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CONCLUSION.
ON reviewing the foregoing pages, it
appears that the opinion which some have entertained that
the atonement of Christ was necessary, for the purpose of
exhibiting evidence to the minds of intelligent beings that
the divine law is just and reasonable, must be entirely
erroneous. The truth is, no such evidence was wanting.
Intelligent beings well understood that the law was holy,
and just, and good. But if it had been otherwise, if such
evidence had really been wanting, it would be impossible to
find it either hi the obedience or sufferings of Christ. If,
previously to the atonement of Christ, there had been any
ground of reasonable doubt concerning the justice of the
divine law, the nature of the case would have required
evidence of a different kind from any thing which results
from the life or death of Christ to have removed it. The
obedience of Christ could not have answered the purpose. For
if the justice of a law be suspected, the justice of him who
gave the law must be equally called in question; and,
consequently, no conduct of his, founded on this suspicious
law, can be considered as free from the same suspicion.
If a king should make a bad law,
doubtless the same motives which induced him to make it
might also induce him to obey it. His obedience, therefore,
could do nothing towards removing the grounds of suspicion.
Neither could the sufferings of Christ have answered any
such purpose. It has been shown, indeed, that the sufferings
of Christ answer the same purposes which the execution of
the penalty of the law would have answered. But still they
do not prove the law to be just; for this would not have
been proved by the execution of the penalty. Should a king
give an unjust law and govern his subjects by it, rigorously
executing its penalty on every transgressor, it must be
obvious, surely, that this could not prove the law to be
just. Nor would the mere execution of the penalty of a good
law afford any better evidence of its goodness.
But if the ease were otherwise, and
it could be shown that the obedience or the sufferings of
Christ did actually prove that the divine law is just,
still, how could this make the necessary atonement? The
atonement was necessary, not that God might he just in
condemning transgressors, but that he might be just in
justifying and saving them, if they would believe in Jesus.
But how could proving the law to be just answer this
purpose? In other words, how could proving the law to be
just afford any reason for remitting its penalty, and
pardoning the transgressor? If it could do it in any way,
must it not follow that the more clearly it appears that a
law is just, the more easily may its penalty be dispensed
with; and, on the other hand, that the more doubtful it is
whether a law is just, the more indispensably necessary it
must be that its penalty should be rigorously
executed?
Equally erroneous is the opinion that
the atonement was necessary to show that the divine law may
be obeyed by man. What Christ has done and suffered does not
prove this. It is true, Christ obeyed the law; but how this
can possibly afford any evidence that man is capable of
obeying it, does not appear. For Christ was not a mere man.
In his glorious person the divine and human natures are
united. Hence his obedience no more proves that a mere man
is capable of yielding a perfect obedience, than his walking
on the sea, raising the dead, and performing other wonderful
works is evidence that any mere man can do the same things.
But were it otherwise, and the obedience of Christ did prove
that man has power to obey as perfectly as he obeyed, still.
it would. be difficult to see how this would render it
consistent that sinners should be pardoned. Are they less
criminal because the law which they have disobeyed is one
which they had full power to obey? If they had been
incapable of obeying the divine law, would this have
rendered it more necessary to punish their disobedience? If
God had pardoned sinners on the ground that the law they had
violated was shown to be just, and capable of being obeyed
by man, how would this support the authority of that just
and reasonable law? Would this have any tendency to deter
others from disobedience? Would it manifest clearly God's
love of righteousness and hatred of iniquity? Would any
consistency of conduct appear in giving such a law, and then
neglecting to execute its penalty? Would its being shown to
be a good law be a sufficient reason why its penalty should
not be executed? It is believed no one would choose to
answer these questions in the affirmative.
It appears, also, that Crossest death
was not a ground of redemption, merely as being a means of
sanctification. It is evident, indeed, that Christ's
sufferings and death, when viewed aright, must be a powerful
means of promoting those dispositions of mind which are
necessary to eternal life; and hence some have been led to
suppose that the virtue and efficacy of Christ's death
should not be viewed in any other light. Since none can be
saved unless they are sanctified by his blood, or death, it
has been concluded that the only reason why God forgives
sins and bestows other blessings on account of his death is,
because this is a proper means of cleansing from sin. This
scheme supposes that atonement was necessary for no other
purpose than to furnish sinners with those personal
qualifications without which they cannot receive
pardon.
To explain the scheme it has been
said that God "wants neither our information nor importunity
to engage his kind regards; but he requires us to pray to
him for his blessing and favors, in order to improve our
minds in pious and virtuous dispositions. He wants not our
assistance for the relief of the indigent and distressed;
but he has made it our duty to succor them, for the exercise
of our benevolence. He wants no sacrifice to excite or
assist his mercy; but we may want it to increase and
strengthen our virtue." And "as our prayers are a reason of
God's conferring blessing upon us, because our prayers are
means of producing pious dispositions in our minds; so the
blood of Christ makes atonement for sin, or is a reason of
God's forgiving our sins, because the blood of Christ is a
mean of cleansing us from sin." This scheme is
unsatisfactory for several reasons.
1. According to this scheme the death
of Christ is an atonement only so far as it is a mean of
cleansing from sin; and its virtue consists only in being
such a mean; from whence it would seem evidently to follow,
that any thing else, which is a mean of sanctifying and
cleansing from sin, must, at least, so far as it actually
produces this effect, constitute as satisfactory an
atonement as has been made by the death of Christ. Prayers,
alms, and sufferings for Christ's sake, as well as the blood
of Christ, are means of promoting pious dispositions in the
mind, sanctifying the affections, and cleansing from sin.
The institutions of the gospel are all means of
sanctification. The preaching of the gospel is particularly
designed as such a mean; the word of God generally is so
designed; Christ, prayed for the elect, "Father, sanctify
them through thy truth, thy word is truth;" and the Holy
Spirit is designated to the particular work of
sanctification. If, then, the blood of Christ makes
atonement, only because it is a mean of cleansing from sin,
it must be difficult to see why all these other things do
not answer the same purpose; yet neither of them is ever
said to make atonement.
2. The scheme in question appears to
suppose that the sanctification and cleansing of sinners was
all that was necessary to render it consistent for God to
grant them pardon and salvation. But certainly it must
require some very explicit declaration of Scripture to
authorize a belief that had this been all that was
necessary, a God of infinite wisdom could not devise any
means of sanctifying and cleansing them, which would have
been less expensive than the sufferings and death of his
beloved Son; or that if such means could be devised, a God
of infinite benevolence would not have chosen them. The
Scriptures, however, give no intimation of any such
thing.
3. However this scheme may be
considered as combining the glory of God with the good of
his creatures, it seems evidently to make the glory of God
but a secondary object; but this appears to be inconsistent
with the Scriptures, which plainly represent God as seeking
his own glory supremely in all he does.
4. Although, in this scheme, the
death of Christ is named as making atonement; yet it
represents the atonement as consisting rather in a mere
circumstance attending the death of Christ, namely, its
tendency to promote sanctification. Indeed, it may be
doubted whether even this circumstance would be the very
thing; for the value of this must depend on the effect
produced in cleansing from sin. So that, after all, the
sanctification of the sinner would, in fact, be the
atonement This appears to be the precise reason why God
exercises pardon. Hence it is not seen why a sinner, who
might attain to as high a degree of sanctification in some
other way, would not be as proper a subject of pardon, nor
why God would not be as readily disposed to pardon him. But
this would be yielding to those who have denied atonement
all that they have contended for; as it would be granting
that atonement was not necessary that God might be just in
pardoning and saving sinners; and that he could not
consistently with infinite benevolence, withhold pardon from
any penitent. It would, however, be very inconsistent with
the Scriptures, which declare that Christ was set forth to
be a propitiation through faith in his blood, that God might
be just and the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus;
and which plainly intimate, that without shedding of the
Saviour's blood, there can be no remission.
Again; from the view which has been
taken of the necessity and nature of the atonement, we may
learn in what sense the sufferings of Christ may be
considered as pleasing to God. It has been said, "Mere pain
cannot be agreeable to a God of infinite goodness." From
whence it has been inferred, that the sufferings of Christ
were of no avail, any further than as they exhibited
evidence of his disposition to obey. "The bare distress and
pain of the Saviour, in themselves simply considered, had no
virtue in them and were of no worth; but the disposition of
mind with which he endured those extreme agonies and pains,
the temper expressed under them were of infinite
worth."
The correctness of this opinion may,
be reasonably doubted, It is admitted, however, that if by
the sufferings of Christ, considered in themselves simply,
be meant his sufferings abstracted from his obedience; And
not only so, but abstracted also from all consequences to
the universe as it, respects supporting the divine law and
government, and displaying the divine, character and glory;
in short, so abstracted from every thing in the universe, as
to do no good in any sense, it must indeed follow that they
are of no worth.
But it may be doubted, also, whether
the disposition manifested by such sufferings in the same
sense abstracted from every thing, would really be of any
more worth. Indeed, if the sufferings of Christ be
considered in any sense which would render them useless, it
is not seen how a disposition to endure them can be of any
worth. What wisdom or virtue can appear in a disposition to
endure useless or worthless sufferings? If the sufferings of
Christ were of no worth except as a medium through which
Christ displayed the strength of his disposition to obey, it
will follow that the atonement consists in the strength of
his disposition to obey. It would hence follow, that
whatever would answer to display the strength of Crossest
disposition to obey as fully as his sufferings did, would
answer the same purposes in respect to the atonement. If,
then, it be true that "without shedding of blood there is no
remission" of sins, it must follow that there was no
possible way in which an infinite God could display the
strength of Christ's disposition to obey, so fully as by his
sufferings and death. A conclusion which necessarily results
from this is, that since the display of Crossest disposition
to obey was of infinite worth, his sufferings must be of
equal worth, because they constituted the only possible
medium through which this disposition could be
displayed.
From what we have seen of the
necessity and nature of atonement, it is evident that
notwithstanding the disposition of Christ to obey was of
infinite worth, it did not, however, constitute any part of
the atonement. As has been shown, it did not answer any of
those purposes for which atonement was necessary. To answer
these purposes, the sufferings of Christ were indispensably
necessary. If, then, there was any worth in the atonement,
the same worth is found in the mere sufferings of Christ,
because in these sufferings is the atonement found; and if
there were any thing pleasing to God in the atonement, then
were the sufferings of Christ pleasing to him for the same
reason.
It is an unquestionable truth, that
God is, in some sense, pleased with whatever answers a
valuable purpose. Things may answer valuable purposes, and
be objects of choice on account of those purposes; and in
connection with those purposes may be viewed as pleasing,
all things considered, though they am in their own nature
displeasing, and would, if they did not answer those
purposes, be highly disgusting. This is this mm with the
misery of the damned. Undoubtedly that would be highly
displeasing to infinite benevolence, if it did not, answer a
valuable purpose. But as far as that misery is necessary to
support the authority of the divine law and the honor of the
divine government, it is unquestionably, on the whole,
pleasing to God; nor is it seen why the sufferings of
Christ, if they be supposed to answer the same purposes, may
not be, in the same sense, pleasing.
The sufferings of Christ were
designed as a substitute, not for the punishment of sinners,
but for the execution of the penalty of the law. They answer
the game purposes which would have been answered by the
execution of that penalty in case there had been no
atonement. But, if it were pleasing to God to annex a
penalty to his law, and if he be a consistent being, it is
not seen why it may not be pleasing to have that penalty
executed upon transgressors. But, if the execution of that
penalty might be pleasing, why might not any thing else,
which would answer the same valuable purposes, be equally
pleasing?
The sufferings of Christ were
designed to answer these purposes, and it has been shown
that they do answer them fully. Hence, it is evident, they
are agreeable to God. It is not supposable that they were
agreeable in any other sense; nor is it supposable that
Christ would have consented to suffer, or that the Father
would have consented that he should suffer, if they had not
been agreeable in this sense
Hence we may conclude that he
suffered nothing more than an infinitely wise God judged
necessary, that these important purposes might be fully
answered. He suffered nothing in vain. What he began in the
manger, he finished on the cross. Nothing more can be
intended, by his suffering under Pontius Pilate, than that
he then finished the great work. He then completed that
course of sufferings which was necessary to answer the great
ends of his incarnation.
It may be observed further, that in
God's requiring the sufferings of Christ in order to pardon
believing sinners, there is nothing arbitrary. He did not
require this without sufficient reasons. The honor of his
law, the glory of his character, and the interests of his
kingdom rendered it necessary. Some have supposed that the
constitution of the gospel, which requires full atonement
before sinners can be pardoned, represents the Supreme Being
as deficient in goodness. But this, surely, must be a great
mistake, unless he would have appeared possessed of more
goodness if he had executed the penalty of his law on all
transgressors, without having mercy on any of them. For,
surely, no one, can rationally suppose that God would have
appeared as possessing more goodness, if he had suffered his
holy law to fall into contempt, his subjects to transgress
with impunity, and the affairs of his kingdom to go to
confusion and ruin. Such a procedure, on the part of the
divine Being, might, indeed, have rendered the state of
incorrigible offenders less deplorable; but it would have
been totally inconsistent with the blessedness of holy
beings, or the general good of God's universal
kingdom.
The doctrine of atonement, therefore,
instead of lowering our ideas of God's goodness, greatly
exalts them, Indeed this is the doctrine which, above all
others, produces this effect. The sufferings of Christ
declare God's goodness, as well as his righteousness. Herein
"was manifested the love of God."
Some have supposed, that if Crossest
sufferings constituted a full atonement for all those for
whom he died, he must have endured as much pain as all those
for whom he died would have endured, in case they had
suffered the full punishment due to them for their sins; and
that, if this is the case, there is nothing gained by the
substitution, because the evils which the damned would
suffer would no more than counterbalance the evils which
Christ has suffered, leaving nothing gained in favor of the
general good. To this it may be answered, that, even on this
ground, much would still be gained. Though it is true that
nothing would be gained by avoiding positive evil, yet much
would be gained by obtaining positive happiness. For while
the two evils exactly balanced the happiness secured by the
everlasting redemption of a great multitude which no man can
number, would greatly overbalance the sum of happiness which
the man Christ Jesus lost during the short period of his
sufferings, if this could be considered as loss, on the
whole, to himself. But even this is not to be admitted. On
the contrary, there was a gain of happiness even to Christ
himself, in consequence of his sufferings. Hence we are
assured that, "for the joy which was set before him," he
"endured the cross, despising the shame." There would,
therefore, even on this ground, evidently be a great gain of
happiness in the universal system.
But besides, there is no reason to
believe that the sufferings of Christ were of an amount, in
point of quantity, equal to all which those for whom be died
must have endured. It does not appear to have been
necessary, considering the innocency and dignity of his
character, that the real evil endured by Christ should be so
great as the evil of the sufferings of those whom he
redeemed must have been. It is, quite sufficient if God's
regard for his law, his opposition to sin, and his love for
the general good, be as fully manifested in the sufferings
of Christ, as they could have been by the execution of the
penalty of the law.
The objection, which has sometimes
been made, that the doctrine of atonement represents God as
being inexorable, is also groundless. For certainly no one
can rationally suppose that God is inexorable, merely
because he will not pardon sinners in a way which is totally
inconsistent with the honor of his government, the well
being of his kingdom, and the glory of his own character.
Instead of inexorability, or a deficiency of goodness, every
display which God has made of himself in the great work of
man's redemption, has been a display of infinite benevolence
or love, Even his anger is to be viewed as the result of
benevolence.
We read much in the Scriptures of the
anger of God. "He is angry with the wicked every day;" and
his "anger burn; to the lowest hell." But from these and,
other similar passages, we are to understand no more than
the eternal opposition of God's benevolence to every thing
which opposes his glory, and the highest good of his
kingdom. God never indulged any other anger towards any
creature, however rebellious and wicked, than what
necessarily results from his supreme regard to the glory of
his own name, and the highest good of the universe. Nor does
the death of Christ render God propitious to sinners in any
other sense than this; as it supports the authority of his
law and kingdom, it renders the pardon of sinners consistent
with the highest good of his kingdom, and with his own
glory.
It hence appears, moreover, that the
atonement of Christ is, in a strict and proper sense, for
all mankind. Christ tasted death for every man; for the
non-elect as much as for the elect. Indeed, election has
nothing to do with atonement, any more than it has with
creation, resurrection from the dead, or the general
judgment.
From the necessity and nature of the
atonement it is evident that its extent is necessarily
universal. It was necessary to remove obstacles which stood
in the way of God's pardoning sinners. These obstacles have
been considered; and it has been shown that the death of
Christ completely removes them. Nothing, therefore, now
remains in the way of God's pardoning any sinner whatever of
the human family, who will comply with the conditions of the
gospel on which pardon is offered. Neither the compliance of
sinners with these terms, nor their non-compliance can, in
the least degree, affect the nature or the extent of the
atonement. Though the operations of the Holy Spirit are
necessary to produce in the hearts of sinners a compliance
with these terms, and though these operations are indeed
granted to some, while they are withholden from others; yet
this is not owing to any thing particular in the nature of
the atonement; but it is owing merely to the "purpose of
God, according to the election of grace." The Scriptures are
remarkably plain on the point now before us. Christ
testified that "God so loved the world, that he gave his
only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should
not perish, but have everlasting life." John 3:16. And the
apostle John, addressing his Christian brethren, said, "If
any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus
Christ the righteous. And he is the propitiation for our
sins; and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the
whole world." 1 John 2:2.
But though the atonement is, strictly
speaking, for all mankind, one as much as another, this does
not imply any obligation on the part of God, either to
Christ or to sinners, to save any of them. Notwithstanding
the atonement, God is at full liberty to save, or not save,
just as the general good may require, and his unerring
wisdom dictate. If the general good require that any of
those for whom Christ died should be left to continue in
impenitency, and to perish in their sins, God may thus leave
them, in perfect consistency with the nature and design of
the atonement.
Whether the general good requires the
salvation of a great or a small number, is a question which
cannot be decided merely from the nature of the atonement
For if God had designed the salvation of only a small
number, the same atonement, for aught we are able to see,
would have been necessary to render his conduct consistent
in pardoning that few, which has now been made as a ground
of offering pardon to the whole. Indeed, if instead of
designing the salvation of any, God had only designed to
make a free and gracious offer of pardon and salvation to
all who would repent and believe, leaving them entirely to
their own choice whether to repent and believe, or not,
still the same atonement must have been made. For it is
plain that God could not consistently offer pardon to
sinners on any ground which would not fully justify him in
actually granting it, in case they comply with the
conditions on which it is offered. But whether they shall be
made to comply with these conditions, by the sanctifying
agency of the Holy Spirit, or whether they shall be left to
follow the dictates of their own wicked heart, and finally
perish in unbelief, or whether there shall be an election of
grace among them, and some be called and sanctified, while
others are left to their own choice, are questions to be
decided on other grounds than atonement. Because the direct
object of atonement might be fully accomplished in either
case.
This object, as has been shown, was
to make a manifestation of the divine character, to declare
the righteousness of God. This manifestation God has made.
He has shown his hatred of sin and love of holiness. He has
shown his regard to his own glory and the best interest of
his kingdom. He has, also, manifested a merciful and
gracious disposition towards sinners; for he has offered
them pardon and eternal life, on condition that they believe
in Jesus. These things constitute the object of atonement,
and these things will for ever appear, even though no sinner
should ever believe, or be saved. It will for ever appear
that all was done on the part of God which was necessary, in
order that salvation might be freely offered. It will also
appear that the free offer of salvation was actually made.
God may for ever say, in view of these things, "What could I
have done more in my vineyard, that I have not done in it?"
And Christ may say to a world of ruined sinners, "Ye would
not come unto me that ye might have life." The direct object
of atonement, therefore, may be accomplished, though no
sinners should be saved.
Notwithstanding all the atonement has
done, there still remains an obstacle in the way of
salvation. The unbelief of sinners must be removed. They
must believe in Jesus, or his atonement can never save them.
This is an obstacle which the atonement of Christ does not
remove. Neither is there any thing in the nature of
atonement which requires that God should remove it. The
truth is, mere atonement has nothing to do with its removal.
God may remove it or not, as in his view the interest of his
kingdom and his own glory may require. If the interest of
his kingdom and his own glory require that this obstacle be
universally removed, no doubt it will be done.
But we have no evidence that this is
the case. We indeed have evidence that the glory of God and
the interest of his kingdom require, that this should be
done in some instances because we see that it is done. We
see that the unbelief of sinners is removed, and they become
believers in Jesus. But there are multitudes of others
concerning whom this does not appear. The Scriptures also
assure us that some believe, and they assure us, too, that
some do not believe "All men have not faith." They describe
mankind as constituting two classes, the righteous and the
wicked, the believing and the unbelieving. Nor, have we any
evidence that these two classes will not continue to exist
for ever.
The mere goodness of God certainly
does not afford proof that they will not thus continue to
exist. For if the existence of sinners, in unbelief and
misery, were inconsistent with the goodness of God, they
certainly could not thus exist at the present time. We know,
however, that they do thus exist. But if their present
existence in this state is not inconsistent with divine
goodness, then we have no evidence that their future state
may not also be sinful and miserable. No doubt God is as
able to make all mankind holy and happy in this world as he
will be in the world to come. But since he does not make
them holy and happy now, notwithstanding his infinite
goodness, we have no evidence that he will do it hereafter.
Doubtless the reason why God does not make all his creatures
holy and happy in the present world is, because his own
glory and the general good require otherwise. But if the
glory of God and the general good may require that some of
God's creatures should be suffered to continue in unbelief
and misery in this world, we have no evidence that his glory
and the general good may not require that they should be
suffered to continue in the same state, in the world to come
and during eternity. It is certainly as conceivable that sin
and misery should be subservient, or even necessary to the
glory of God and the general good in the world to come, as
that they are so in this world.
It has been shown that the atonement
of Christ answers the same Valuable purposes, at least in
relation to all that believe that the complete execution of
the penalty of the law would have answered. Nothing more
than this was necessary. Nothing less than this was
sufficient. If, then, God should give faith to an mankind,
he might, out of respect to the atonement, save them all,
and at the same time promote his own glory and the good of
the universe to the same extent which might have been done
by the execution of the law.
But it does not hence follow that God
will give faith to all; nor, if he should, that this would
promote his glory and the good of his kingdom in the highest
degree. It might, indeed, promote these objects in as high a
degree as they could have been promoted by the execution of
the law; but the execution of the law could not have
promoted them in the highest degree. If it could, then
certainly the law would have been executed. For surely no
one can suppose that God would have given up Christ to the
sufferings of death, if his glory and the interest of his
kingdom might have been as well secured by the execution of
the law. And yet all that was necessary in order that the
sufferings of Christ should constitute a complete atonement
was, that they should answer the same valuable purposes
respecting the character and government of God, which the
execution of the law would have answered.
From whence it must follow, that the
execution of the law would not have promoted the glory of
God and interest of his kingdom in the highest degree. The
sufferings of Christ, however, in order to constitute
complete atonement needed only to answer the same purposes
which the execution of the law would have answered. Nor have
we any evidence that they do, in themselves, answer any
other purpose. Neither the execution of the law, nor the
atonement of Christ, therefore, in itself, is capable of
promoting the highest glory of God, or the best interest of
his kingdom. If one could, the other must, for the same
reason.
It may be asked, then, why should
infinite wisdom choose the method of atonement, rather than
the execution of the law? The answer is, the atonement,
though it does not of itself promote any object which might
not have been promoted by the execution of the law, yet it
opens a way in which God can introduce other measures, and
accomplish other purposes, which could not have been
introduced and accomplished in case the law had been
executed; and these other measures and purposes promote his
glory and the interest of his kingdom in the highest degree.
If the penalty of the law had been executed upon all
transgressors, God never could have displayed his justice
and mercy to the degree in which they now appear. The
atonement, however, opens the way in which God makes this
display in the highest perfection.
It is by means of atonement that God
has opportunity of displaying his justice in the highest
degree. If the penalty of the law had been executed on all
transgressors, it is true the justice of God would have
appeared in some degree. It would have appeared in as great
a degree as that state of things would have required. But it
would not have appeared to that degree which the present
state of things, under the gospel, requires. For, in order
that the glory of divine justice may fully appear, it is
necessary that the evil nature of sin should fully appear.
But this never could have appeared to the extent that it now
does, if atonement had not been made. Indeed, by the
atonement, sinners are brought into a new situation in
relation to their God, in which their sins become vastly
more aggravated than was possible before. If no atonement
had been made, the guilt of sinners would have been
incomparably less than it now is. Sin now appears to possess
a degree of malignity which never could have appeared if
Christ had not come into the world as a Saviour. Hence he
declared, "If I had not come and spoken unto them they had
not had sin, but now they have no cloak for their sin:" We
are not to understand by this declaration of our Saviour
that he meant that mankind, strictly speaking, would have
been free from sin if he had not come. We are rather to
understand that the sins of those who reject him are much
greater, in consequence of this rejection; indeed, that they
are incomparably greater. If he had not come, the sins of
mankind, in comparison with what they now are, would have
been as nothing. Yet, in order that the justice of God in
the punishment of sinners may appear in the highest degree,
it is necessary that the evil nature of sin, in its full
extent, should appear.
Antecedently to all consideration of
atonement, mankind, as sinners, actually deserved endless
punishment. If no Saviour had appeared, and no offer of
pardon been made, God would have been just in the infliction
of this punishment. No doubt holy angels, who beheld, would
have glorified his justice. In this case, however, the depth
of human depravity, and the extent of the malignity of sin,
could not have appeared. It could not have been seen that
sin was so exceedingly malignant, and mankind so exceedingly
full of it, as to be ready to reject a Saviour and his
salvation when freely offered. If any one, except the
Supreme Being himself, had informed angels that mankind had
become so exceedingly depraved that even if a Saviour should
be provided and salvation should be freely offered, on the
most reasonable condition, they would all make light of it,
and ungratefully reject the offer, it is probable angels
would have doubted whether such wickedness were possible. If
mankind, antecedently to the revelation of God's purposes of
mercy, had been so informed, probably they, too, would have
rejected the idea, and with indignation. All this, however,
is true, and must be seen, before the justice of God, in his
opposition to sin, can fully appear. But this is what could
never have been seen, if the penalty of the law, without
atonement, had been inflicted. Neither could it have been
seen, if, when atonement was made, God had given faith to
every sinner. Because, in that case, it never could have
appeared that the wickedness of mankind was so great, that,
if left to their own choice, they, would forever reject a
bleeding Saviour. Yet all this must appear, in order that
the justice of God, in his opposition to this wickedness,
may fully be seen. And if the nature of sin is really so bad
that a sinner, left to himself, will continue his opposition
to divine, grace, during eternity, then this must be
manifested, in order that the justice of God, in punishing
such wickedness, may fully appear.
Divine grace, also, must forever
appear great, in proportion to the greatness of the
wickedness that is pardoned. If, then, God would display the
full extent of the riches of his grace, to the view of
intelligent beings, he must so order his providence
respecting sinners, as to make a clear manifestation of the
evil nature of sin, even though it. should be at the expense
of leaving some to their own perverse and wicked choice, to
be forever living examples of what all sinners must have
been, had not divine grace plucked them as brands from the
burning.
Thus it is evident that the glory of
God may require that the extent of his justice, and the
riches of his grace, be forever manifested, by leaving some
sinners to their own chosen way, in perpetual unbelief; that
he may, as saith the apostle, "show his wrath and make his
power known on vessels of wrath fitted to destruction." Nor
is it difficult to see how the universe of holy beings may
be constantly benefitted by such a display. Certainly, all
holy beings must always be interested in every display of
the justice and grace of God. Even when the smoke of the
torment of the damned ascendeth up forever and ever,
inspiration assures us that they cry "Alleluia." Especially
will redeemed sinners feel a deep interest in these
displays. Our Saviour has plainly taught us, that he to whom
much is forgiven, will love much.
If, then, the happiness of saints in
heaven will principally consist in loving God, for his rich
grace in their salvation, they will certainly be much
interested in every display which is made of the depth of
wickedness from which they have been delivered, and the
awful but just punishment from which they have been saved.
But this is what they never could have clearly seen, if
divine grace had brought every sinner to embrace the Saviour
by faith, as soon as his atonement had been announced. We
have no reason to doubt, therefore, that divine justice,
notwithstanding full atonement, does actually require that
unbelieving sinners should be finally punished, according to
the full demerit of their sins.
By their unbelief, they not only make
a much greater manifestation of the evil. nature of sin, but
they also become much more guilty. Their sins are much more
heinous. They really deserve a much greater punishment for
rejecting the blood of Christ, than they ever could have
deserved if atonement had not been made. If, then, the
divine law should take its course on them now, since they
have go much enhanced their guilt by neglecting a Saviour,
surely its demands must be much more awful than they ever
could have been, if no Saviour had bled. Had the original
penalty been executed and no salvation their sin, and
consequently their desert of punishment, would have been
nothing in comparison with what they now are.
What, then, if the sufferings of
Christ do answer all the valuable purposes which the
execution of the law would have answered, provided no
atonement had been made? Does this prove that the execution
of the law can answer no valuable purpose now, when, in
fact, the guilt of sinners is actually increased to an
incomparable degree, by their sinning against the atonement?
If a delinquent debtor, at a time when his debt amounted
only to a hundred pence, was offered a free discharge of it,
provided he would perform a certain condition, would this
entitle him to a discharge afterwards when instead of
performing the required condition, he had increased his
original debt to ten thousand talents? Vain is every hope of
eternal life which is not founded in the blood of Christ,
and authorized by a living faith!
For, as has been abundantly shown,
the same obstacles which stood in the way of God's pardoning
sinners without an atonement, stand equally in the way of
his pardoning those who do not receive Christ by faith, as
their Redeemer and Saviour. God cannot be just and the
justifier of any who do not believe in Jesus. If, then, the
general good required that none should be pardoned without
an atonement, it must still require, notwithstanding the
atonement, that none be pardoned except they believe.
Withholding pardon from unbelievers, therefore, is so far
from being inconsistent with full atonement for all mankind,
that it is required by it. Both are on the same ground
equally necessary.
Benevolus, in the atonement made for
his wife, is supposed to have been actuated by a regard for
the public good; a desire to support the authority of the
law, and the interest of the community. If, having suffered,
he had communicated a knowledge of the fact to her, and she
had wholly disapproved of the substitution, and clearly
manifested her determination to continue in the practice of
the same wickedness for which she had been condemned, could
be consistently with his regard to the good of the
community, the very motive from which he consented to
suffer, even desire her pardon? If he should in this case
insist on her being pardoned, would he not contradict all
the evidence which he had before given of being actuated by
a regard to the laws and interests of the
community?
If the son of Zaleucus had
disapproved of his father's expiation, called it folly, and
openly avowed his determination of persisting in his crime,
it is evident the good king could not have pardoned him. The
atonement he had made was indeed ample, but his son's wicked
opposition and contempt presented a new obstacle in the way
of his being pardoned. The father had made an exhibition of
high respect for his law. If, therefore, the son had
remained in open and manifest opposition to this law, the
father could not have justified him, without justifying
opposition to the very law which himself had suffered to
support. If he should now justify his son in this
opposition, he would completely counteract all the effect of
the atonement which he had made. He would appear very
inconsistent destroying, at one time, what he had done, at
great expense at another. His subjects would have no
evidence that he was determined to support the authority of
his law. The immorality which it prohibited would not be
prevented. The laws and authority of his government would
fall into contempt, and his kingdom would be
ruined.
Delusive, indeed, are all the
expectations and hopes of the wicked, which are built merely
on the universality of the atonement; or, on the ground that
Christ has tasted death for every man; while the very nature
of the atonement is such, that God cannot be just, and the
justifier of any who do not believe in Jesus; while the very
blood which was shed "for every man," reiterates, the awful
declaration of Christ, He that believeth not shall be
damned."
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