lawgiver's preference of obedience to disobedience in themselves considered, while at the same time he actually prefers disobedience to obedience, in many cases at least, all things considered. In opposition to this view, it is now maintained, that the law of a perfect moral government, expresses the lawgiver's preference of obedience to disobedience all things considered, that is; when all things which depend on the former are compared with all things which depend or can be made to depend on the latter, either as its own proper results, or by the infliction of punishment, or in any other way.

 

This view of the import of the word law, or this nature of a law may be tested by an appeal to common sense. Suppose a father to enact a law, that his children shall not lie, cheat, nor drink to excess. This being the unqualified form of the law, suppose him to add by way of explanation: "On the whole, or all things considered, I prefer, that you should transgress rather than obey the law--that you should lie, and cheat and drink, rather than tell the truth, and be honest and sober"would not common sense pronounce the so-called law a contemptible burlesque and a mockery? And yet such, without, a shade of caricature, is the law of God in the view of infidels, universalists, and all who maintain that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good. If men will thus go against common sense, they must expect common sense to go against them.

 

But this topic demands and will receive a more thorough consideration hereafter. Some further remarks will, however, not be out of place in this connection. A law then, which is not an unqualified expression of the lawgiver's preference of the action required to its opposite, all things considered, is not a law. It expresses no will, no choice, no preference, and therefore can in no respect be a command, either as a requirement or a prohibition. The will cannot prefer one thing to another in themselves considered, and at the same time prefer the latter to the former, all things considered. The mind may involuntarily desire one thing more than another in themselves considered. But an involuntary desire is not an act of will; it is not an act of choice, or an elective preference. The will or mind can choose between two objects, and so prefer one to the other only in view of them all things considered. To suppose it to do both at the same time, is to suppose that it can choose opposites at the same time, which is as absurd as to suppose that a body should move in opposite directions at the same time. Or, view this topic in another aspect. If the two choices or preferences supposed may coexist in the same mind and should so exist--which would show itself in executive action, or which of the two wills would a benevolent being express in the form of law to his subjects? He wills or chooses, that his subjects should act morally right rather than morally wrong, considering the acts in themselves; and at the same time, he wills or chooses, that they should act morally wrong, considering all things. He cannot express with truth his will or choice that they should act morally right, for he wills or chooses that they should act morally wrong. He cannot with truth express his will or choice that they should act morally wrong, for he wills or chooses that they should act morally right. Let him express either of the supposed wills in the form of law, and he is convicted of falsehood by the existence of its opposite; which shows the supposition of these two wills to be an absurdity. The doctrine of two wills on the part of a lawgiver, as now presented, is a simple absurdity, though extensively maintained by infidels, universalists, and by some of worthier name. If his law is his will, it expresses his preference of the action required to its opposite, all things considered.

 

5. The law of a perfect moral government implies, that the lawgiver can be satisfied with obedience, and with nothing but obedience on the part of subjects. The law of such a government is, as we have seen, an unqualified expression of the lawgiver's preference of the action required to its opposite, all things considered. As a lawgiver, so far as any thing on the part of subjects is concerned, he must be satisfied either with their obedience or disobedience. As willing or preferring the former rather than the latter, he must be satisfied with the former, and dissatisfied with the latter. To suppose otherwise, is to suppose him to be dissatisfied when his will is done, and satisfied when his will is not done but crossed and thwarted; which is the absurdity of supposing him dissatisfied when satisfied, or satisfied when dissatisfied.

 

Again; the preference of a perfect moral governor expressed in his law, is a preference of the indispensable means of the best end, to the sure means of the worst end. The former is as excellent and valuable--as much to be desired as the end of which it is the means. The latter is as odious and abominable--as much to be abhorred as the end of which it is the means. If the former--obedience, does not take place on the part of subjects, then the latter takes place on their part. And if a perfect moral governor is not satisfied with the former, then he must be satisfied, if at all, with the latter, i.e., he must be satisfied with that which he regards as odious and abominable, even with the means of the worst conceivable end. The absurdity is obvious.

 

The same thing may be viewed in another light. The action required by his law, is either the best thing which can be required of subjects, or something else is better, or something else is as good. If it is the best thing, then a perfect moral governor must be satisfied with it, and with nothing else on the part of subjects; since otherwise, he would be without benevolence, and of course without authority. If something else is better than obedience to law, then also, as not requiring the best thing he is destitute of benevolence, and of course, destitute of authority. If something else is as good, then he expresses a false or groundless preference in his law, and is of course destitute of the only character which can invest him with authority.

 

Again; if that which is required by the law, is not the only thing on the part of the subject which will satisfy the lawgiver, then the question what will satisfy him or whether any thing will, is left wholly undetermined. On this most momentous of all questions, all is uncertainty and doubt; or rather deception and falsehood. None but a malignant being could fail to put this question at rest, in the view of his subjects. I need not say, that in such a case, neither law nor moral government could exist. Or, if we suppose that the moral governor can be satisfied with any thing but obedience on the part of subjects, then by his law he furnishes no reason to his subjects, why they should obey rather than disobey his law. Nothing appears to show that he cannot be satisfied with something on their part which is not obedience--something which he does not claim in his law; that he will not accept of a substitute for obedience--some equivalent on the part of subjects. He thus abandons all claim for obedience, and adopts the principle, that one thing or another, any thing or nothing will satisfy him. No rule of action--no law can exist in such a case.

 

Further; the same thing will be still more apparent, if we advert to the grounds or reasons for satisfaction with obedience on the part of the governor, and to the grounds or reasons for dissatisfaction on his part with disobedience. In respect to obedience, the grounds of satisfaction are two: first, obedience is the means of the highest well-being of the whole community, and of the obedient subject; secondly, another ground of satisfaction with the obedient subject is, that, by his obedience he perfectly honors the law and fully supports the authority of the moral governor. Nothing on the part of the subject can amount to such a perfect recognition of the rightful authority of him who reigns, as the perfect obedience of the subject. This gives to the law its highest honors, and to the authority of the governor that homage which enthrones him in absolute dominion. Thus in the two respects specified--the entire object and end--all that a perfect moral governor can propose or desire from his subjects, is fully accomplished, and perfect benevolence is perfectly by their obedience.

 

In respect to disobedience, the grounds of dissatisfaction are two. One is, that it tends to destroy the highest well-being, and to produce the highest misery of the community and of the disobedient subject. Disobedience to a perfect law is selfishness. This as a principle of action, or rather as itself action, tends to the destruction of the highest well-being and the production of the high misery in others and in its subject. Such action must, of course, be the object of high dissatisfaction to a benevolent or perfect moral governor. I say nothing here concerning reconciliation with the transgressor through an atonement. I only say, that with his character as a transgressor, and the enemy of the highest well-being of all, a perfect moral governor must be, in a high degree, dissatisfied. The other ground of dissatisfaction with the transgressor is, that by his act of transgression, he has done what he can to destroy, and that which uncounteracted in its true tendency, must destroy the authority of the moral governor. Actions, in familiar phrase, speak louder than words. The act of disobedience says, in a manner the most unequivocal, the law is not to be obeyed--the authority of the moral governor is to be disregarded, and himself esteemed worthy only of unqualified contempt. The transgressor does what he can therefore, to bring into contempt, and thus to prostrate, and if nothing be done to counteract the true tendency of his act, he does what must effectually prostrate all law and all authority. Who would or could respect a king, who either from weakness, approbation, or policy, should acquiesce in the open rebellion of a single subject, trampling on his law and confronting his authority with undisguised contempt? Suppose every subject thus to defy his authority, and the triumphant shout of rebellion to go throughout his empire, what is there of law, authority, or government remaining? Nothing. And the reason is, that the act of transgression is a declaration and a proof that the lawgiver, his law, and authority, are unworthy of regard. It places the foot of rebellion on all that can be called authority, and all that is authority in the dust, with the acquiescence of the moral governor. The proof is decisive; the conclusion is not merely authorized but required, either that he is incompetent or indisposed to uphold the best law, or both; and of course that he has no right to reign, and is entitled to no submission. The principle is the same in respect to a single instance of disobedience, considered as testimony. It gives the same testimony. It establishes the same fact--that so far as authority is concerned, there is none. For what is done once may be done again; what is done by one may be done by all. The governor's acquiescence is the result either of weakness, of timidity, of indifference, of approbation, or of a selfish policy, and a single act of transgression acquiesced in by him proves this. Such an act therefore, in the very nature of the case subverts all authority. We may indeed imagine that a moral governor should maintain his place on his throne by dint of power. We may suppose him to express due disapprobation of all other transgressors but one. But if he fails to do this in respect to one transgressor and so treats him with favor, under a merely legal system, his authority is gone--subverted. He shows the partialities of favoritism, and these subvert authority if any thing can. They show him to be wanting in principle, and therefore wholly destitute of that character which gives the right to rule; they show that he is as truly the friend of the disobedient as of the obedient--that he does not regard obedience to the best law as the indispensable means of the best end, and disobedience to it as the sure means of the worst end. Thus disobedience, without his disapprobation, subverts his authority, and he acquiesces in the result. What right has he to reign?

 

It may here be said, that under human governments, acts of disobedience often occur without detection, and that even subjects who are convicted as offenders are often pardoned, and yet the authority of law is not subverted. This may be admitted. But why is not the authority of law in these cases subverted? Is it because the principle now stated is not true? Or is it because every such government does what it can and shows itself determined to do what it can, consistently with its own weakness and imperfection, to counteract the tendency of transgression, by upholding its authority in the punishment of the guilty and the protection of the innocent? The latter is the reason. In proof of it, let us suppose a civil ruler to possess knowledge and power fully adequate to detect and to punish without error and mistake, every offender against the fundamental law of the state, could he refuse to do it--could he refuse and be known to refuse to arrest the traitor and bring him to punishment, and yet sustain his authority in the view of his subjects? Could treason be thus left to walk abroad in the face of day, Untouched, uncounteracted in its tendency, and the authority of the king not be subverted? What sort of justice and what sort of authority could belong to such a ruler, suffering rebellion thus to trample on law? He would be virtually employing his power to protect the traitor, and so become his accomplice in crime. In respect to the pardoning prerogative in human governments, whence is it? It rests solely on the ground of fallibility in the administration of justice. If we suppose the infallibility of omniscience, giving absolute security that the innocent shall not be punished instead of the guilty, the pardoning prerogative under civil law would be, or ought to be, unknown. There could be no pretense for it; for what sort of justice would that be, which should punish some or many offenders and not punish another known to be equally guilty? The act of remitting penalty in respect to a convict under a merely legal system, must either rest on the presumption of his innocence, or be an outrage on law. Thus every human government, though necessarily imperfect in the hands of an imperfect administrator, distinctly recognizes the principle of doing all it can do to sustain its authority, by counteracting the tendency of transgression to destroy it. By thus doing all it can do for this purpose, it shows that it would do more if it could, and thus avoid the very imperfections that mar its administration. It shows that, in its own estimation, the transgression of law in its true tendency is the subversion of all law and of all authority, by doing all it can do to counteract this tendency. It thus recognizes, and therefore fully establishes, that very principle of a perfect moral government which it is supposed to disprove.

 

If it should here be said, that in many instances human governments do not do what they can nor show that they are disposed to do what they can, to sustain their authority in the sense now maintained, and that still their authority is recognized, I answer that in this view of a human government, all that can be called authority is in truth mere appearance. Language is used in these, as it is in many other cases, as if that which it denotes had an actual existence, when it has not. It is merely the language of appearance, and the thing when duly reflected upon, is seen to be a mere quasi authority thing imagined or supposed. Authority is recognized in words, and even in unreflecting thought and action; as when we speak of the rising and setting of the sun, or of the sweetness of sugar, or the coldness of ice, as properties of these things which resemble our sensations. As in these cases so in the present case, by reflection, the error is easily and surely detected and the opposite truth fully recognized. If in such cases rulers and subjects seem to recognize authority, it is at most only a recognition of something for the reality, which is not; while even this subserves the purpose of preventing the evils of revolution and of anarchy.

 

While the act of transgression then in its true nature and tendency subverts the authority of the moral governor, I now proceed to show that the transgressor cannot in any way, either by doing or by suffering prevent the actual effect. The whole force and influence of his act to destroy the authority of the moral governor, may be said to he in the fact that the subject has violated the claim for his obedience. It follows therefore, that there is no way in which he can prevent the actual subversion of all authority, except by satisfying the unsatisfied claim for obedience. Can he then by any thing which he can either do or suffer, satisfy this claim? Can be annihilate the act of transgression, or change it into an act of obedience, or cause it to be true, that he has not transgressed? This is impossible. Can repentance or future obedience satisfy this claim? Repentance or future obedience can at most only satisfy the claim in future. Were it otherwise, what would the law be? It would be in language and in import, not obey, but sin and repent, transgress and reform. This would be allowing present transgression on condition of future obedience. Can works of supererogation? These are out of the question, the continued demands of law being co-extensive with the powers of the subject. Can voluntary suffering? But voluntary suffering is not the thing which the law claims of the subject. The lawgiver threatens to inflict suffering, but no benevolent lawgiver ever claimed voluntary suffering as the duty of a subject. Voluntary suffering then cannot satisfy the claim. The law has but one claim on the subject, and that is, for his obedience. The lawgiver proposes nothing, aims at nothing, desires nothing, except his obedience and his happiness. How can misery be a substitute for happiness in the estimate of a benevolent lawgiver? To suppose this is to suppose him to say, "I am as willing that you should transgress and be miserable, as obey and be happy." Besides, the most that the transgressor can be supposed to accomplish either by doing or suffering, is to evince his present regard for the law. But he is bound to do or to suffer whatever can do this; it can therefore, only satisfy a present claim. Can punishment? But punishment is not the act of the transgressor, but of the lawgiver. It is not inflicted by him as a substitute for obedience. It is not an act of the lawgiver declaring himself as well satisfied that his subjects should disobey and be punished, as obey and be blessed. It is an act of the lawgiver designed, not to reform the subject and bring him to honor the law, not to retrieve all the evils of transgression and so to be an equivalent for the happiness it has destroyed, but to prevent simply one of the evils of transgression, viz., the subversion of law. It is simply the lawgiver's act, upholding his law and authority. What then on the part of the transgressor can satisfy the unsatisfied claim for his obedience? Nothing. By the act of transgression he has proclaimed that the law is unworthy of regard, and may be trampled in the dust by every subject; and this testimony is decisive of the fact, it is prima facie evidence and uncounteracted by opposing evidence from the governor himself, authorizes and demands the belief, that the moral governor acquiesces in rebellion, that his law has ceased as truly as had a repeal of it issued from his own lips, and that he no more reigns with authority, than were he driven an insulted and degraded exile from his throne.

 

The conclusion then on this topic is, that the law of a perfect moral governor is in its very nature an unqualified claim for obedience on the part of every subject, and that whatever it may threaten, it claims of the subject nothing but obedience. It knows of no substitute or equivalent for disobedience on his part, nor yet on the part of the lawgiver himself; and therefore necessarily implies, that the lawgiver can be satisfied with nothing but obedience on the part of the subject.

 

6. The law of a perfect moral government expresses the lawgiver's highest approbation of obedience, and highest disapprobation of disobedience.

 

First. It expresses his highest approbation of obedience. By highest approbation, I mean not higher approbation than he may feel toward some other object, which cannot come into competition with this as an object of approbation. A perfect moral governor would feel as high approbation of the end of right moral action, as of right moral action itself. But by highest approbation, I mean, as high as he can feel toward any object, and higher than any which he can feel toward any of all the objects which can come into competition as objects of approbation.

 

The law of a perfect moral governor expresses as we have seen, his preference of the action required to its opposite, all things considered. This preference is of course an elective preference. It involves not only an act of will, but also affection, love, approbation of its object as it is in its own nature and tendency; and that degree of approbation which is suited to the worth and excellence of the object. Obedience to the perfect law of a perfect being is as we have seen the indispensable means of the best end, even of the highest happiness of the individual subject and of all others. As such a means of such an end, it is as excellent and valuable, as much to be loved, desired, approved and sought as the end itself. At the same time, these objects--obedience and the highest happiness of all, can never come into competition as objects of approbation. A perfect moral governor therefore, must regard obedience to his law with as high approbation as that with which he can regard any other object, even the highest happiness of all. Such approbation is necessarily involved in the very preference which he expresses in his law, otherwise the preference expressed in his law is not what it must be--a preference of obedience as it is in its true nature and tendency--the necessary means of the best end. Can he then feel so high a degree of approbation of any other object, which can come into competition with obedience as an object of approbation, as that which he feels for obedience? This is impossible and absurd. To suppose it, is to suppose, that perfect benevolence should feel as high approbation or love for that which is neither the highest happiness of all nor the necessary means of it, as it feels for these objects--which is to suppose that to be benevolence which is not benevolence.

 

Again; the only object, which, under a moral government, can be conceived to exist and to come into competition with obedience as an object of approbation to a moral governor, must be some supposable degree of happiness with exemption from some supposable degree of misery or suffering, in case of disobedience. It is admitted that a benevolent being approves of happiness, and of exemption from suffering in themselves considered. But no happiness, and no exemption from suffering which are conceivable in case of disobedience, or connected with it or depending on it, can be so highly approved by a benevolent ruler as obedience to a perfect law. Suppose what else we may, so long as obedience does not exist, the necessary means of the best end does not exist, nor the best end itself. Of course nothing exists or can exist without obedience, of which a benevolent ruler can so highly approve and love as obedience to his law. The expression of his preference in his law therefore, being an expression of his approbation of obedience as it is, is an expression of his highest approbation of obedience.

 

This reasoning might be further enforced by considering obedience in its particular relations as the means of the highest well-being of all. Such it is, not merely in its direct tendencies to produce the highest happiness of the obedient and of all others, but also in all its indirect tendencies. Not however to specify these, I only advert to one of them already stated--its tendency to support the authority of the moral governor. The obedience of his subjects is the testimony and the homage of every intellect and every heart, to his perfect qualification to reign; and pre-eminently enthrones him in rightful dominion. This is "the column of true majesty" in kings. When obedience exists, all exists that a perfect moral governor can propose or desire in respect to himself and his subjects. And this he tells them in the preference the will given forth in his law. What other object can he so highly approve?

 

Secondly. The law of a perfect moral governor expresses his highest disapprobation of disobedience. By the highest disapprobation, I mean as high as he can feel toward any object, and higher than any which he can feel toward any of all the objects which can come into competition as objects of disapprobation. This is necessarily involved in the preference expressed in his law. This preference of the action required to its opposite involves aversion, hatred, disapprobation toward the opposite as it is in its true nature and tendency. It involves a degree of disapprobation, which is suited to the degree of turpitude and odiousness in disobedience. Now disobedience to the law of a perfect moral government, in its true nature and tendency, is the sure means of the worst end even of the highest misery of the subject and of all others. As such a means of such an end, it is as odious as fit to be abhorred and disapproved as the end itself. These objects however, disobedience and the highest misery of all, can never come into competition as objects of disapprobation. A perfect moral governor therefore, must regard disobedience with as high disapprobation as that with which he can regard the highest misery of all. Such disapprobation of disobedience is involved in the very preference expressed in his law. For this preference involves aversion, hatred, disapprobation of disobedience as it is in its true nature and tendency, that is as the means of the highest misery of all. Can he then feel so high a degree of disapprobation toward any other object which can come into competition with disobedience as an object of disapprobation, as he must feel toward disobedience? This is impossible. To suppose it is to suppose, that a being of perfect benevolence should feel as high disapprobation toward that which is neither the highest misery of all nor the means of it, as he feels toward these objects; which is to suppose a perfectly benevolent being, who is not perfectly benevolent.

 

This view of the subject is confirmed by considering the specific tendency of disobedience to destroy the authority, of the governor. It not only tends as a kind of action to produce the highest misery of all, but as we have seen, it tends to subvert the authority of law and government, and thus to demolish the necessary and only security and safeguard against this fearful issue. Intent on its work of ruin, it storms and raises to the foundation the only citadel of defense and protection, that it may extend its desolations unhindered and unmolested. It thus destroys the last hope and refuge of benevolence itself; forcing it to yield its authority and its designs to the ravages of fell malignity. What object so fit to be abhorred? What can be called law, which does not express supreme abhorrence of transgression? What lawgiver can be entitled to respect, who does not express in his law the highest disapprobation of this deed of death--this worst of evils as a cause an evil equaled only by its appropriate effect, the absolute wretchedness of all? Thus, when disobedience exists, all exists that a perfect moral governor can deprecate, disapprove and abhor as the cause of evil and the source of woe. It is hostility and defeat to his entire and only design. It crosses and frustrates his only will--his whole will as given forth in his law. What other object can he so highly disapprove and abhor?

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