LETTER OF
The GOSPEL TRUTH CHARLES G. FINNEY
1874
To Mark Hopkins
14 October 1874
[MS in Oberlin College Archives, in the handwriting of Rebecca Finney]
Mark Hopkins (1802-1887), President of Williams College, was an intimate friend of John Morgan of Oberlin, and had been to stay in Oberlin from time to time, when Finney will have got to know him. See, for example, The Lorain County News (Oberlin), 4 October 1865, p. 3; 4 August 1869, p.3; 25 September 1873, p. 3.
Oberlin Oct 14th 1874.
Rev. Mark Hopkins D. D.
Dear Brother, My
wife & self are just reading your
"Outline Study of Man". Wife has
just read to me, what you say
of the relation of the idea of right
to moral obligation. I see you
make the idea of right a
condition of the obligation to put
forth executive volitions.
Is not the same true of the
obligation to choose good as
the ultimate end? I under-
stand you to say that right
never enters into the ground
or ultimate reason of obligation.
With this I fully agree. But, on
perceiving the good, does not the
mind perceive the moral fitness
[page 2]
of choosing the good for its own
sake; and, upon this condition
affirm obligation to choose the
good, for its own sake? And
is not this idea of the moral
fitness of the choice, the same
as that of right, or rightness?
Again, on perceiving, or on
assuming the utility of an
executive volition, does not
the mind affirm the moral
fitness of such a volition?
and upon that condition, not
ground, affirm obligation to
put forth that volition?
And is not this idea of moral
fitness identical with that
of right, or rightness? In one
word, or, in one sentence, is
the idea of or rightness
not ^ right ^ always a condition
while good is always the ground
of obligation? And does not
[page 3]
the error of rightarians consist
in confounding a condition
with the ground of obligation;
or, rather, the mistaking the one
for the other? We are very
much interested in your book.
I see nothing thus far, from
which to dissent, unless it be
the shade of difference on this
question of the perception of
moral fitness, right, or rightness,
as always the condition of
moral obligation. Your book
is a very valuable one. But once
more, would the mind affirm
moral obligation to choose good
did it not perceive the relation
of moral fitness existing between
choice and the good, and
would it affirm obligation to
put forth a useful volition
did it not perceive the relation
[page 4]
of moral fitness or rightness,
existing between the volition
and its object. I am glad
you made the highly important
remark that a refusal to choose
the good, is itself a choice, being
the preference of something else, to
the good. A simple refusal to
choose, is not a choice, because
it has no object. But a preference
of another end, is a choice, so
that sin is not, as some say,
a negation, but a positive preference
of a less to a greater good, upon
condition of the relation of the
less good to self. We shall
probably find that you have said
this, as we read further. When we
have finished your book, I may write you again, in
the meantime should be glad to hear from you.
God Bless You, My Dear Brother. C. G. Finney
Finney had the following reply from Mark Hopkins:
Williams College Oct. 21st 1874
Rev. C. G. Finney,
My honored Friend
The point
you do me the favor to notice
was considered by me as you will
see by reference to the bottom
of the 241st page. Whether you
had read that before writing I am
not quite sure. I hesitate about
it, but on examining the processes
of my own mind it seemed to me
that when I was so placed as
to be under the necessity of choo-
sing between a higher and a
lower good, the obligation
was af to choose the higher
was affirmed immediately in
view of that good. As means,
no process, no volition is required.
The mind comes face to face with
[page 2]
that which is the ground of
obligation, and I see no need
of any intervening idea. The
good is to be chosen for its own
sake; the affirmation of obliga
tion to choose it is all that
is required for moral action
and I do not see why that af-
firmation should not be made
immediately in view of the good
itself rather than in view of
the fitness of the choice to
secure the good. You say
"moral fitness," but I do not
see how any kind of fitness can
become moral except with
reference to some end beyond
itself. I would make the good to
be the ground of the obligation, and
the condition to be an alternative
between a higher and a lower
good so presented that there
[page 3]
should be a necessity of
choosing between them.
I am surprised and much
gratified that you and Mrs. Finney
are reading my book. It is not
often that one who has investigated
those subjects so fully takes them
up again. I am particularly
pleased that you can commend
the book so fully. I thank you
for noticing the above point
as you have, and if, on consider-
ation you judge that I am
wrong, your opinion on that,
or any other point would
have great weight with me.
Trusting you may be long
spared to enlighten and quicken
others I am your friend and
brother &emdash;
Mark Hopkins
Footnotes:
Outline Study of Man; or, The Body and Mind in One System, with illustrative diagrams etc. (New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co., 1873)
MS in Finney Papers, Oberlin College Archives.
The bottom of page 241 reads:
It is indeed possible, since choice is moral action, to carry the word right, up into the region of choice as distinguished from action, and to say of the choice of a higher good made under a sense of obligation, that it is a right choice, or that it is right to choose the higher good; but here again it is right with reference to the good chosen, and can have moral quality only [p. 242] from the primary obligation based on that.