The GOSPEL TRUTH

LECTURES ON THE

MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.

 By

 NATHANIEL W. TAYLOR, D. D.,

1859

VOLUME I

SECTION I:

WHAT IS A PERFECT MORAL GOVERNMENT?

OR,

MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT.

LECTURE II:

 

V. A perfect Moral Government Involves the exercise of authority through the medium of law. The nature of such a law. First, It to a decisive rule of action to subjects. Secondly, It must require benevolence as the best kind of action, and must forbid selfishness as the worst kind of action. Viewed In relation to these objects, and to the agent who exercises them, these affections an supreme, intelligent morally free, permanents and predominant

I HAVE said that a moral government is-- I. An influence on moral beings; -- II. That it implies amoral governor; -- III. That it is designed so to control the action of moral beings, as to secure the great end of action on their part; -- IV. That it is the influence of authority. I now proceed to say:

V. That a perfect moral government involves the exercise of authority through the medium of law.

Here the question arises, what is law--the law of a perfect moral government?

Generally speaking, the law of a perfect moral government, is the will of the moral governor concerning the action of his subjects, promulgated as an authoritative and perfect rule of action to them. In this general answer to the question, there would be perhaps a universal agreement in opinion, while in respect to its particular import, there might be diversity. Hence the question demands an answer in several important particulars. I proceed, then, to say--

That the law of a perfect moral government, is the promulgated will of the moral governor, as a decisive rule of action to his subjects, requiring benevolence on their part as the best kind of action, and as the sum of obedience, forbidding selfishness on their part as the worst kind of action and the sum of disobedience, expressing his preference of the action required to its opposite all things considered, his satisfaction with obedience and with nothing but obedience on the part of subjects, and his highest approbation of obedience and highest disapprobation of disobedience; and including the appropriate sanctions of the moral governor's authority.

This definition of the law of a perfect moral government, I shall attempt to support in the following particular propositions:

 

1. The law of a perfect moral government is the promulgated will of the moral governor as a decisive rule of action to his subjects. The will of the moral governor must be promulgated, that it may be known by the subject, since there can be no obligation on the part of the latter to obey the will of the former, if it cannot be known. At the same time, the will of the lawgiver being clearly promulgated, ignorance of the law becomes voluntary, and can be no excuse for disobedience. This will must be promulgated as a decisive rule of action to subjects. Beings who have the prerogative of deciding the question of duty for themselves irrespectively of the decision or will of another, are not under law to another. A rule of action propounded to others for consideration, leaving the question of duty wholly to their judgment of the nature and tendency of action, is not a law. Law differs widely from wholesome counsel or good advice; and one of its essential characteristics is, that it is a rule of action, determining what ought to be done. Without this conception of a rule of action, that of law cannot be formed. Law, therefore, instead of leaving the question of duty to the judgment of its subjects, to be founded on other evidence, is an authoritative decision of the question, from which there is no appeal.

This conception of law is founded in the truth of things. The right to command which imposes an obligation to obey, results from competence and disposition to give and maintain the best law. When a rightful sovereign therefore, in the form of promulgated law decides what the subject ought to do, the right of the subject to rejudge the decision, or to decide for himself, is wholly superseded. Whatever other rights real or imaginary, the subject may be supposed to possess in other circumstances, as a subject of law, he can possess none which is inconsistent with this right of the sovereign. The right to rule vests in him, because its exercise by him is necessary to the general good. As the subject then, can possess no right inconsistent with the general good, so he can possess none inconsistent with that right of the sovereign, which is demanded by the general good. He cannot therefore even raise the question of duty, without usurping a right which he has not--nay more, without invading a right which pertains exclusively to the sovereign -- one of the most sacred and inviolable of all rights, the right of deciding that action or conduct of subjects on which the highest well-being of each and of all depends. To suppose otherwise, is to divest the law of a rightful sovereign of its peculiar and essential characteristic as a rule of action, and to degrade it to the level of mere advice. It is to commit the question of what ought to be done by the subject, to the incompetent judgment and self-will of one who is bound to conform his decision to that of unerring wisdom and goodness. It is to suppose, that the subject of the best law is not bound to obey it, but has a right to disobey it, and to make war on the general good. Law then, the law of a perfect moral government, decides--settles the question of duty on the part of its subjects, by superseding absolutely and wholly the right of decision on their part.

 

2. The law of a perfect moral government must require benevolence as the best kind of action, and forbid selfishness as the worst kind of action on the part of moral beings,

 

The general proposition, that benevolence is the best kind of action, and selfishness the worst kind of action conceivable on the part of moral beings, can scarcely be supposed to need the support of formal argument. In this general view of the two kinds of action however, the mind, we think, but imperfectly appreciates the intrinsic worth of the one as moral worth, and the intrinsic evil of the other as moral evil. A thorough and successful analysis of the essential elements which constitute the one the best, and the other the worst kind of action on the part of moral beings, will, I think, greatly serve to heighten our estimate of the moral worth, excellence, and rectitude of the one, and of the moral evil, pravity, and turpitude of the other, and thus reveal more distinctly to our admiration the attractive lineaments and clustering beauties of the one, and to our abhorrence the repulsive aspect and manifold deformities of the other.

 

It is proposed then, for the purpose of showing that a perfect moral government must require benevolence, and forbid selfishness on the part of its subjects, to show, by unfolding some of the essential elements of these only two kinds of moral action, that the one is the best and the other the worst kind of action conceivable on the part of a moral being, inasmuch as one is perfectly or in the highest degree fitted to prevent the highest misery, and to produce the highest wellbeing of all other sentient beings, and of the agent himself; and the other is perfectly or in the highest degree fitted to prevent the highest well-being, and to produce the highest misery of all other sentient beings, and of the agent himself.

I propose to consider these different acts of a moral being:

(1.) As they are related to other sentient beings than the agent; and,

(2.) As they are related to the agent himself.

Let us, then, contemplate these acts --

(1.) As they are related to other sentient beings than the agent.

I here remark --

In the first place, that each of these acts is a supreme affection; in other words, it is an elective preference of its object as supreme. By this, I mean to distinguish each of these, acts, not only from the other characteristics above specified, and from all involuntary or constitutional preferences, but even from all subordinate and executive preferences which are voluntary or elective.

Benevolence then, as the act of a moral being is an elective preference of the highest well-being of all other sentient beings as his supreme object. Selfishness, as the act of a moral being, is an elective preference of the world, as his supreme object. To explain further, every elective preference of an object as supreme, is a choice between those objects and those only which can come into competition as objects of election or choice, and also a preference of every object which is implied in or necessary to the existence of the supreme object. Now, with the object of the benevolent preference, viz., the highest good of all other sentient beings, the highest good of the agent can never come into competition as an object of election or choice, for the highest well-being of the agent depends on the highest well-being, or rather on his choice of the highest well-being of all other beings. But with the exception of his own highest well-being, and with what is necessary to or involved in it (e.g., his own virtue which cannot be an object of choice ,) every other good to the agent, including the non-existence of evil in many forms, even all worldly good can come into competition with the highest well-being of all other beings as an object of preference. The benevolent preference then, is not, and cannot be a preference to the highest well-being of all other beings, to the agent's own highest well-being, nor of his own highest well-being to the highest well-being of all other beings. It is a preference of the highest well-being of all other beings, to all other good, including the non-existence of all evil, which can come into competition with their highest well-being as an object of choice. In this preference therefore, the agent prefers the highest well-being of all other beings to any and every good, including the non-existence of all evil, which can be preferred by him to their highest well-being. It is, of course, not indeed an uninterested, but a disinterested affection, it being its true nature and tendency as a benevolent preference, to sacrifice all good, and to submit to and incur all evil, on his part, which can be necessary to secure the highest well-being of all other beings. Nor does it stop here. A moral being, in preferring the highest well-being of all other sentient beings as his supreme object, prefers every thing to its opposite, which is necessary to or implied in the existence of this object of his preference. Particularly he prefers to its opposite, every thing in their condition and circumstances which is necessary to the existence of this object, especially the perfect virtue of all other moral beings, as the known necessary means of their highest well-being. He also prefers to their opposites, the non-existence of the highest misery, and of all misery or unhappiness on the part of all others, with the non-existence of all causes and means of these evils; especially he thus prefers the non-existence of the vice or wickedness of all other moral beings, as the cause or means of their highest misery. Thus we see the perfect adaptation of benevolence, considered as an elective preference of the highest well-being of all other beings as supreme, to secure this object, unclogged by any regard of the agent to his own highest well-being, and to any less happiness on his part, and involving a preference to its opposite of every thing else which can be necessary to, or implied in the existence of the object of his preference, the highest well-being of all other sentient beings.

 

We shall now see, that from the nature of selfishness as an elective preference of its object as supreme, the facts are far otherwise. With the object of the selfish preference, viz., the world, as the supreme object, the highest well-being of the agent, the highest well-being of all other sentient beings, and the non-existence of the highest misery of all such beings, are necessarily in competition as objects of choice. The agent in preferring the world as his supreme object, necessarily prefers the non-existence of his own highest well-being to the non-existence of the highest well-being, and the existence of the highest misery of all other sentient beings, to the absence or non-existence of the object of his selfish preference. Nor is this all. A moral being in preferring the world as his supreme object, necessarily prefers every thin, else to its opposite, which can be necessary to, or implied in the attainment of his supreme object. He therefore prefers to its opposite every thing in the condition and circumstances of all other sentient beings, which can be necessary to the attainment of his object; particularly the non-existence of the perfect virtue, and the existence of the perfect vice or wickedness of all other moral beings, together with the non-existence of all other causes or means of their happiness, and the existence of all other causes or means of their unhappiness or misery, to the absence, or non-existence of his supreme object. It is of course the true tendency of the selfish preference on the part of a moral being, to destroy all good--all happiness and the means of it, and to produce all evil--all misery and the means of it --on the part of all other sentient beings, which may be necessary to secure the object of the preference.

 

This view of selfishness as a principle of action on the part of a moral being, is abundantly recognized in the language of common life, particularly in that of the Scriptures. (Vid. JAS. iv. 4.) It places its object--the world--above every other object in its affections; and will therefore destroy the highest good and produce the highest misery of all other beings, if necessary to the accomplishment of its object. Though it may not always reveal itself in the form of malice or hate, still it lives and acts in the mind with constant and reckless neglect and contempt, and therefore with practical opposition and hostility to all other good than its own object. It is, of course, as a principle of action, nothing but a principle of malevolence, in the only true and essential form of malevolence. Such is it in its essential nature; nor is it less odious and destructive because, though it assume not the mere terrific form of infuriate malice or hate in its overt doings, it carries on its work with heartless indifference and open scorn for the highest good, and the highest misery of all other beings.

 

Thus, each of these two kinds of moral action--benevolence and selfishness--considered simply as an elective preference of its object as supreme, places that object in choice, in affection and in purpose, above every other object, which call come into competition with it as an object to be sought. It involves, of course, an unqualified determinations full purpose of heart to sacrifice any good, the sacrifice of which, and to produce any evil, the production of which, may be necessary for the accomplishment of its object. At the same time, no state of mind on the part of a moral being is of such sure and infallible tendency as a cause, to go out into the full production of its effect, as the elective preference of an object as supreme. Nor does a moral being aim at or seek any object as supreme, except in either the benevolent or the selfish preference. All other acts of will, on the part of such a being fix on their objects in subservience to the accomplishment of his supreme object; and therefore terminate in these objects. It is only in the elective preference of an object as supreme, that a moral being so fixes his will upon, and so directs his affections to that object--so concentrates thought, and desire, and feeling upon it, as to be unqualifiedly willing--even fully determined, to sacrifice any and every good, and to incur any and every evil which may be necessary to the attainment of that object. But this he does in each elective preference of an object as supreme, Benevolence then, as an elective preference of its object as supreme, is in one respect the action and the only action of a moral being, which is perfectly fitted to prevent the highest misery, and in its stead, to produce the highest well-being of all other sentient beings; and selfishness, as an elective preference of its object as supreme, is, in one respect, the action and the only action of a moral being, which is perfectly fitted to prevent the highest well-being, and to produce the highest misery of all other sentient beings. Benevolence, then, as an elective act, and as related to other beings, is the best kind of action in this respect, and selfishness as an elective act, and as related to other beings, is in this respect, the worst kind of action conceivable on the part of a moral being.

 

I remark --

 

In the second place; that each of these moral acts is an intelligent preference of its object as supreme. By this, I mean, that in each of these elective preferences, the mind acts with an intellectual apprehension of the objects of its choice. In either case, the will and the affections are fixed on an object as supreme, not with ignorance, but with knowledge; not amid the darkness of error, but under the light of truth. The agent, whether he acts for weal or for woe, knows what he is doing. He has apprehended the two great objects of moral choice, their nature, relations and tendencies. All that knowledge or truth can do, is done. He knows the object at which he aims, in distinction from that at which he does not aim. The end at which he aims--the end to be accomplished, is clearly to be distinguished from the end not to be accomplished; and is ever held in distinct vision before him. Thus every conceivable security is furnished, that his supreme object will never be mistaken; that his supreme object, or any thing involved in or necessary to its existence, will not be forgotten or lost sight of; nor in any way neglected by being unthought of or out of mind; nor that the opposite object will be sought in its stead. What higher or more invaluable security than this, can be given, that the benevolent preference will act for, and thus accomplish its object--and what higher or more fearful security than this, that the selfish preference will act for, and thus secure its object? How salutary and excellent the intellectual element in the one; how destructive and fatal the same element in the other! And further--by this intellectual element -- this adequate, and constant, and sure apprehension of the object of the preference, the mind is prepared to decide at once, to a vast extent, with its prior knowledge of subordinate, executive actions, the fitness of such action to promote or to defeat its supreme object. How is this decision, in a vast majority of cases, made with the quickness of instinct; and on this account, is the fitness of the benevolent preference to good, and the fitness of the selfish preference to evil, increased! Thus it may be said, that all that is valuable in being wise to do good, is combined in the one, and all that is destructive in being wise to do evil, is combined in the other, as each is an intelligent preference. Indeed, were it not so, the mind could have no supreme object or end. It would have no steady aim, and could be guided by nothing. It would be like a ship in the darkest tempest, without helm or compass; while this constant intellectual apprehension and aim clears away every cloud, lights up the star of direction, and like, the unerring needle, ascertains and guides the course. Being thus an intelligent act -- combining the perfect employment of the intellect for its own purpose, how is the fitness of each moral preference to secure its object, perfected in another respect? It is the benignant tendency and fitness of the benevolent preference, active with unqualified and unerring aim for its object in the light of truth; and it is the malignant tendency and fitness of the selfish preference, active with unqualified and unerring aim for its object, under the same light. One is the act of a moral being, with the knowledge of good and evil, aiming to prevent misery, even the highest misery and to produce the highest good of all other beings; the other is the act of a moral being with the knowledge of good and evil, aiming to destroy the highest good, and to produce the highest misery of all other beings! As intelligent action then, benevolence, in another respect, is the best kind of action, and selfishness the worst kind of action conceivable on the part of a moral being.

 

I remark --

 

In the third place, that each of the elective preferences under consideration, is a morally free action. A moral being has power to make either of these preferences in the circumstances in which he acts, instead of the other; and is also under an absolute necessity of making the one or the other. By making one therefore, he prevents the other in the only possible way of preventing it. Now each of these elective preferences has its peculiar tendency--the one its beneficial tendency, the other its destructive tendency--considered simply as an elective preference of its object as supreme; and so it would be, though the actual opposite of each preference were nothing more than its own non-existence. But the actual opposite of each is not its own non-existence. A morally free being is not merely Under the necessity of making one of these preferences or not making it, that is, of making one or making no preference. If he does not make the one, he does and must make the other. Make which he may, he does more than make it--he prevents the opposite preference, which otherwise must be made. Moral agency must serve one of two masters, when by serving one his designs are accomplished, while the same service, preventing all service to the other, defeats his designs.

 

In this view, free agency is the grand, not to say the most momentous element in the nature of a moral being, as related to the happiness and misery of other beings. By giving existence to one positive cause, whether of immense good or immense evil to them--to one of which such a being must give existence--he prevents the other. If a free moral agent makes the benevolent preference, he not only gives existence to a positive cause of immense good to all other beings, but in so doing he prevents the selfish preference in its stead, and so prevents a positive cause fitted to destroy all happiness, and to produce the highest misery of all other beings. If such a being makes the selfish preference, he not only gives existence to a cause of immense evil to other beings, but in so doing he prevents the benevolent preference in its stead, and so prevents a cause fitted to prevent all misery, and to produce the highest well-being of all other beings.

 

We are familiar with the precept, "Cease to do evil, and learn to do well." Now, were a moral being merely to cease to do evil, the simple act of ceasing from another action so fitted to destroy happiness, and to produce misery, would possess high worth and excellence. In like manner, great pravity and turpitude would pertain to the simple act of ceasing to do well. But, acting morally, he can no more cease to do evil, without doing well, than darkness can cease without light; and he can no more cease to do well, without doing evil, than light can cease without darkness. There is for a moral being, no neutral ground to stand on. A moral being must be good, or he must be wicked. He must be for the greatest good, or against it. He must be benevolent or he must be selfish. Such is the nature of free moral agency, that he must prevent himself from being the one by being the other; that by becoming in principle an angel of mercy, he must prevent himself from becoming in principle a demon in malignity; and by becoming in principle a demon of malignity, he must prevent himself from becoming in principle an angel of mercy. In this respect then, what worth and excellence in the one kind of action, what pravity and turpitude in the other! Benevolence, on the part of a moral being, prevents selfishness, with all its fitness to cause ruin and wretchedness and woe to all other beings. Selfishness, on the part of a moral being, prevents benevolence, with its fitness to prevent the highest misery, and to secure the highest good of all other beings. What else than benevolence can prevent a cause of so much evil? What else than selfishness can prevent a cause of so much good? As morally free action then, viewed as related in this respect to the happiness and misery of other beings, benevolence is the best kind of action, and selfishness is the worst kind of action conceivable on the part of a moral being.

 

I remark --

 

In the fourth place, that each of the elective preferences of which 1. speak, is a permanent state of mind. By this I do not mean that it is immutable, nor that it never changes; but that it remains in all practical doings. Indeed, when once formed, it never changes, nor can change, unless the mind changes de novo between the two great objects of moral choice. This the mind is exceedingly unapt to do, chiefly because the preference of an object as supreme, has a peculiar tendency to perpetuate itself, by confining thought and feeling to its object, and engrossing the whole mind with it. It thus strengthens feeling, and strengthens itself, and becomes permanent, so far as it can be, with a physical possibility and yet with the lowest probability of change. It is with these qualifications to be viewed as an abiding or fixes, as opposed to a fitful or fluctuating state of mind. As soon as it exists, and without use or custom, it is a supreme affection fixed on its object as the chief good--as the portion of the soul and is thus in its very beginning what philosophers have called it--a habit of the mind--in one form of it, the ____ __________ of Pythagoras, or "the habit of what ought to be." It is formed to be permanent--to be engrossed with and ever intent on its object--to be ever present in the mind in relation to its object, that its object may never be disregarded, nor fail to be attained for want of constancy or fixedness of affection. Here then, in the permanency of the supreme elective preference of a moral being, we have another element of its fitness to secure its object. Without this element or characteristic, there could be no such thing as moral character, the most momentous fact in respect to moral beings, nor any manifestations of character in practical doings--none, of course, in its results of good and evil. All, in principle, would be unfixed, fitful, and fluctuating--at most an incessant series of transitions from one Supreme affection or elective preference to the other. Neither would abide long enough to produce results. An essential element of moral character, whether good or bad, would be utterly wanting, because an essential element of fitness to either good or bad results would be utterly wanting. A constant fluctuation, as opposed to permanency in these preferences, would render that which has the highest conceivable worth utterly worthless, and that which is in the highest conceivable degree injurious, utterly harmless. The absolute nature of each might remain the same; but neither having a relative nature, or sustaining any relation to any being or thing, could be either useful or injurious, either good or evil, either right or wrong. Whatever be supposed in opposition to permanence in these preferences, so far as it is supposed, it annihilates all the good of the one, and all the evil of the other; for so far it annihilates its existence, while with the element of permanence in each, there is the continuance of all that is good, useful or right, in the one, and all that is evil, injurious or wrong, in the other. How then, is the peculiar and exclusive fitness of the benevolent preference to prevent the highest misery, and to promote the highest good of all other sentient beings perfected by its permanency in the mind of the agent? How, by the same element of the selfish preference, is disclosed its peculiar and exclusive fitness to destroy the highest good, and to produce the highest misery of all other beings? Who does not see in the permanency of the benevolent principle a signal worth and excellence to approve and admire; and in the same characteristic of the selfish principle, a signal deformity and odiousness to disapprove and abhor? The benevolent preference once formed by a moral being partakes as it were of his own immortality, and still lives and still acts to carry out its own blessed issues forever. The selfish preference formed by the same being, alike ceaseless in its activity and duration, remains to accomplish its results in wretchedness and woe forever. Who shall measure the worth of _permanence in the one, and the fearfulness of permanence in the other? The one, like the principle of self-preservation, which every moment guards and perpetuates life and its blessings, is ever present to guard and promote the highest well-being of a sentient universe; the other, alike permanent and effective, is ever present to devastate and make wretched that universe. As permanent action then, and viewed in relation to the happiness and misery of all other beings, benevolence is the best kind of action, and selfishness is the worst kind of action conceivable on the part of a moral being.

 

I remark --

 

In the fifth place, that each of the elective preferences under consideration, is a predominant act or state of the mind. I call it predominant, as it controls and directs all other action of the being in subservience to the accomplishment of its end or object. Fixed on its object or end as supreme, its direct and peculiar tendency is, whether the object be good or bad, to employ every power of the agent in subordinate action for the accomplishment of its object. It brings into requisition the whole inner and outer man, the intellect, susceptibility, will, and heart, in all the various forms of thought, feeling, affection, volition, with all the powers, of executive action, and all in subservience to the supreme object. The labors, the toils, and the hardships of self-denial in one case, are made easy and light by a willing mind and a ready hand, while in the other, to invade and destroy the rights, the peace, the happiness of others, is a work of alacrity and exultation. Thus an apostle suffers the loss of all things, and the hero desolates kingdoms; and each is a cheerful martyr to his cause. Thus the supreme preference, in its true tendency, takes absolute dominion in the soul, and reigns with controlling sway over the entire productive energy of the agent.

While such is the peculiar and exclusive characteristic of the benevolent and selfish preference, every moral being is doomed by a necessity of nature, to place himself under the absolute dominion and control of the one or the other of these preferences. It is an ordinance of his very being, that he cannot serve both these masters, and must serve one. The preference of one of the only two objects of moral choice, excludes the other from all thought except to oppose and resist it, and therefore shuts off all controlling influence from it as an object to be attained, as it were by its utter annihilation, and so consecrates his whole being to the attainment of the supreme object. He thinks, he feels, he wills, he acts; he lives, or as the case may be, he dies for it. Such is the nature--such the tendency of each of the two great moral principles or preferences of a moral being, as a predominant principle. What now is it, as the benevolent--what as the selfish principle in its relation to the happiness and misery of other beings? What is it in a being, whose exaltation in the scale of being likens him to his Maker, in the nature and greatness of powers to produce results in happiness and misery? What is it for a being, like an archangel strong--strong in intellect, in emotion, in will, in executive power, to be under the constant and entire dominion of perfect benevolence; or what instead, to be under the constant and absolute dominion of unqualified selfishness! In the one ease, what--high devisings and plans of wisdom, what desires and affections of heart absorbed and glowing with their object--what intensity and strength of firm resolve, what ceaseless activity of all productive energies, devoted to the prevention of the highest misery and the production of the highest well-being of all! In the other case, what a like devotion of the same exalted powers, to the destruction of the highest well-being, and the production of the highest misery of all! Look now on the actual results as real, and learn the benignant dominion of benevolence--the terrific dominion of selfishness. Survey the broad field of eternity, cheered, and brightened, and blessed with the fruits and harvests of the joyous activities of reigning benevolence; and then, the same field made desolate, and dark, and dead in the woes of reigning selfishness. See in the one principle the brightest image of that infinite uncreated excellence, that makes heaven; see in the other the very spirit that would convert all into the dark world of hell. Measure now, in relation to other beings, the perfect fitness of the one to good, and the perfect fitness of the other to evil, as the predominant and reigning principle of a moral being. What so manifest in the form of absolute knowledge, as that benevolence is the best, and selfishness the worst kind of action which, on the part of such beings can be conceived.

 

I now proceed, as I proposed, to consider --

 

(2.) As they are related to the agent himself.

 

The nature of benevolence, and of selfishness, as the one is related to the happiness, and the other to the misery of the agent.

 

My design is to show, that benevolence on the part of a moral being is perfectly fitted to give him the highest happiness of which he is capable from action; and that selfishness is perfectly fitted to give him the highest misery of which he is capable from action.

 

These things will appear, if we consider some of the essential characteristics of each of these kinds of action.

 

In the first place; benevolence on the part of a moral being is perfectly fitted to secure to him the highest happiness, and selfishness the highest misery, of which he is capable from the objects of action. By the object of action I mean all that which a moral being in the elective preference of his supreme object, may be truly said to will or choose, that is, the object itself and the necessary means of obtaining it. With this explanation of the object of action in view, I proceed to show that --

 

Benevolence on the part of a moral being is perfectly fitted to secure to him the highest happiness of which he is capable from any object of action. This may be shown thus: there is no conceivable object of action from which a moral being is capable of deriving so much happiness, as from the highest happiness of all other beings, including what is necessarily involved in the existence of this object of preference, particularly the non-existence of the highest misery of all other sentient beings, and the perfect virtue of all other moral beings. But benevolence is the action and the only action on the part of a moral being, which is perfectly fitted to secure this object or end of action. Benevolence therefore is the action and only action on the part of a moral being, which is perfectly fitted to secure to him the highest happiness of which he is capable from any object of action. Now the necessary and perfect means of a good end, has all the worth or value of the end itself. Benevolence then, on the part, of a moral being, as the necessary and perfect means of the highest well-being of all other beings, and as such the necessary and perfect means of the highest happiness to himself, of which he is capable from any object of action, has all the worth or value to him of his highest happiness from any object of action. No equal worth or value to a moral being can be conceived to pertain to any other action, on account of its relation to the object of action. Or thus: while action on the part of a moral being, which would have no object of worth or value to him, could itself have no worth or value to him, the worth or value of action on the part of such a being to him is at least equal to the worth or value to him of its object; and the worth or value to him of its object, is equal to the worth or value of the happiness of which he is capable from the object of action. In the present case, the action is benevolence; and the happiness of which the agent is capable from the object or end of the action, is the highest of which he is capable from any object or end of action. Benevolence therefore, has to him a worth or excellence equal to that of the highest happiness which he can derive from any object or end of action, and has, of course, the highest worth or value to him, compared with any action conceivable on his part, in relation to the object or end of action.

 

The same thing will appear, if we consider more particularly the import of the word good, or what it is that constitutes worth, value, excellence. The goodness, or the worth, or the value, or the excellence of a thing, is not the absolute nature, but the relative nature of that of which it is the predicate; or, more particularly, it is the real nature of that of which it is predicated, as related to sentient being. Even happiness itself is not good, or has no worth or value, except as related to a sentient being who can enjoy it. Were there no being capable of happiness, and could there in the nature of things be no such being, nothing could be good, nothing could possess worth, value, or excellence; for there could be neither happiness, nor the means of happiness, nor yet even the idea or notion of either. Nothing is good but happiness and the means of happiness, including the absence of misery and the means of its absence. Were every thing as it is--were God and his vast creation as they are, with the single exception of all capacity of happiness and all possibility of such capacity all would be utterly worthless. All the worth or value of man or of any other moral being, consists in his capacity of happiness and of that self-active nature which qualifies him to produce happiness to other beings and to himself. All the worth, or value, or goodness, or excellence, which pertains to action on the part of a moral being, is its fitness or adaptation to produce these results. The best kind of action, therefore, on his part, is that which is exclusively and perfectly fitted to produce the highest happiness of others, and his own highest happiness. This kind of action in its relation to the happiness of others, and its relation at least in one respect, to the happiness; of the agent himself, is benevolence or benevolent action. This kind of action is good, not simply as it is perfectly fitted to produce the highest happiness of all other beings, but also as by being thus fitted to produce the highest happiness of all other beings, it is perfectly fitted to produce the highest happiness of the agent, of which he is capable from any object or end of action. Its being perfectly fitted to produce the highest happiness of all other beings, constitutes its worth or value to them, and it is the same fitness on which the highest happiness of the agent in the case depends, and which constitutes, in one respect, the worth or value of the action to him; for his highest happiness, so far as it depends on the objects of action, depends on the object of this action, and so depends on the action itself, as exclusively and perfectly fitted to produce the object on which the highest happiness to himself, of which he is capable from any object of action, depends. While therefore, in the manner explained, the worth or value of the action to the agent himself, in one respect, essentially depends on or consists in the relation of the action to the highest happiness of all other beings, it also depends on the relation of the action to his own happiness. Were the agent wholly unsusceptible to happiness from the happiness of others, and as, therefore, he must be wholly indifferent to their happiness, he must be wholly indifferent to benevolence on his own part as the means of their happiness. Benevolence in such a case could possess no worth or value to him, either directly or indirectly. But being capable of higher happiness from the highest happiness of all other beings than from any other object of action, and benevolence being the only action perfectly fitted to secure the highest happiness of all other beings, it is perfectly fitted to secure to him the highest happiness of which he is capable from any object of action; and of course, the highest happiness of which he is capable from any action on account of its relation to the object of action.

 

And now, what is the worth or value of this kind of action on the part of a moral being to himself? It is not identical with the worth to him of the highest happiness of all other beings, or with the worth to him of his own happiness from their happiness. But the worth of the action to him is equal to the worth to him of either the highest happiness of all other beings, or of his own happiness from their highest happiness. The worth to him of the highest happiness of all other beings, is its fitness to give him the highest happiness of which he is capable from any object of action; and the worth to him of benevolent action is its perfect and exclusive fitness to produce the highest happiness of all other beings, and herein its perfect fitness to secure to him the highest happiness of which he is capable from any object of action.

 

Nor is it necessary to the worth or value of benevolence on the part of a moral being, that the highest happiness of all other beings, or that his own happiness as the direct effect of this object actually exist; for the action has the same nature the same fitness to produce these results, whether they are actually produced or not. Nor in estimating the worth of benevolence to the agent are we to view him as under the controlling dominion of the selfish principle, when his susceptibilities to the happiness of others, and to his own happiness from it are rendered dormant and dead by the influence of that principle. But we are to view the mind in the perfect exercise of its powers, especially when its susceptibilities to happiness, in the full play of their perfect activity, give their perfect results. To appreciate then, the worth or value of benevolence on the part of a moral being to himself, we must measure the worth or value of that happiness which such a being in the perfect use of his high powers and capacities, would derive from the non-existence of the highest misery, and the existence of the highest happiness of all other beings, as the actual and true product of his own action. What a source of happiness to a moral being were such an object. What but comparative insignificance and vanity were happiness from the only other object of action--the world--on the part of such a being. What other action on his part can afford him such happiness from the object of action, and possess in this respect such worth or value to him as that which should prevent the highest misery, and produce the highest blessedness of God and of his sentient creation. What worth, what excellence, would such a scene of moral beauty and magnificence, with all its blessedness, give to the action which was its true and proper cause.

 

I now proceed to say, that --

 

Selfishness on the part of a moral being is perfectly fitted to secure to him the highest misery of which he is capable from any object or end of action. There is no conceivable object or end of action on the part of a moral being, from which he is capable of deriving so much misery, as from the highest misery of all other beings, including what is necessarily involved in the object of his preference; particularly, the non-existence of the highest happiness of all other beings, and the perfect vice or wickedness of all other moral beings. Selfishness, as we have seen, is the action and the only action of a moral being, which is perfectly fitted to secure this object, or this result of action, to other beings. Selfishness therefore is the action, and the only action on his part, which is perfectly fitted to secure to him the highest misery of which he is capable from any object or end of action. Now the necessary and perfect means of a bad end, is as bad--as evil--as is the end itself, to the being whose end it is. Selfishness then, on the part of a moral being, as the only and perfect means of the highest misery of all other beings, with all that is involved in this evil, and as such a means, the only and perfect means of the highest misery of which he is capable from any object or end of action, is as great an evil to him, as is the object or end itself, or as is his own highest misery from any object or end of action.

 

The remarks already made respecting the word good, mutatis mutandis, apply to the word evil. The word evil, like the word good, is a relative term; that is, it denotes the nature of that of which it is a predicate, as related to sentient being. Even misery or suffering is evil only as related to a sentient being, who can experience or feel it. Nothing is evil but misery or suffering, and the means of it, including the absence of happiness and the means of its absence. All the evil which pertains to action on the part of a moral being, is its fitness or adaptation to produce misery or suffering, to other beings and to himself. The worst kind of action therefore on the part of a moral being, is that which is exclusively and perfectly fitted to produce the highest misery of all other beings, and bis own highest misery. This kind of action in its relation to the misery of others, and in its relation at least in one respect to the misery of the agent himself, is selfishness. This kind of action is evil, not simply as it is perfectly fitted to produce the highest misery of all other beings, but also, as being on account of this very fitness, or in this very fitness, perfectly fitted to produce the highest misery of the agent, of which he is capable from any object or end of action. While therefore the evil nature of the action as an evil to the agent, depends on its relation to the highest misery of others, it also depends on the relation of the action to himself. Were the agent entirely unsusceptible to misery from the misery of others, and therefore necessarily entirely indifferent to their misery, he must also be utterly indifferent to selfishness on his own part as the means of their misery. Selfishness on his part, in such a case, could be no evil to him. It is obvious then, that one essential element of the evil of selfishness to the agent, is its perfect fitness to produce the highest misery of all other beings, and in this respect, or on this very account, its perfect fitness to give him the highest misery of which he is capable from any object or end of action; and of course the highest misery of which he is capable from any action, on account of its relation to the object or end of action.

 

The evil of this kind of action to the agent is equal either to the evil to him of the highest misery of all other beings, or to the evil to him of his own misery from their highest misery. Nor is it necessary to the intrinsic evil of the action, that the actual results in misery to others or to himself actually exist. But to appreciate the evil to himself of selfishness on the part of a moral being, we must measure the evil of that misery which such a being in the perfect unperverted action of his powers and capacities, would derive from the non-existence of the highest happiness, and the existence of the highest misery of all other beings, as the actual product of his own action. What a source of misery to such a being, were such an object or end of action fully accomplished! What other action on his part can bring to him so much misery from the object of action, and in this respect, be so great an evil to him, as that action which should destroy the highest blessedness of this sentient universe, and fill it with woe?

 

Thus it appears, that benevolence on the part of a moral being is perfectly fitted to secure to him the highest happiness, and selfishness, the highest misery, of which he is capable from the objects or ends of action. Benevolence then, as related in this respect to the agent's own happiness, is to him the best kind of action, and selfishness as related in this respect to the misery of the agent, is to him the worst kind of action.

 

I remark --

 

In the second place; that benevolence on the part of a moral being is perfectly fitted to afford him the highest happiness, and selfishness, the highest misery, of which he is capable from any action, as each is intelligent action. This characteristic or element of the two kinds of action in its relation to the happiness and misery of all other beings than the agent, we have already considered. We now contemplate it in its relation to the happiness and misery of the agent himself. Next in degree to that happiness or that misery of which the mind is capable from the action of the will and the heart, are that happiness and that misery of which it is capable from the action of the intellect in the form of knowledge. This happiness and this misery on the part of a moral being, depend on what is known, or on the objects of knowledge, and the use made of it. Now a moral being, in all moral action, whether be acts for good or for evil, for weal or for woe, acts intelligently. Whatever he does--whatever object he aims at, whatever results he produces, he acts not in ignorance, not under mistake, not With doubt, but with knowledge. The two great objects or ends of all moral action are known--known in their nature, known in their difference, known in all their vastness, as the highest happiness, and the highest misery of all sentient being. The will, the heart, the entire susceptibility, and productive energy the whole man, acts not in the darkness of ignorance or error, but in the light of truth. In respect to the most momentous agency in the universe of causes, moral action, he knows what is true, what is false, what is good, what is evil, according to the eternal and immutable nature of things. Act as he may, he acts with a just and adequate view and comprehension of all that need be known, that the great end of all being--of all existence may be accomplished or be defeated. And now what is such knowledge to such a being--what, if he acts morally right; what, if he acts morally wrong. Knowledge, how delightful, joyous, in the one case--how exquisitely painful in the other! How diverse these acts, with the same results, done in the darkness and blind stupidity of mere physical agencies or causes! This perfect knowledge with right moral action--such knowledge rightly used, applied, employed for its true end, we see at once is the light of life to the soul. The knowledge of all that can bless and of all that can curse a sentient universe knowledge of all that ought to be and ought not to be, with knowledge, that all on his part which ought to be is--such knowledge is the constant associate of perfect benevolence in a moral being--in its absolute certainty, its clear and cloudless effulgence, enlightening, directing, quickening all his spiritual activities to their true result in the perfect blessedness of all who shall value its objects, who shall measure its extent, who unfold its perfection, who utter its joys! A moral being, perfect, immortal, ever living, ever acting under the approving eye of Omniscience, and "seeing as he is seen, and knowing as he is known!"

 

What now, is such knowledge to a moral being of the opposite character? Knowledge consciously, deliberately, and willful resisted, hated, perverted--knowledge, while it excludes all ignorance that might palliate guilt or mitigate its pangs, reveals the full measure of both. Knowledge, when ignorance were bliss--light a thousand-fold more terrific than deepest darkness--light revealing a moral being to himself in the work of destroying all good, and producing all evil! What degradation in rank, what perversion of faculties, what frustration of the high end of his being, what ruin to others, what self-ruin--himself knowing all, and yet doing all-living, acting amid the wreck and wretchedness of his own work, and knowing all only to be wretched in all he knows!

 

I remark --

 

In the third place, that another element of fitness in each of the two kinds of action specified, to secure its result to the agent, is that it is his own action. The same action duly contemplated by one who is not its author, would afford him as the action were good or bad, a high degree of pleasure or a high degree of pain. But how would this pleasure or pain be augmented were the action his own! The action has now a new element. It is his action. The mere fact, that that which gives us pleasure or pain is ours, and more especially that it is ours by production or authorship, is a source of a high, distinct and peculiar pleasure or pain. We value happiness, or we value natural beauty or excellence the more because it is our own; and we abhor misery, or we abhor natural deformity or worthlessness the more because it is our own. In respect to an action or work which is our own, which has high worth or excellence, the fact is more striking and obvious. Who that has read with pleasure and learned to appreciate Milton's "Paradise Lost," would not be aware of a new and peculiar pleasure, were that immortal poem the product of his own genius? In view then of an action characterized by such unparalleled worth and excellence as perfect benevolence on the part of a moral being, an action perfectly fitted to prevent the highest misery, and to produce the highest happiness of all other beings, perfectly fitted to please and bless God and his sentient creation--to say, "I have done it," must be a source of happiness, which in this respect, can have no parallel, as the effect of any or all other action conceivable. For a being capable of this happiness, to lose it, how great the loss; to secure it and perpetuate it in the perfect exercise of his exalted powers forever, what a possession for immortality!

 

On the contrary, the opposite action of a moral being, for the same reason, is in a high degree painful. It is his own action. No one can duly contemplate such action in its fearful and fell malignity, even as the act of another being, without a painful, revolting abhorrence. How then, must the painfulness of this emotion be augmented when the action is his own. The action has now another element. It is his action, and the emotion is not mere abhorrence, but it is self-abhorrence, with that oppressive painfulness which admits of no alleviation. Were it but the act of another, that would afford sensible relief. But the whole weight and burden of authorship fall on him. The destruction of the highest happiness, and the production of the highest misery forevermore, is the measure of the evil, of the turpitude of his own act. It is his act, which can never be undone; or rather, in view of its remediless result, it is his act being done forever, and therefore, with the ruin ever before him, he sees himself the continued perpetrator of this deed of death. In view of such an act--such a work, to be obliged to say, "I have done it"this is one element of that unqualified self-abhorrence which completes the misery of a moral being, on account of wrong moral action. What an inheritance were this, when apart alone, in the reflective solitude of eternity!

 

I remark --

 

In the fourth place, that another element in each kind of moral action, is that it is done with moral liberty. An intelligent agent, we may suppose, would reflect on a necessary action having the same relations to the happiness and misery of other beings as a free action, with emotions of pleasure in the one case, and of pain in the other. But how would the pleasure in the one case, and the pain in the other be heightened in view of the action, as done with power to do the opposite in its stead--done, when otherwise the opposite must be done--done, when do which he may, he does more, he avoids doing and so prevents the opposite action. What a determination then, is that of free-will in moral action! We all know how moral liberty burdens the soul with moral responsibility. If it discharge that responsibility, what joy and triumph it finds in so doing! If it violates it, how the violation remains to oppress and crush the spirit! What power of life and death to the soul, in moral liberty! Wherefore is this? It is that moral liberty, compared with what would be without it, in one case doubles the happiness, and in the other doubles the misery, of which the agent is capable from action as it is related to its objects.

 

Consider this in respect to benevolence or benevolent action. Either of two positive actions--the one with its tendency to the highest conceivable good, or the other with its tendency to the highest conceivable evil of other beings, is possible to the agent. The action in respect to the objects of action, is elective; and determines one of these great issues of action, and so prevents the other. The agent is under the absolute necessity of doing one positive action or the other positive action; and when he can do either instead of the other, does that which in its true tendency blesses all, and in so doing prevents the doing of that which in its true tendency curses all. His therefore, must be the twofold joy of this twofold achievement. And is there then no peculiar joy in avoiding and so preventing the evil in such a case? Who does not know the joy of escaping death, when life and death are placed in an even balance? And is there no peculiar joy, when right and wrong moral action with their respective tendencies and results are thus poised on moral liberty, in doing the right when otherwise the wrong would and must be done? What a deliverance from evil is thus effected, in the accomplishment of good! What a sublime power in a moral being is the will acting right, when otherwise it must act wrong I Look through heaven and earth, what other power is sublime--what other is there to admire--in what other to rejoice! Power necessitated to act with a sure result for the highest happiness or for the highest misery of all, and free to act for either instead of the other, and acting right! How is the conscious, joy of acting right heightened by the conscious and equal joy of not acting wrong--becoming the twofold joy, that of action perfectly fitted to bless, and that of avoiding action perfectly fitted to curse a sentient universe! It is the moral liberty of action, giving to the self-complacency of virtue, a signal, unsurpassed element of joy--even the twofold blessedness within, of electively preventing a bell and creating a heaven without. What other action conceivable can afford such happiness to a moral being?

 

Let us now briefly contemplate selfishness or selfish action as done in the exercise of moral liberty. Here the same element so benign in benevolent action, becomes only a fearful and deadly evil. In this kind of action there is also a twofold performance, involving a twofold issue. How great the evil, in evil done and in good prevented. The agent by his one act, spreads the broad field of sentient existence with desolation, misery and woe, not where otherwise there had been nothing, but where otherwise, by his own opposite act he had diffused life, joy and perfect blessedness to all. By his one act he has both destroyed the good and produced the evil. His therefore must be the twofold misery of this twofold deed of death. And is there no additional peculiar misery in an act, which while it produces so much evil also destroys so much good, when the agent might as well have prevented the evil and produced the good? To stand at this fountain of life or of death to all, and by one act to open the stream that shall flow forth in desolation and woe unmingled, remediless, eternal, when I might instead by another act, cause the rivers of pleasure and of the fullness of joy to flow for evermore--to do that which is thus fitted to curse, instead of that which is thus fitted to bless all sentient being--it is this, which gives to remorse one of its peculiar elements of unequaled agony. What a fearful power is free-will, acting morally wrong! Who shall measure the conscious agony of acting morally wrong enhanced by the equal agony of not acting morally right in its place! Here is no necessity to alleviate what could not be avoided but conscious freedom--conscious moral liberty, with the twofold agony of the twofold work of destroying the highest happiness, and of producing the highest misery of all other beings the twofold agony within, of preventing a heaven and of producing a hell without! What other action can give such misery to a moral being?

 

I remark --

 

In the fifth place; that another element in each kind of moral action, is that it is predominant action. Under this relation, it is what is commonly called the governing principle of the mind, inasmuch as in its true nature and tendency, it reigns over the whole man, controlling and directing all other action in subservience to the accomplishment of its object or end. We have already contemplated this relation of the two kinds of moral action to the happiness and misery of others than the agent. Nor is there perhaps any other relation under which the one more impressively reveals itself as the means of happiness, and the other of misery to the agent himself As a Predominant principle, whether the morally right or the morally wrong principle, it sways and determines all, all thought, all feeling or emotion, all desires, all volitions, all subordinate and all executive action--the whole inner and outer man. It is the grand central power, which takes under its dominion the entire productive energy of a moral being. It thus employs powers the most exalted--powers, which in comparison degrade all others--powers unparalleled for good and for evil either for the best, or for the worst conceivable results of power.

 

Contemplate then, a moral being placing benevolence on the throne, and giving it perfect dominion over himself. You see in such a being, one made to live and to act for the prevention of the highest misery, and for the production of the highest happiness of a sentient universe. Behold these canopying heavens--each world of this vast system perhaps the residence of spiritual and immortal beings like our own! Amid what amplitude and splendors of existence a moral being is destined to live and to act forever! With this destination every thing comports. You see powers and capacities fitted to this high end. You see subordinate objects, ends, motives, the laws and modes of subordinate action, and executive doings, combined to give completeness to the system. You see all worthy of the infinite attributes of their author--all stamped with and fitted for, never-ending existence. In such a being you see benevolence the reigning principle--governing, guiding, employing these high powers for these high ends--directing and consecrating all with delightful activity to the accomplishment of these results, and with the joyous anticipation of accomplishing them forever. And now to sway such a scepter--to reign over and employ such powers for such ends thus to govern and employ intelligence, and feeling, and emotions and will, and heart--the entire productive energy of an immortal spirit, and that spirit one's self--what other dominion, what other condition of being, is worthy of a desire or a thought? What sublime dignity, what moral excellence, beauty and glory, in the reigning principle itself! What absolute perfection it imparts to the whole nature of a being the greatest of all, save Him who made him! What, compared with this, are the splendors of earthly royalty, even of the monarch of a thousand empires? Compared with him, this were the apocalyptic angel, seen standing in the sun. Is there pleasure is there happiness in the possession and use of power? What higher pleasure, what higher happiness than the possession and perfect use of the powers of a moral being, guided and controlled by perfect love to their perfect issues? Particularly, under the guidance and control of such a principle, how would the intellect awake, in all its forms of action, and in the vastness of its power! How, in the delightful activity of its unimpaired vigor, would it grapple with themes worthy of its strength! How, as destined to know and to know still more forever, would it exult in its own expansion and enlargement! How would it remove the clouds and darkness, that intercept the knowledge of all that is great, and good and fair, and devoted to reasonings and contemplations which become the minds of angels, partake of their happiness, in seeing and knowing all in the sunlight of changeless truth! How also, would the dominion of such a principle extend to all the primary active principles of our nature! No dull inactivity would oppress the mind; no reluctant sloth more wearisome than the effort it dreads, would stupefy the powers. Its self-active nature would be ever awake in all its susceptibilities to objects without and objects within--to the happiness of others and its own in their beautiful coincidence--to moral rectitude in its loveliness, and to moral pravity in its turpitude--to the attractive fitness of all means to ends which are good, and to the revolting fitness of all means to ends which are evil. The desire of knowledge, the desire of excellence, the desire of power, the desire of the esteem and love of others, the desire of society--every desire, tendency and appetency of our nature of the class which seem least capable of perversion, would be in place, and active to fulfill its function and to find its own gratification. Under the reign of this principle, there would be emulation without ambition, exaltation without pride, self-approbation without vanity, distinction without envy, acquisition without avarice, temperance without austerity, economy without meanness, liberality without prodigality, and excitement without agitation. There would be no extremes either in deficiency or excess, and no violence by conflicts. How too it would subdue, regulate, and direct all those propensities, lusts, and passions which annoy, molest and make wretched; preventing internal anarchy, bringing all into peaceful subjection, imparting order and harmony in their attractive beauty, and employing all these essential elements of our nature, even those which have been counted its grand defects and blemishes, only as the instruments of our highest well-being. Instead of the storms and tempests of ungoverned appetite and passion, to darken and disturb the serenity within, the ever-present shekinah would diffuse its perpetual luster and influence.

 

Consider too, its achievements in difficulties overcome and deeds performed. Its work is to resist, to overcome, to control all obstacles and all enemies to truth, to virtue and happiness. How it corrects prejudice and willful pertinacity of opinion. with their false judgments and errors! How it welcomes truth not only in its light, but in its practical power! If error is death, what victories are these? How it overcomes the world, vanquishing every form of temptation, resisting corrupt example, repelling the seductive attractions of wealth, honor and pleasure, using the world as not abusing it, and rendering all its gifts tributary to a pilgrimage hastening to a better country. In its onward way, it is discouraged by no obstacles, stopped by no fatigue, put to flight by no terrors; but perpetuating its own strength for higher achievements by its use, it becomes stronger and stronger for its everlasting triumphs. What deeds of magnanimity it has performed, in dungeons, on scaffolds, on the rack, in the fire, to which worldly heroism furnishes no parallel--deeds that need not the acclamations of admiring men, for they are crowned with God's approbation. How too, in all the varied forms of beneficence, it sends forth the almoners of its bounty--the ministering spirits of its love! By its practical sympathies, by its supplies of want, by the prevention of evil, by the removal of suffering and the relief of sorrow, by the instruction of ignorance, the reformation of vice and the restoration to virtue, how, like our great Exemplar, it feeds the hungry, heals the sick, gives sight to the blind, binds up the brokenhearted, and raises the dead to life. It is the spirit of well-doing on angel-wings, waiting the orders of the throne, or flying on errands of mercy in their execution. How it adorns the mind with all the minor virtues of the inner man! How it meets crosses with cheerfulness, suffering with patience, trials with submission, injuries with forgiveness, wrath with meekness, persecution with prayer, rendering good for evil, and blessing for cursing, and bringing all, by these conquests, into sweet and peaceful subjection, how gracefully it sways the scepter! No jarring elements or violent changer, without interrupt "the soul's calm sunshine and heartfelt joy." In this sanctuary dwell truth and uprightness, integrity and justice, love and gratitude, kindness, good-will and mercy. Piety also is here, with its adoring reverence, and love and gratitude, with its steadfast hope in immutable goodness, its confidence reposing in everlasting strength, and its fullness of joy flowing from the fountains of eternity. This is benevolence reigning in the heart. How, under its perfect dominion, would the soul be blessed! On earth, would those sister seraphs, holiness and happiness, again dwell in every heart, and paradise be regained Like the Supreme on the throne above, summoning the angel hosts to His service, it calls forth the full and bright assemblage of all the minor virtues and graces to do its will, in blessing and in being blessed. This is the moral excellence of a moral being with its happiness--that moral excellence, whose worth, beauty, loveliness can be seen only in heaven's light, whose raptures can be expressed only in heaven's song. It is heaven itself.

 

Let us now contemplate the selfish principle enthroned in the heart of a moral being. We see every thing reversed. Under this dominion, we see the same exalted powers--powers unparalleled for good and for evil, employed for the worst conceivable results of power. The high powers of intellect, of emotions of will and heart, which qualify for action amid the scenes and grandeurs of eternity, powers and capacities which reveal the image, are stamped with the immortality, and bespeak the highest design of a creating Deity; these powers, with the productive energies and unchanging laws of executive action, are devoted to the destruction of the highest happiness, and to the production of the highest misery of a sentient universe; these powers in their uncounteracted nature and tendency--for so truth contemplates them--make sure their results. And now, what is it to the agent himself, thus to employ such powers for such ends? What is it, to establish such a dominion over himself? What a perversion of faculties, what a defeat of high destiny, what low and still lower depths of degradation, what an outrage on nature, what utter self-destruction! More particularly, how under the influence of the selfish principle the exalted power of intellect is employed! This faculty of a moral being is made to preside over and direct all his other powers. It gives to such a being the knowledge of the greatest of all truths--that to be happy, he must be good; and yet in forming and acting under the selfish principle, it governs him by the greatest of all lies--that to be happy, he must be selfish. "As a man thinketh in his heart, so is he." He who thinks right, will feel and act right; he who thinks wrong, will feel wrong and act wrong. Every impure affection, every corrupt principle, every criminal design, every wrong and vicious action, has its antecedent in thought. Thoughts grow into desires, desires ripen into resolves, and resolves terminate in execution. "Out of the heart proceed evil thoughts." What next? "Murders, adulteries, fornication, thefts, false witness, blasphemies." All begins in thought. Thoughts are the precursors of all the storms and tempests of the soul--the floodgates of all which desolates, afflicts, corrupts and ruins the immortal mind. Thus intellect, that high faculty, which so exalts a moral being above every other, by giving him all truth necessary to the highest perfection of being, gives him for his practical guidance and control only falsehood and lies. With such things to be known, and with such intelligence to know them--such treasures of wisdom and of knowledge, with such power to know them by intuition, by consciousness, by reflection, by memory, by reason and judgment, with such intelligence dwelling amid the light of truth, of life, of blessedness, and yet every right and true conviction is held in abeyance, and every practical operation of thought, of contemplation, of reasoning, gives error, falsehood and death! At the same time, this intelligence by a necessity of its own nature, must see and know its own fearful perversions and the fearful issues! Who shall measure the unhappiness, the miseries of such perversions of such a power--of the violence and outrage done to this godlike faculty? Consider now the influence of the selfish over all those primary principles of the soul, which directly lead to all subordinate emotions, desires and affections. And here its first effect is to resist, counteract, and paralyze that highest susceptibility of the mind--susceptibility to happiness from the well-being of others. This part of our nature, which is the basis of all feeling in respect to right and wrong doing, of all the affections, desires, and emotions that respect the true well-being of others and our own, is held in abeyance, or rather be numbed into inaction and torpidity.

 

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