By
IN WHOM WE HAVE REDEMPTION THROUGH HIS BLOOD, THE
FORGIVENESS OF SINS, ACCORDING TO THE RICHES OF MS
GRACE.--Ephesians 1:7. HAVING, in the preceding discourse, given an answer to
the two inquiries proposed concerning the necessity, and the
ground of the necessity of the atonement of Christ, I
proceed to the third, which is, III. Are we, notwithstanding the redemption of Christ,
forgiven freely by grace? That we should be forgiven wholly
through the redemption of Christ, and yet by free grace,
hath, as I observed, appeared to many a grand inconsistency,
or a perplexing difficulty. In discoursing on this question,
I shall, 1. Mention several modes in which attempts have been made
to solve this difficulty. 2. 1 shall suggest some
considerations which may. possibly lead to the true
solution. First. I am to mention several modes, in which attempts
have been made to solve this difficulty. 1. Some allow that there is no exercise of grace in the
bare pardon or justification of the sinner: that all the
grace of the gospel consists in the gift of Christ; in
providing an atonement; in the undertaking of Christ to make
atonement, and in the actual making it. And as the pardon of
the sinner is founded on those gracious actions; so that in
a more lax sense is also said to be an act of grace. As to
this account of the matter, I have to observe, that it is
rather yielding to the objection, than answering it. It is
allowed, in this state of the matter, that the pardon of the
sinner is properly no act of grace. But this seems not to be
reconcilable with the plain declarations of Scripture; as in
our text: "In whom we have redemption through his blood, the
forgiveness of sins, according to the riches of his grace.
Being justified freely by his grace, through the redemption
that is in Jesus Christ." Rom. 3: 24. These and such Eke
passages seem plainly to import, that pardon itself is an
act of grace, and not merely that it is founded on other
acts, which are acts of grace. Besides the very idea of
pardon or forgiveness implies grace. So far only is any
crime pardoned, as it is pardoned graciously. To pardon a
crime on the footing of justice, in the proper sense of the
word justice, is a direct contradiction. Again; it is not proper to say, that the pardon of the
sinner is an act of grace, merely because it is founded on
the gracious gift of Christ, and his gracious act in making
atonement. It is not proper to say, that any act is an act
of grace, merely because it is founded on another act, which
is really an act of grace. As well we may say, that if a
creditor, by a third person, furnish his debtor with money
sufficient to discharge his debt, when the debtor has paid,
in this way, the full debt, it is an act of grace in the
creditor to give up the obligation. Whereas, who does not
see that the furnishing of the money, and the giving up of
the obligation, are two distinct acts; and however the
former is indeed an act of grace, yet the latter is no more
an act of grace, than if the money had been paid to some
other creditor, and he had given up an obligation for the
same sum. If it be an act of grace in the creditor to
deliver up an obligation, for which he hath received the
fall sum, because the money paid was originally furnished by
himself, then it would be consistent with justice in the
creditor to retain the obligation,--after he has received
the full sum for which it was given; or to reject the money,
and cast the debtor into prison, though he tenders payment.
But neither of these, I presume, will be pretended to be
just. 2. Some have attempted to relieve the difficulty now
under consideration in this manner: they say, the pardon of
the sinner is no act of grace to Christ, because he has paid
the debt for the sinner; but that it is an act of grace to
the sinner, because the debt was paid, not by the sinner
himself, but by Christ. Nor was Christ so much as delegated
by the sinner to pay his debt. Concerning this I observe, in
the first place, that if the atonement of Christ be
considered as the payment of a debt, the release of the
sinner seems not to be an act of grace, although the payment
be made by Christ, and not by the sinner personally. Suppose
any one of you, my auditors, owes a certain sum; he goes and
pays the full sum himself personally. Doubtless all will
agree, that the creditor, in this case, when he gives up the
obligation, performs a mere act of justice, in which there
is no grace at all. But in what respect would there have
been more grace in giving up the obligation, if the money
had been sent by a servant, by a friend, or by a third
person? Here I am sensible an objection will arise to this
effect: but we did not send the payment of our debt to God,
by the hand of Christ as our friend; we did not delegate him
to make atonement for us; he was graciously appointed and
given by God. To this I answer, that this objection places
the whole grace of the gospel in providing the Saviour, not
in the pardon of sin. Besides, if by delegating Christ, he
meant such a sincere consent and earnest desire, that Christ
should make atonement for us, as a man may have that his
friend should discharge a debt in his behalf; without doubt
every true Christian, in this sense, delegates Christ to
make atonement for his sins. Did not Abraham and all the
saints who lived before the incarnation of Christ, and who
were informed that atonement was to be made for them by
Christ, sincerely consent to it, and earnestly desire it?
and though now Christ has actually made atonement, yet every
one who walks in the steps of the faith of Abraham, is the
subject of the like sincere consent to the office and work
of Christ, and the like earnest desire, that by his
atonement, a reconciliation may be effected between God and
himself. So that if Christ have, in the proper sense of the
words, paid the debt for his people, his people do as truly
send him to make this payment, as a man ever sends his
friend to make payment to his creditor. Nor is any thing wanting to make any man, or all men, in
this sense delegate Christ to make atonement for them, but
the gift of repentance or a new heart. And if God had not
prevented them by previously appointing Christ to the work
of redemption, all mankind being brought to repentance, and
being informed that Christ, on their consent and delegation,
would make atonement for their sins, would freely have given
their consent, and delegated him to the work. But what if the people of Christ did not, in any sense,
delegate him to this work? would this cause the payment of
their debt by Christ, to be at all more consistent with free
grace in their discharge? Suppose a man without any
delegation, consent, or knowledge of his friend, pays the
full demand of his creditor, it is manifest, that the
creditor is obliged in justice to discharge the debtor,
equally as if the agent had acted by delegation from the
debtor. Or if we had in every sense delegated and
commissioned Christ, still our pardon would be an act of
grace, as still we should be treated more favorably than our
personal characters deserve. Now to apply the whole of this to the subject before us.
If Christ have, in the proper sense of the words, paid the
debt which we owed to God, whether by a delegation from us
or not; there can be no more grace in our discharge, than if
we had paid it ourselves. But the fact is, that Christ has not, in the literal and
proper sense, paid the debt for us. It is indeed true, that
our deliverance is called a redemption, which refers to the
deliverance of a prisoner out of captivity, commonly
effected by paying a certain sum as the price of his
liberty. In the same strain, Christ is said to give himself
a ransom for many, and Christians are said to be bought with
a price, &c. All which Scripture expressions bring into
view the payment of money, or the discharge of a debt. But
it is to be remembered, that these are metaphorical
expressions, therefore not literally and exactly, true. We
had not deprived God of his property; we had not robbed the
treasury of heaven. God was possessed of as much property
after the fall as before; the universe and the fulness
thereof still remained to be his. Therefore when Christ made
satisfaction for us, he refunded no property. As none had
been taken away, none needed to be refunded. But we had
rebelled against God, we had practically despised his law
and authority, and it was necessary, that his authority
should be supported, and that it should be made to appear,
that sin shall not go without proper tokens of divine
displeasure and abhorrence; that God will maintain his law;
that his authority and government shall not be suffered to
fall into contempt; and that God is a friend to virtue and
holiness, and an irreconcilable enemy to transgression, sin,
and vice. These things were necessary to be made manifest,
and the clear manifestation of these things, if we will use
the term, was the debt which was due to God. This
manifestation was made in the sufferings and death of
Christ. But Christ did not, in the literal sense, pay the
debt we owed to God; if he had paid it, all grace would have
been excluded from the pardon of the sinner. Therefore, 3. Others seeing clearly that these solutions of the
difficulty are not satisfactory, have said, that the
atonement of Christ consisted, not in the payment of a debt,
but in the vindication of the divine law and character; that
Christ made this vindication, by practically declaring the
justice of the law, in his active obedience, and by
submitting to the penalty of it, in his death; that as what
Christ did and suffered in the flesh, was a declaration of
the rectitude of the divine law and character, so it was a
decla. ration of the evil of sin; and the greater the evil
of sin appears to be, the greater the grace of pardon
appears to be. Therefore the atonement of Christ is so far
from diminishing the grace of pardon, that it magnifies it.
The sum of this is, that since the atonement consists not in
the payment of a debt, but in the vindication of the divine
law and character; therefore it is not at all opposed to
free grace in pardon. Concerning this stating of the matter, I beg leave to
observe; that if by a vindication of the divine law and
character be meant, proof given that the law of God is just,
and that the divine character is good and irreproachable; I
can by no means suppose, that the atonement consisted in a
vindication of the law and character of God. The law is no
more proved to be just, and the character of God is no more
proved to be good, by the perfect obedience and death of
Christ, than the same things are proved by the perfect
obedience of the angels, and by the torments of the damned.
But I shall have occasion to enlarge on this point by and
by. Again; if by vindication of the divine law and character
be meant, proof given that God is determined to support the
authority of his law, and that he will not suffer it to fall
into contempt; that he will also support his own dignity,
will act a consistent part in legislation and in the
execution of his law, and will not be disobeyed with
impunity, or without proper satisfaction; I grant, that by
Christ the divine law and character are vindicated, so that
God can now consistently with his own honor and the
authority of his law forgive the sinner. But how does this
make it appear that there is any grace in the pardon of the
sinner, when Christ, as his substitute, hath made full
atonement for him, by vindicating the law and character of
God? what if the sinner himself, instead of Christ, had, by
obedience and suffering, vindicated the law and character of
God, and in consequence had been released from further
punishment? Would his release, in this case, have been by
grace, or by justice? Doubtless by the latter and not by the
former; for "to him that worketh, is the reward reckoned,
not of grace, but of debt." Rom. 4: 4. Therefore, why is it
not equally an act of justice to release the sinner, in
consequence of the same vindication made by Christ? Payment
of debt equally precludes grace, when made by a third
person, as when made by the debtor himself. And since the
vindication of the divine law and character, made by the
sinner himself, precludes grace from the release of the
sinner; why does not the same vindication as effectually
preclude it, when made by a third person? Those authors who give us this solution of the difficulty
under consideration, seem to suppose that it is a sufficient
solution to say that the atonement consists, not in the
payment of debt, but in the vindication of the divine law
and character; and what they say, seems to imply, that
however or by whomsoever that vindication be made, whether
by the sinner himself, or any other person, it is not at all
opposed to the exercise of grace in the release of the
sinner. Whereas it appears by the text just now quoted, and
by many others, that if that vindication were made by the
sinner himself, it would shut out all grace from his
release. And I presume this will be granted by those authors
themselves, on a little reflection. To say otherwise, is to
say, that though a sinner should endure the curse of the
law, yet there would be grace in his subsequent rerelease.
It seems, then, that the grace of pardon depends, not barely
on, this, that the atonement consists in a vindication of
the law and character of God; but upon this particular
circumstance attending the vindication, that it be made by a
third person. And if this circumstance will leave room for
grace in the release of the sinner, why is there not as much
grace in the release of the sinner, though the atonement of
Christ be a payment of the sinner's debt; since the payment
is attended with the same important and decisive
circumstance, that it is made by a third person? Objection. But we could not vindicate the law and
character of God; therefore it is absurd to make the
supposition, and to draw consequences from the supposition,
that we had made such a vindication. Answer. It is no more
absurd to make this supposition, than it is to make the
supposition, that we had paid the debt to divine justice;
for we could no more do this than we could make the
vindication in question. And if it follows, from this
circumstance, that we neither have vindicated nor could
vindicate the divine character, that our release from
condemnation is an act of grace; why does it not also follow
from the circumstance, that we neither have paid nor could
pay the debt to divine justice, that our release is an act
of grace, even on the supposition that Christ has, in the
literal sense, paid the debt for us? Thus, not any of these modes of solving this grand
difficulty appears to be satisfactory. Even this last, which
seemed to bid the fairest to af-ford satisfaction, fails.
Therefore, Secondly. I shall suggest some considerations which may
possibly lead to the true solution. The question before us
is, whether pardon through the atonement of Christ be an act
of justice or of grace. In order to a proper answer to this
question, it is of primary importance that we have clear and
determinate ideas affixed to the words justice and
grace. I find the word justice to be used in three distinct
senses; sometimes it means commutative justice, sometimes
distributive justice, and sometimes what may be called
general or public justice. Commutative justice respects property and matters of
commerce solely, and secures to every man his own property.
To treat a man justly in this sense, is not to deprive him
of his property, and whenever it falls into our hands, to
restore it duly, or to make due payment of debts. In one
word, commutative justice is to violate no man's
property. Distributive justice consists in properly rewarding
virtue or good conduct, and punishing crimes or vicious
conduct; and it has respect to a man's personal moral
character or conduct. To treat a man justly in this sense,
is to treat him according to his personal character or
conduct. Commutative justice, in the recovering of debts,
has no respect at all to the character or conduct of the
debtor, but merely to the property of the creditor.
Distributive justice, in the punishment of crimes, has no
respect at all to the property of the criminal, but merely
to his personal conduct; unless his property may, in some
instances, enhance his crimes. General or public justice comprehends all moral goodness;
and though the word is often used in this sense, it is
really an improper use of it. In this sense, whatever is
right, is said to he just, or an act of justice; and
whatever is wrong or improper to be done, is said to be
unjust, or an act of injustice. To practise justice in this
sense, is to practise agreeably to the dictates of general
benevolence, or to seek the glory of God and the good of the
universe. And whenever the glory of God is neglected, it may
be said that God is injured or deprived of his right.
Whenever the general good is neglected or impeded, the
universe may be said to suffer an injury. For instance; if
Paul were now to be cast down from heaven, to suffer the
pains of hell, it would be wrong, as it would be
inconsistent with God's covenant faithfulness, with the
designed exhibition of his glorious grace, and with the good
of the universe. In this sense, it would not be just. Yet in
the sense of distributive justice, such a treatment of Paul
would be perfectly just, as it would be no more than
correspondent to his personal demerits. The term grace, comes now to be explained. Grace is ever
so opposed to justice, that they mutually limit each other.
Wherever grace begins, justice ends; and wherever justice
begins, grace ends. Grace, as opposed to commutative
justice, is gratuitously to relinquish your property, or to
forgive a man his debt. And commutative injustice is to
demand more of a man than your own property. Grace, as
opposed to justice in the distributive sense, is to treat a
man more favorably or mildly than is correspondent to his
personal character or conduct. To treat him unjustly is to
use him with greater severity than is correspondent to his
personal character. It is to be remembered, that, in
personal character, I include punishment endured, as well as
actions performed. When a man has broken any law, and has
afterwards suffered the penalty of that law; as he has, by
the transgression, treated the law with contempt, so by
suffering the penalty, he has supported the authority of it;
and the latter makes a part of his personal character as he
stands related to that law, as really as the former. With regard to the third kind of justice, as this is
improperly called justice, and as it comprehends all moral
goodness, it is not at all opposed to grace; but comprehends
that, as well as every other virtue, as truth, faithfulness,
meekness, forgiveness, patience, prudence, temperance,
fortitude, &c. All these are right and fit, and the
contrary tempers or practices are wrong, and injurious to
God and the system; and therefore, in this sense of justice,
are unjust. And even grace itself, which is favor to the
ill-deserving, so far as it is wise and proper to be
exercised, makes but a part of this kind of justice. We proceed now to apply these explanations to the
solution of the difficulty under consideration. The question
is this. Is the pardon of the sinner, through the atonement
of Christ, an act of justice or of grace? To which I answer,
That with respect to commutative justice, it is neither an
act of justice nor of grace. Because commutative justice is
not concerned in the affair. We neither owed money to the
Deity, nor did Christ pay any on our behalf. His atonement
is not a payment of our debt. If it had been, our discharge
would have been an act of mere justice, and not of grace. To
make the sinner also pay the debt, which had been already
paid by Christ, would be manifestly injurious, oppressive,
and beyond the bounds of commutative justice, the rule of
which is, that every man retain and recover his own
property, and that only. But a debt being paid, by
whomsoever it be paid, the creditor has recovered his
property, and therefore has a right to nothing further. If
he extort, or attempt to extort, any thing further, he
proceeds beyond his right and is guilty of injustice. So
that if Christ had paid the debt for the believer, he would
be discharged, not on the footing of grace, but of strict
justice. With respect to distributive justice, the discharge of
the sinner is wholly an act of grace. This kind of justice
has respect solely to the personal character and conduct of
its object. And then is a man treated justly, when he is
treated according to his personal moral character? If he be
treated more favorably than is correspondent to his personal
character, he is the object of grace. I say personal
character; for distributive justice has no respect to the
character of a third person, or to any thing which may be
done or suffered by another person, than by him, who is the
object of this justice, or who is on trial, to be rewarded
or punished. And with regard to the case now before us, what
if Christ has made an atonement for sin? This atonement
constitutes no part of the personal character of the sinner;
but his personal character is essentially the same, as it
would have been, if Christ had made no atonement. And as the
sinner, in pardon, is treated not only more favorably, but
infinitely more favorably, than is correspondent to his
personal character, his pardon is wholly an act of infinite
grace. If it were, in the sense of distributive justice, an
act of justice; he would be injured, if a pardon were
refused him. But as the case is, be would not be injured,
though a pardon were refused him; because he would not be
treated more unfavorably than is correspondent to his
personal character. Therefore, though it be true that if a third person pay a
debt, there would be no grace exercised by the creditor in
discharging the debtor; yet when a third person atones for a
crime, by suffering in the stead of a criminal, there is
entire grace in the discharge of the criminal, and
distributive justice still allows him to be punished in his
own person. The reason is, what I have mentioned already,
that justice in punishing crimes, respects the personal
character only of the criminal; but in the payment of debts,
it respects the recovery of property only. In the former
case, it admits of any treatment which is according to his
personal character; in the latter, it admits of nothing
beyond the recovery of property. So that though Christ has made complete atonement for the
sins of all his disciples, and they are justified wholly
through his redemption; yet they are justified wholly by
grace. Because they personally have not made atonement for
their sins, or suffered the curse of the law. Therefore they
have no claim to a discharge on account of their own
personal conduct and suffering. And if it is objected, that
neither is a debtor discharged on account of any thing which
he hath done personally, when he is discharged on the
payment of his debt by a third person; yet justice does not
admit that the creditor recover the debt again from the
debtor himself: why then does it admit that a magistrate
inflict the punishment of a crime on the criminal himself,
when atonement has been made by a substitute? The answer is,
that justice in these two cases is very different, and
respects very different objects. In criminal causes, it
respects the personal conduct or character of the criminal,
and admits of any treatment which is correspondent to that
conduct. In civil causes, or matters of debt, it respects
the restitution of property only, and this being made, it
admits of no further demand. In the third sense of justice before explained, according
to which any thing is just, which is right and best to be
done; the pardon of the sinner is entirely an act of
justice. It is undoubtedly most conducive to the divine
glory, and general good of the created system, that every
believer should be pardoned; and therefore, in the present
sense of the word, it is an act of justice. The pardon of
the sinner is equally an act of justice, if, as some
suppose, he be pardoned not on account of the death of
Christ, considered as an equivalent to the curse of the law
denounced against the sinner; but merely on account of the
positive obedience of Christ. If this be the mode and the
condition of pardon established by God, doubtless pardon
granted in this mode and on this condition, is most
conducive to the divine glory and the general good.
Therefore it is, in the sense of justice now under
consideration, an act of justice; insomuch that if pardon
were not granted in this mode, the divine glory would be
tarnished, and the general good diminished, or the universe
would suffer an injury. The same would be true, if God had
in fact granted pardon, without any atonement, whether by
suffering or obedience. We might have argued from that fact,
that infinite wisdom saw it to be most conducive to the
divine glory and the general good, to pardon without an
atonement; and of course that if pardon had not been granted
in this way, both the divine glory and general good would
have been diminished, and injustice would have been done to
the universe. In the same sense the gift of Christ to be our
Saviour, his undertaking to save us, and every other gift of
God to his creatures, are acts of justice. But it must be
remembered, that this is an improper sense of the word
justice, and is not at all opposed to grace, but implies it.
For all those divine acts and gifts just mentioned, though
in this sense they are acts of justice, yet are, at the same
time, acts of pure grace. In this sense of justice the word seems to be used by the
apostle Paul, Rom. 3:26; "To declare his righteousness, (or
justice) that he might be just, and the justifier of him
which believeth in Jesus.' That God might be just to himself
and to the universe. Again, in Psalm 85:10; "Mercy and truth
are met together, righteousness and peace have kissed each
other." Righteousness, in the distributive sense, hath not
kissed peace with respect to the sinner; but so far as it
speaks any thing, calls for his punishment. But the public
good, and the divine glory admit of peace with the sinner.
In the same sense the word occurs in the version of the
Psalms in common use among us, where it is said, "justice is
pleased, and peace is given." Again, in the catechism of the
assembly of divines, where they say, "Christ offered up
himself a sacrifice to satisfy divine justice." Thus it appears that the pardon of the sinner, in
reference to distributive justice, which is the only proper
sense of the word, with respect to this matter, is entirely
an act of grace, and that although he is pardoned wholly
through the redemption of Jesus Christ. It is in the same sense an act of grace, as the gift of
Christ, or any other most gracious act of God. Though the
sinner is pardoned wholly through the redemption of Christ,
yet his pardon is an act of pure grace, because in it he is
treated inconceivably more favorably than is correspondent
to his personal character. The pardon of the sinner, on this plan of the redemption
or the atonement of Christ, is as entirely an act of grace,
as if it had been granted on an atonement made, not by the
sufferings of Christ, but merely by his active obedience.
For if we suppose, that the atonement of Christ consists
wholly in the obedience of Christ, not in his sufferings, in
what sense would the pardon of the sinner be an act of
grace, in which it is not an. act of grace, on the
hypothesis concerning the atonement which hath been now
stated? Pardon is no more procured by the payment of the
sinner's debt, in the one case, than in the other. If it be
said that Christ's suffering the curse of the law is the
payment of the debt; I answer, this is no more a payment of
the debt, than the obedience of Christ. If it be said that
Christ's obedience only honors and magnifies the law, I
answer, no more is done by the sufferings of Christ. It is
true, that if the sinner be pardoned on account of Christ's
obedience, he is treated more favorably than is
correspondent to his personal character. The same is true,
if he be pardoned on account of Christ's sufferings. If it
be said, that in the one case Christ suffers, as the
substitute of the sinner; I answer, in the other case, he
obeys as the substitute of the sinner. In the one case,
Christ has by his sufferings made it consistent with the
general good to pardon the sinner; in the other case, he
hath made the same thing consistent with the general good,
by his obedience. And if this circumstance, that the pardon
of the sinner is consistent with the general good abolishes
grace from his pardon in the one case, the same circumstance
is productive of the same effect in the other. The truth is,
that in both cases the whole grace of pardon consists in
this, and this only, that the sinner is treated infinitely
more favorably than is correspondent to his personal
character. Again; according to this scheme of the atonement, the
pardon of the sinner is as wholly an act of grace, as if he
had been pardoned without any atonement at all. If the
sinner had been pardoned without any atonement, he would
have been treated more favorably than is correspondent to
his own character; so he is, when pardoned through the
atonement of Christ. ]In the former case, he would be
pardoned, without a payment of his debt; so he is in the
latter. If the measures taken by God to secure the public
good, those measures consisting neither in any personal
doing or suffering of the sinner, nor in the payment of
debt, be inconsistent with grace in the pardon of the sinner
in the one case; doubtless whatever measures are taken by
God to secure the public good in the other case, are equally
inconsistent with grace in pardon. And no man will pretend,
that if God do pardon the sinner without an atonement, he
will pardon him in a way which is inconsistent with the
public good. In this view of the objection, either the bare
circumstance that the pardon of the sinner is consistent
with the public good, is that which abolishes the grace of
pardon; or it is the particular mode in which the
consistence of pardon and the public good is brought about.
If the bare circumstance of the consistence of pardon and
the public good, be that which abolishes the grace of
pardon, then it seems, that in order that any pardon may be
gracious, it must be inconsistent with the public good; and
therefore the pardon of the sinner without any atonement,
being by the concession of the objector a gracious act, is
inconsistent with the general good of the universe, and with
the glory and perfections of God, and therefore can never be
granted by God, as long as he is possessed of infinite
perfection and goodness, whereby he is necessarily disposed
to seek the good of the universal system, or of his own
kingdom. Or if it be said, that it is the particular mode in which
the consistence between pardon and the public good is
brought about, which abolishes the grace of pardon; in this
case it is incumbent on the objector to point out what there
is in the mode which is opposed to grace in pardon. He
cannot pretend that in this mode the debt of the sinner is
paid, or that in repentance the sinner's personal character
is so altered that he now deserves no punishment. If this
were the case, there would certainly be no grace in his
pardon. It is no grace, and no pardon, not to punish a man
who deserves no punishment. If the objector were to hold,
that the personal character of the sinner is so altered by
repentance that he no longer deserves punishment, he would
at once confute his own scheme of gracious pardon. Neither can it be pretended, by the advocates for pardon
without atonement, that there is any grace in pardon, in any
other view than this, that the sinner is treated more
favorably than is correspondent to his personal character.
And pardon, on such an atonement as Christ hath made, is, in
the same view, an act of grace. So that if the true idea of
grace, with respect to this subject be, a treatment of a
sinner more favorably than is correspondent to his personal
character, the pardon of the sinner through the atonement of
Christ, is an act of pure grace. If this be not the true
idea of grace, let a better be given, and I am willing to
examine it; and presume that on the most thorough
examination of the matter it will be found, that there is as
much grace in the pardon of the sinner, through the
atonement of Christ, as without any atonement at all. Surely
it will not be pleaded, that it is no act of grace to treat
a sinner more favorably than is correspondent to his, own
personal character; if such treatment be not more favorable
than is correspondent to the personal character of some
other man, or some other being; and that it is no act of
grace in a prince to pardon a criminal, from respect to the
merits of the criminal's father; or, that if Capt. Asgill
had been the murderer of Capt. Huddy, there would have been
no grace exercised in the pardon of Asgill, from respect to
the intercession of the court of France. On every hypothesis concerning the mode or condition of
pardon, it must be allowed, that God dispenses pardon from
regard to some circumstance, or juncture of circumstances,
which renders the pardon both consistent with the general
good, and subservient to it: and whatever this be, whether
the death of Christ, or any thing else, provided it be not
the payment of money, and provided the personal character of
the sinner be the same, it is equally consistent or
inconsistent with grace in pardon. In short, the whole strength of this objection, in which
the Socinians have so much triumphed, that complete
atonement is inconsistent with grace in the pardon of the
sinner, depends on the supposition, that the atonement of
Christ consists in the literal payment of a debt which we
owed to God; and this groundless supposition being set
aside, the objection itself appears equally groundless, and
vanishes like dew before the sun. Whatever hypothesis we adopt concerning the pardon of the
sinner, whether we suppose it to be granted on account of
the death of Christ; or on account of the obedience of
Christ; or absolutely without any atonement; all will agree
in this, that it is granted in such a way, or on such
conditions only, as are consistent with the general good of
the moral system; and from a regard to some event or
circumstance, or juncture of circumstances, which causes
pardon to be consistent with the general good. And that
circumstance, or juncture of circumstances, may as well be
called the price of pardon, the ransom of the sinner,
&c., as the death of Christ. And whereas it is objected,
that if God grant a pardon from respect to the atonement of
Christ, we are under no obligation to God for the grace of
pardon; I answer that whenever God grants a pardon, from
respect to the circumstance or juncture of circumstances
before mentioned, it may as well be pleaded, that the sinner
so pardoned is under no obligations of gratitude to God on
account of his pardon; for that it was granted from regard
to the general good, or to that circumstance which rendered
it consistent with the general good, and not from any
gracious regard to him; or that if he be under any
obligation to God, it is to him as the author of that
circumstance or juncture of circumstances, which renders his
pardon consistent with the general good, and not to him, as
the dispenser of his pardon: as it is objected that if, on
the scheme of pardon through the atonement of Christ, we be
under any obligation to God at all, it is merely on account
of the provision of the atonement, and not on account of
pardon itself. Perhaps some, loth to relinquish this objection, may,
say, Though it be true, that the pardon of the sinner, on
account of the atonement of Christ, be a real act of grace;
would it not have been an act of greater grace, to pardon
absolutely, without an atonement? This question is capable
of a twofold construction. If the meaning be, whether there
would not have been more grace manifested towards the
sinner, if his pardon had been granted without any
atonement? I answer, by no means; because to put the
question in this sense, is the same as to ask, whether the
favor of par. don granted without an atonement, would not be
greater in comparison with the sinner's personal character,
than it is when granted on account of the atonement of
Christ? Or whether there would not have been a greater
distance between the good of pardon, and the demerit of the
sinner's personal character, if his pardon had been granted
without an atonement, than if it be granted on account of
the atonement of Christ? But the good, the safety, the
indemnity of pardon, or of deliverance from condemnation, is
the very same, in whatever way it be granted, whether
through an atonement or not, whether in a way of grace or in
a way of debt, whether from a regard to the merits of
Christ, or the merits of the sinner himself. Again, the
personal character of the sinner is also the same, whether
he be pardoned through an atonement or not. If his pardon be
granted without an atonement, it makes not the demerit of
his personal character and conduct the greater; or if it be
granted on account of the atonement of Christ, it makes not
the demerit of his personal character the less. Therefore as
the good of pardon is the same, in whatever way it be
granted; and the personal character of the sinner pardoned
is the same; the distance between the good of pardon, and
the demerit of the sinner's character is also the same,
whether he be pardoned on account of the atonement of
Christ, or absolutely, without any atonement. Of course the
pardon of the sinner is not an act of greater grace to him
personally, if granted without regard to an atonement, than
if granted from regard to the atonement of Christ. But perhaps the meaning of the question stated above is,
whether, if the sinner had been pardoned without an
atonement, it would not have exhibited greater grace in the
divine mind, or greater goodness in God; and whether in this
mode of pardon, greater good would not have accrued to the
universe. The answer to this question wholly depends on the
necessity of an atonement, which I have endeavored briefly
to show, in the preceding discourse. If an atonement be
necessary to support the authority of the law and of the
moral government of God, it is doubtless necessary to the
public good of the moral system, or to the general good of
the universe and to the divine glory. This being granted or
established, the question just now stated comes to this
simply; whether it exhibits greater grace and goodness in
the divine mind, and secures greater good to the universe,
to pardon sin in such a mode, as is consistent with the
general good of the universe; or in such a mode as is
inconsistent with that important object? a question which no
man, from regard to his own reputation would choose to
propose.