THE ATONEMENT
IN ITS
RELATIONS TO GOD AND MAN
By
The Rev. NATHAN S. S. BEMAN, D.
D THE NATURE OF THE
ATONEMENT: CONTINUED FEW things have a more deep and
extensive influence on our religious opinions than the ideas
we entertain respecting the atonement made by Jesus Christ.
Having first of all endeavored to establish the necessity of
a propitiation for sin, the attention of the reader was then
directed to the fact that the Bible expressly reveals this
doctrine; and in the preceding chapter the investigation of
its nature was commenced. Two opinions, in relation to this
branch of the subject, and which differ materially from each
other, were there mentioned as having a special claim on our
serious consideration. One opinion represents the Lord Jesus
Christ as the legal substitute of the elect-as having
suffered, in this character, the exact penalty of the law in
their stead-and as having released them, on the principles
of formal and strict justice, from that curse which was
pronounced upon them as transgressors. This representation
of the nature of the atonement has been shown to be
inadmissible, on the following grounds. Such a satisfaction as is here
defined would imply an exchange or transfer of moral
character between Christ and those for whom he died. Christ
could not be punished, on legal principles, till he was
guilty in the eye of the law-and his people could not be
justified by the principles of the law, till its penalty was
literally inflicted. This transfer of character so as to
render Jesus Christ the sinner, and the soul for whom he
died, innocent, appears to us without foundation in reason
or scripture. The same system would destroy all mercy in God
the Father, in the salvation of sinners, because it
represents God as totally disinclined to the exercise of
compassion, till every jot and tittle of the legal curse was
inflicted. On the same principle grace or pardon in the
release of the sinner from future punishment, would be out
of the question-for what grace, or pardon, or favor, can
there be in the discharge of a debtor whose demand has been
cancelled to the "uttermost farthing?" And as to the
benevolence of the gospel, it is impossible to discover how
such a feature can consist with that idea of the atonement
which represent Christ as having suffered the same quantity
of penal evil which would have been embraced in the future
condemnation of all those who will be redeemed by his
sacrifice. What wisdom or benevolence can there be in a plan
or expedient which shall inflict a certain degree of
suffering upon the innocent who could never deserve it, in
order to spare the guilty from precisely the same degree of
suffering, and to which, too, their sins had justly exposed
them? Thus far has the inquiry respecting the nature of the
atonement been already prosecuted. The other view of this
doctrine which has been stated, and which will now come
under consideration, represents the Lord Jesus Christ as
suffering, not the literal penalty of the law, but that
which will fully vindicate the divine character and support
the divine government, while God, at the same time, offers
pardon and eternal life to the sinner, and actually secures
these blessings to everyone who complies with the terms and
conditions on which they are offered. This, it is
apprehended can easily be shown to be the only rational idea
of the atonement, and the one too which corresponds with the
representations of this subject as presented in the Holy
Scriptures. This subject is discussed in his
usual masterly manner by the apostle Paul, in the third
chapter of his Epistle to the Romans. In the introduction to
this consecutive and logical treatise, he gives us a
graphical description of the deplorable state of mankind as
rebels against God; and after declaring unequivocally the
impossibility of justification by the deeds of the law, he
adverts to that plan of restoration which is revealed in the
gospel. This plan was contrived for sinners. Justification
is by grace, and yet this grace is expressed through an
atonement. "Being justified freely by his grace, through the
redemption which is in Jesus Christ." Whatever this price of
redemption offered by Jesus Christ is, it certainly does not
so answer the penal demands of the law, as to discharge the
sinner, or to admit of his restoration to the favor of God
on any other principle than that of grace alone. This
"propitiation" God hath set forth, or exhibited to the
universe, to declare his righteousness "that he might be
just, and the justifier of him who believeth in Jesus." The
object of the atonement is here stated in explicit terms. It
was required and made in order to open a consistent way for
the publication of pardon, or for the exercise of grace to
sinners. Its purpose was to declare the "righteousness" or
moral rectitude and perfection of God in dispensing, in this
instance, with the literal execution of the penalty of the
law, and ill bestowing eternal life upon those who deserved
to die. This satisfaction was required, that God might be
"just"--just to himself as the moral governor, and just or
faithful to the interests of the universe over which he
presides, even in justifying and saving the believing
sinner. But a more clear and satisfactory
illustration of this idea of the atonement, will be
attempted in answer to the following inquiries. What were
the feelings of God toward our fallen world, without respect
to a propitiation? Why was not pardon absolute, without any
connection with a sacrifice for sin? And how did the
atonement made by Christ, prepare the way for the exercise
of mercy to sinners? What were the feelings of God toward
our fallen world, without respect to a propitiation for sin?
The representation which has often been made of the divine
character, as connected with the moral law and the doctrine
of the atonement, we have often thought highly derogatory to
the Godhead. The eternal Father is exhibited before us, as a
being of unbending justice, and as determined, at all
events, to maintain the honor of the law by inflicting the
last particle of penal evil which it has denounced against
the sinner. The mercy exhibited in the gospel, is considered
an attribute or feeling altogether superinduced by the
propitiatory sacrifice which was offered by Jesus Christ.
When all the suffering which was included in the penalty of
the law, had been endured by a substitute, then and not till
then, is the compassion of God excited for perishing
sinners. This description poorly corresponds with that
character of God which is delineated in the Bible. All his
attributes are independent of time and circumstance. The
scriptures teach us, that God was inclined to mercy, in his
treatment of our apostate world, irrespective of any
atonement or satisfaction whatever. So far from being the
effect or consequence, mercy is the exciting and efficient
cause of that propitiation which was made in the person of
Jesus Christ. "For God so LOVED THE WORLD, that he gave his
only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him, should
not perish, but have everlasting life." God was not only inclined to exhibit
the attribute of mercy, in our world, but he positively and
irreversibly determined, in his own infinite mind, to unfold
this perfection here below, and to rescue multitudes of our
race from the curse of that law which they had violated.
This feeling of compassion, in Jehovah, was infinitely
strong; this determination to save sinners, was settled and
eternal. It is the deliberate purpose of God to set aside
the penalty of the law, at least, so far as it respects the
salvation of many sinners in our world. Mercy is to be
displayed and glorified in the salvation of men; and the
grand question now is, not what shall be done to excite the
compassion of God for a ruined world, but in what way shall
that eternal love which is in active operation, be
expressed, so as to shield the sinner from the curse of the
law, on the one hand, and to secure the divine honor and
integrity, on the other? But this leads us to the second
inquiry proposed: why was not pardon absolute, without any
connection with, a sacrifice for sin? Finite minds should
speak, and even think, with reverence and caution of the
processes of the infinite mind; hence it would be bold and
presumptuous for man to undertake to determine and explain
all the reasons which may have influenced the counsels of
God in requiring the atonement. 'As the heavens are higher
than the earth, so are his ways higher than our ways, and
his thoughts than our thoughts.' Some of these reasons,
however, lie within the reach of the human powers, and
others have been made the theme of special revelation; and
they have been glanced at in the chapter on the necessity of
a propitiation for sin. Without traversing again the field
then trodden, a few considerations may here be suggested in
answer to the inquiry stated above. The spirit of the
inquiry is this. If sinners are to be saved by grace, and by
grace alone, why was not pardon or forgiveness directly and
absolutely bestowed upon them, without the intervention or
sufferings of a mediator? To the humble christian we might
reply, that this was not the plan of salvation adopted by
infinite wisdom-and this reply to such an one, would be
deemed sufficient. The Bible has so informed us. If any,
however, are still disposed to push the inquiry, why pardon
could not have been extended to the sinner without an
atonement, the reply is, that there was the same necessity
for an atonement that there originally was for the penalty
of the moral law; the same reason there is, that this
penalty should be executed upon the transgressor. The penalty of the moral law was
intended to operate as a powerful motive to obedience; and
the execution of this penalty, whenever it takes place in
the universe, becomes an awful warning to deter others from
transgression. Now if the penalty of the law were never to
be executed, its whole moral power or authority would be
annihilated. It would become more feeble and inefficient,
than if no threatening had ever been annexed. If the order
and happiness of the universe, under the moral government of
God, require laws with suitable penal sanctions, and
require, too, that these laws be executed; then it would
seem, that, whenever pardon is to take the place of the
penalty of the law, a substitute for the execution of the
threatened curse, would be proper, in order to preserve the
divine authority from aspersion, and to guard the throne of
heaven from encroachment. Should it still be urged, that
human governments frequently grant absolute pardons, or
exempt the criminal from the legal penalty without any
reference to a propitiation, the answer is, that from the
imperfection of human governments, this may sometimes be the
best thing which can be done; but every interference with
the direct operation of the law, weakens its authority, and
gives countenance to crime. It is a well known fact, that in
every country, offenses abound in direct proportion to the
difficulty of conviction, and the facility of pardon. In the
moral government of God, which is the only perfect
government in the universe, the penalty of the law is always
equally important and necessary; and in case this penalty is
to be set aside and not executed, in any particular
instance, there is the same necessity that the moral
governor should furnish a public substitute for the
infliction of the curse, as there was that the law should
originally include a penal sanction. The conclusion from
this mode of reasoning would be, that in the government of
God, pardon could never be granted except through the
intervention of an adequate atonement; that is, the penalty
of the moral law could never be set aside without the
adoption of those precautionary measures which would secure
the order and prosperity of the universe, as effectually, to
say the least, as the infliction of the penal curse itself
could do. Under this government, then, we may always expect
the infliction of the penalty according to its original and
literal intention, or an adequate atonement, as a
succedaneum or substitute. But how did the atonement made by
Jesus Christ, prepare the way for the exercise of mercy to
sinners? That the object of the atonement was,
not to pay our debt, or to obliterate our guilt, but to
prepare the way for a free pardon, and a gracious acceptance
with God, appears from the whole drift of the Apostle's
reasoning, in the paragraph to which reference has already
been made in this chapter. Sinners are represented as being
justified freely by grace, and yet this is effected through
the redemption that is in Jesus Christ. God required an
atonement, that he might declare his "righteousness" or the
moral propriety of his administration, in saving sinners
"that he might be just, and the justifier of him which
believeth in Jesus" in other words, that God might be both
just and merciful. This is the proper place to inquire
in what sense the justice of God was satisfied by the
atonement made by Jesus Christ. That very incorrect ideas
are not infrequently attached to this expression, ideas
entirely different from those intended to be conveyed by the
Apostle in the passage referred to, and in which he
represents the atonement as a declaration of "the
righteousness of God, that he might be just, and the
justifier of him that believeth in Jesus," there can be but
little doubt. The term justice, it should be remembered; is
used in different senses. Its legal acceptation, or its use
as connected with the operation of law, is twofold, which
critical writers have distinguished by the epithets of
commutative and distributive. Commutative justice, which may
with equal propriety be styled pecuniary or commercial
justice, is wholly confined to the regulation of property
and the payment of debts. It is hardly necessary to say,
that this kind of justice can have nothing to do with a
violation of the moral law, or with that atonement which has
been made for sinners by Jesus Christ. And yet, plain as the
case is, many have been misled and bewildered by placing a
literal construction upon the figurative language of the
scriptures in relation to this transaction. The august
business which involved the honor of the divine government,
the death of the Son of God and the redemption of immortal
man, is degraded to the level of a pecuniary transaction, is
brought down to a mere matter of debt and credit. The
declaration ought to be repeated, and the truth contained in
it never forgotten, that commutative justice has nothing to
do with the affair. It is not a pecuniary or commercial
transaction. If the blood of Christ, or the atonement, is
the price of our redemption, it must be so in this sense,
that it furnishes a consistent ground for our free pardon
and gracious acceptance. It is the condition or
consideration which rendered the salvation of sinners
practicable; and in this sense, it may with propriety be
called the price of pardon,-the price of redemption, the
price of heaven. Distributive justice respects the
moral character and conduct of creatures individually
considered, and consists in rewarding, or punishing them
severally according to their merit or demerit. Now this kind
of justice has a connection with the subject of the
atonement, or in other words, the atonement is a transaction
which has intimate and vital relations with moral character
and conduct. Many of the difficulties attending this
subject, may, no doubt, be settled at once if we can
determine the question whether distributive justice was or
was not, satisfied by the death of Christ. Many contend,
that this is the fact. Man had broken the law of God-Christ
became his substitute-stood in his place-and was punished to
the full extent of the penalty of the law. In consequence of
this vicarious sacrifice, man is acquitted by the law,
because justice is satisfied, and there is no further penal
demand against him. This is the representation sometimes,
and not infrequently, given of the atonement. But can this
statement of the affair be defended on the principles of
distributive justice?--Certainly not. In the transaction
under consideration, neither Christ nor the sinner is
treated according to his character, or according to the
terms or principles of the moral law. Christ had perfectly
and uniformly obeyed the law, and by this law he must be
justified, and not condemned and punished. On the other
hand, the sinner had violated the moral law, and this law
could never acquit him. The death of Christ, in itself
considered, had no influence upon the moral character of the
sinner. He may, by the grace of God, be rescued and saved
through this death, but in the eye of the law he is still a
sinner and deserves to be punished. The law knows nothing of
punishing the innocent and acquitting the guilty. The
principles of distributive justice sternly forbid it. The
idea of such a substitution and imputation, as would render
Christ guilty and the sinner holy, has been considered on a
former occasion-and may with safety be pronounced unworthy
of a place in a system of enlightened theology. The
conclusion then is, that distributive justice, or justice in
its common and appropriate sense, in relation to rewards and
punishments, was not satisfied by the atonement made by
Jesus Christ. The moral law, when violated, has but one
demand, and that demand is the death of the transgressor.
But in the gospel, of which the atonement is an essential
part, the principles of distributive justice are overruled
or set aside. The innocent and meritorious suffers, and the
guilty is screened from punishment. This is a sovereign act
of God as the moral governor. Should it be again asked-if
the arm of distributive justice can be arrested, and is to
be arrested, and the law that threatened, in this instance,
is not to inflict the curse, why was not this sovereign and
special interposition so managed as not to involve the
sufferings and death of Jesus Christ? We must here recur to
the doctrine which has been already stated and defended,
that the penalty of the law is essential to the existence
and happiness of a moral government; and the only method in
which the execution of this penalty can be suspended, is to
furnish an adequate and practical, and public substitute in
its place. The ends or objects of distributive justice must
be secured. And this substitute by which these ends or
objects are effectually accomplished, is to be found in that
atonement which is revealed in the gospel. But there is a third sense in which
the term justice is frequently used, and the consideration
of which will lead us directly to the nature of that
satisfaction which Jesus Christ has made for sinners; we
mean what is commonly denominated general or public justice.
In order to distinguish it both from pecuniary and legal
justice, it has been called moral justice. In this
acceptation, it has no direct reference to law, but,
embraces those principles of virtue or benevolence by which
we are bound to govern our conduct; and by which God himself
governs the universe. It is in this sense that the terms
[_______] "just" and [__________]
"righteousness," occur in the passage cited from Paul to the
Romans. These terms are precisely of the same import except
one is a substantive and the other an adjective; and in this
connection they stand directly related to the atonement. The
apostle teaches us, that God required a propitiation for
sin, that he might declare his righteousness or justice;
that he might be righteous or just, and "the justifier of
him who believeth in Jesus," Now we conceive, that this
passage, thus explained, throws much light upon the nature
of that satisfaction which Christ has rendered to the
justice of God. This atonement was required, that God might
be "just," or righteous, that is, that he might do the thing
which was fit and proper, and best and most expedient to be
done; and, at the same time, be perfectly at liberty to
justify, "him which believeth in Jesus." Thus the legal
obstacle to man's salvation was removed by the sacrifice of
Christ. The whole doctrine of the atonement, so far at least
as its nature is concerned, can now be placed before the
reader in a few words. Commutative justice was not satisfied
by the atonement, because the whole transaction was of a
moral and not of a commercial character. Distributive
justice was not satisfied by this transaction, because the
innocent suffered, in order to open a way for the pardon of
the guilty. The penalty of the law, strictly speaking, was
not inflicted at all; for this penalty in which was embodied
the principles of distributive justice, required the death
of the sinner, and did not require the death of Christ. As a
substitute for the infliction of this penalty, God did
accept of the sufferings of his Son. The relation of the
sinner to the curse which this law pronounces against the
transgressor, is legally-not evangelically-just the same
which it was without an atonement. He is the same guilty
creature that he was before satisfaction was made. The law
has the same demand upon him, and utters the same
denunciation of wrath against him. The law, or justice, that
is distributive justice, as expressed in the law, has
received no satisfaction at all. The whole legal system has
been suspended, at least, for the present, in order to make
way for the operation of one of a different character. In
introducing this system of mercy, which involves a
suspension of the penal curse, God has required a
satisfaction to the principles of general or public
justice--a satisfaction which will effectually secure all
the good to the universe which is intended to be
accomplished by the penalty of the law when inflicted, and,
at the same time, prevent all that practical mischief which
would result from arresting the hand of punitive justice
without the intervention of atonement. God can now be "just"
that is, he can secure his own honour as the lawgiver, and
promote the best interests of his universal empire, and, at
the same time, stay the curse of the violated law, and
extend pardon to the chief of sinners. This was the great
desideratum order to bring consolation and hope to a dying
world. This could not have been done without the atonement
of Christ; for" without shedding of blood is no remission."
These views of the atonement are clearly stated and ably
defended by the Rev. Dr. Dwight, in the Sixty Fourth Sermon
in his System of Theology. "Christ in his sufferings and
death made a complete atonement for the sins of mankind. In
other words he rendered to the law, character, and
government, of God, such peculiar honor, as to make it
consistent with their unchangeable nature and glory, that
sinners should, on the proper conditions, be FORGIVEN. But
the atonement inferred no obligation of justice, on the part
of God to forgive them. They were still sinners, after the
atonement, in the same sense, and in the same degree, as
before. In no degree were they less guilty, or less
deserving of punishment. "The supposition, incautiously
admitted by some divines, that Christ satisfied the demands
of the law by his active and passive obedience, in the same
manner as the payment of a debt satisfies the demands of a
creditor, has, if I mistake not, been heretofore proved to
be unfounded in the scriptures. We owed God our obedience,
and not our property; and obedience in its own nature is due
from the subject himself, and call never be rendered by
another. In refusing to render it we are criminal; and for
this criminality merit punishment. The guilt, thus incurred,
is inherent in the criminal himself, and cannot in the
nature of things be transferred to another. All that, in
this case, can be done by a substitute, of whatever
character, is to render it not improper for the lawgiver to
pardon the transgressor. No substitute can, by any possible
effort, make him cease to be guilty, or to deserve
punishment. This (and I intend to say it with becoming
reverence) is beyond the ability of Omnipotence itself. The
fact, that he is guilty, is past; and can never be
recalled. "Thus it is evident, that the sinner,
when he comes before God, comes in the character of a sinner
only; and must, if strict justice be done, be therefore
condemned. If he escape condemnation, then, he can derive
these blessings from mere mercy only, and in no degree from
justice. In other words, every blessing which he receives,
is a free gift. The pardon of his sins, his acquittal from
condemnation, and his admission to the enjoyments of heaven,
are all given to him freely, and graciously, because God
regards him with infinite compassion, and is therefore
pleased to communicate to him these unspeakable
favours." If the views which we have stated of
the nature of the atonement be correct, then the demands of
the law upon the sinner, remain unimpaired and undiminished.
This declaration is true, as it respects both the precept
and the penalty. And yet there is a strong tendency in
almost every human heart, to feel a kind of security from
the mere consideration that Christ has died for sinners. The
fact, that he expired upon the cross in order to open the
door of mercy to a ruined world, ought, no doubt, to be the
cause of ardent and eternal gratitude. It should fill the
earth, as well as heaven with rapturous songs. But on this
fact the unbeliever, continuing such, has no right to build
his hope. As we are liable to receive incorrect impressions
of the atonement, and to derive from it a security which it
was never intended in itself to inspire--let us examine, for
a moment, the condition of man notwithstanding the sacrifice
offered by Jesus Christ upon Calvary! What is there in this
sacrifice which has impaired the demands of the law upon the
sinner or changed his, heart? Whether we consider the
obedience of Christ to the perceptive requirement, or his
death as a substitute for its penalty, we can find nothing
which repeals the original injunction, "Thou shalt love the
Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbour as
thyself." Now this precept stands, and will forever stand,
just as it would if no atonement had ever been
made. But we are still more liable to
ascribe to the atonement an influence over the penalty of
the law which it never possessed, and which, in accordance
with the principles of moral government, it never could
possess. There is a secret and perpetual recurrence to the
idea that Christ has paid the demand, or suffered the
penalty of the law, so that its claims are now quieted and
the sentence of condemnation repealed. But this is a
fundamental, and may prove a fatal error. There is nothing
in the character of Christ's sufferings which can affect or
modify the penalty of the law. These sufferings were not
legal. They constituted no part of that curse which was
threatened against the transgressor; neither do they insure,
in a single instance, aside from the stipulations of the
covenant of redemption, the repeal of that curse as it
respects the sinner. His moral character while he continues
in impenitence and unbelief, is just what it would have
been, if no atonement had ever been made. He is just as much
the slave of sin and the heir of death now, as he would have
been, if Christ had never expired. All that the atonement
has effected for the sinner, is to place him within the
reach of pardon, to make it consistent with the perfections
of God to have mercy on whom he will have mercy. But the
unbeliever, continuing such, must perish. Even the blood of
Christ cannot save him while under the damning sin of
unbelief, rejecting that blood! The sentiments advanced and
supported in the preceding discourse, will enable us
likewise, to reconcile full atonement with free
grace. The opposers of the doctrine of the
atonement, have often objected to what they consider a
palpable absurdity in that system which teaches, that God
first required an ample satisfaction for sin, and then
claims the honor of bestowing a free and unmerited pardon on
the penitent and believing transgressor. They say, that this
doctrine represents God as executing the whole penalty of
the law upon a substitute, till justice is satisfied,--till
the law has no farther demands, and that he then takes to
himself the credit of releasing those from punishment, on
the principles of grace, whom the law could not, in these
circumstances, justly condemn. On this point hear Dr.
Priestley, the great champion of Socinianism. The following
is his objection to the doctrine of the atonement. "We read
in the scriptures, that we are justified freely by the grace
of God. But what free grace, or mercy, does there appear to
have been in God, if Christ gave a full price for our
justification, and bore the infinite weight of divine wrath
on our account? We are commanded to forgive others, as we
ourselves hope to be forgiven; and to be merciful as our
Father, who is in heaven, is merciful. But surely we are not
thereby authorized to insist upon any atonement or
satisfaction, before we give up our resentments towards an
offending penitent brother. Indeed, how could it deserve the
name of forgiveness if we did? It is impossible to reconcile
the doctrine of satisfaction for sin by the death of Christ,
with the doctrine of free grace, which, according to the
universal tenor of the scriptures, is so fully displayed in
the pardon of sin, and the justification of sinners. It is
only from the literal interpretation of a few figurative
expressions in the scriptures, that this doctrine of
atonement, as well as that of transubstantiation, has been
derived; and it is certainly a doctrine highly injurious to
God; and if we who are commanded to imitate God, should act
upon the maxims of it, it would be subversive of the most
amiable part of virtue in men. We should be implacable and
unmerciful, insisting upon the uttermost
farthing." Thus far the Doctor. How learned and
how blind! It needs but little discernment to see, that the
objections here urged, have no application to the doctrine
of the atonement as it has been stated and defended in this
treatise. They fail of their mark, and utterly fall to the
ground. They apply exclusively to that system which
represents the atonement under the literal notion of
repairing damages or paying a debt; and this view of the
subject is utterly disclaimed in this work. If the legal
demand against the sinner was literally and fully cancelled
by Christ, it is frankly conceded, that there would be no
grace in his subsequent justification. Forgiveness could
have no place in the gospel system. But if we consider the atonement as
required by the moral governor, not for the purpose of
taking away the demerit of sin, but for the purpose of
rendering the pardon of sin admissible; if we look upon this
great transaction as intended, not to incline God to the
feelings or exercise of mercy, but as intended to save his
authority and government from prostration, and his
compassion from becoming a real curse to the universe; if we
consider the blood of Christ, not as extinguishing the
sinner's individual debt, but as rendering such a
satisfaction to the general or public justice of God as
would make him "a terror to evil doers" while he forgives
and saves the guilty, then the charge of Dr. Priestley, that
"it is impossible to reconcile the doctrine of satisfaction
for sin by the death of Christ, with the doctrine of free
grace," and his insinuation, that the atonement represents
God as "implacable and unmerciful, insisting upon the
uttermost farthing," is inadmissible, and totally unfounded
in matter of fact! The atonement we hold, is, in every
sense, consistent with free grace. The Doctor's parallel between the
forgiveness of God, and our duty to forgive one another, is
more plausible than solid. His argument, when stripped of
its imposing drapery, is this, we are required to forgive
one another without an atonement, and therefore God must
have forgiven sinners without an atonement. This reasoning
contains, as we shall be able to show, two fundamental
errors. The first error is this there is no
distinction here made between a public and a private
character; between God as the moral governor of the
universe, and man in his individual moral capacity. The
atonement was not required in order to produce a change in
the divine feelings, but it was required in order to remove
difficulties of a public nature which stood in the way of
the sinner's pardon. And a civil governor, or any other man
who sustains public responsibilities, may act in the same
way, and not subject himself to the charge of being
"implacable and unmerciful, and insisting upon the uttermost
farthing." A criminal, for instance, may receive a real
pardon, and yet this pardon may be founded on some
consideration which, in this instance, will sustain the
government in this act of mercy: and aside from this
consideration, clemency might have been a crime rather than
a duty. But the second error is greater than
the first. It consists in confounding the atonement with the
legal punishment which the crime deserved. Such a
satisfaction, and forgiveness could not coexist. But this
point has been thoroughly discussed both in this and the
previous chapter. As to the insinuation, that the
doctrine of the atonement, and of transubstantiation rest
upon the same basis, it more resembles the sneer of the
infidel, than the declaration of a candid christian. There
is a disingenuousness in this remark, which we have rarely
witnessed in any man who was not either grossly ignorant, or
essentially wanting in self-respect. As to,
transubstantiation, it is well known to rest upon the
alleged but falsely literal construction of a single
figurative expression; while the atonement is a web running
through the whole of the Old and the New Testament
scriptures. The whole typical economy of Moses-and every
page of the gospel, point directly to this important
doctrine. So much for the candor of a man who places all
religion in liberality of sentiment! His people too are all
full of charity-for every thing but the truth! Now we cheerfully confess that this
objection would be valid, if the atonement were to be
considered as a satisfaction to commutative justice, or in
the nature of the payment of a debt. In this case to cancel
the demand is to annihilate every thing like grace or favor
in the discharge. The objection, that there would be no
grace in the sinner's release would be equally well founded
if the atonement had rendered full and literal satisfaction
to the claims of distributive justice. If the penalty of the
law was once inflicted, what more could that law demand? It
has but one penalty. If Christ suffered precisely what the
law had threatened against an individual sinner, then it
would be wrong to inflict the same punishment upon that
sinner. And if it would be wrong to punish him, then there
must be an obligation on the part of God to release him;
and, in this case, there could be no grace in his discharge,
or exemption from punishment. Pardon or forgiveness,
supposes that the creature is guilty, and that the law might
justly punish him. But when we consider, that the
atonement includes no such satisfaction as is here
contemplated, the objection will vanish. The atonement paid
no debt, it involved the infliction of no penalty. It was a
substitute for the curse which was due to the sinner; it
merely prepared the way for the proclamation of mercy to
rebels, and the extension of actual pardon to every believer
in Christ Jesus. With this idea of atonement, free
grace is perfectly consistent. If the debt were paid, or the
penalty of the law exhausted, then the sinner's release
could be by law and not by grace. But if the atonement
merely rendered pardon compatible with the glory of God and
the public good--if it did not require, but merely permitted
God to extend forgiveness to sinners--then full atonement
and free grace may go hand in hand. And thus it is
represented in the scriptures. "In whom we have redemption
through his blood, the forgiveness of sins according to the
riches of his grace." The price of redemption was the blood
of Christ; but this merely opened the channels into which
are poured the streams of rich and abundant
mercy. Finally, the view which has been
taken, in this discussion, of the nature of the atonement,
will go very far towards settling the question in regard to
its extent. A full examination of this point, which is here
appended as an inference from the foregoing trains of
thought, will form the subject matter of the succeeding
chapter. But it may not be improper to glance at it, in this
place, as it stands connected with the principles already
established. The whole question respecting limited or
general atonement, is settled by the notions which we
entertain of its intrinsic nature. If the atonement
consisted in Christ's suffering the exact amount of misery
due to all those who will be saved, if it were a transaction
regulated by the principles of commercial justice, then we
might, with propriety, talk of its being limited to the
elect. In this case the sufferings of the mediator must have
been measured out according to the number of individuals who
were to be saved. But if the atonement consists, not in
cancelling the demand for one man or all men, but in opening
the door of hope, in rendering the pardon of sinners
consistent with the character, law and universe of God, then
the question of extent is settled at once. There can be no
limitation in the case; for the same sufferings which would
vindicate the divine character in offering or extending
salvation to one, would equally vindicate the divine
character in offering or extending salvation to
many--leaving, as this system does, the disposal of pardon
and eternal life at the sovereign option of Jehovah. This
does away the common objection against a general provision,
that there is a loss to the universe, if Christ died for
all, and a part only are saved. This objection goes upon the
supposition, that the atonement is the payment of a debt;
and if the debt was paid for all, and a part only shall be
released-then there is a loss of treasure or a sacrifice of
funds. This representation of the case has been already
proved to be mistaken and inadmissible. And thus the system of the gospel
ever where either explicitly or virtually acknowledges the
general character of the atonement. The invitations of the
gospel are to all; the Bible every where testifies, that
there is provision enough and to spare; sinners are blamed
and upbraided for rejecting the atonement; a more aggravated
condemnation is represented as awaiting those who perish
under the gospel, than those who perish under the simple
operation of the law; and unbelief, and not the limitation
of the atonement, is every where in the inspired volume,
declared to be the cause why sinners die. What an amazing
responsibility does the gospel of Jesus Christ impose? If
the despisers of law die without mercy, there will surely be
no excuse for the despisers and rejecters of proffered
grace! Here are claims which make new and thrilling appeals,
claims which fasten directly upon the heart and conscience,
claims ratified and sealed in blood, and these claims ought
to be pressed by every herald of the cross, and felt by
every dying man. To preach more, and more copiously, on the
offers of the gospel, is a desideratum in the protection and
improvement of the christian ministry. To understand them in
their nature and relations, to elucidate them to men, to
show the condescension and sincerity of God in them and the
necessity of accepting them, were this more largely and
competently done in the official ministrations of the church
of God, how great the good that might be expected in the
salvation of men!